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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Literature Review
Auctions are an important market mechanism for determining prices and allocating
goods in many markets. Every day, many kinds of foods and owers are sold via auc-
tions. Governments, as buyer of public goods, often choose suppliers using procurement
auctions. The percentages of governments' expenditures for procurement auctions can-
not be ignored in the gross domestic product (GDP). Some web search engine companies
such as Google and Yahoo! have some advertising spaces on their own web pages and
determine the locations of individual advertisements through auctions. Such an auction
is called an internet advertisement auction, which is an important revenue source for
web search engine companies. Clearly, auctions play an essential role in our economy.
Furthermore, auctions became familiar as a place where we actually participate through
the emergence of online auction markets (e.g., eBay and Yahoo!). In the online auction
market, many people can become buyers or sellers and trade items easily.
It is natural that economists should take an interest in an important and universal
market mechanism such as auctions. In addition to the importance of auctions from a
practical perspective, there are several reasons auctions have been a fruitful research eld
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for economists. In theoretical literature, economists often focus on how equilibrium prices
are determined. While we cannot observe the process of equilibrium price determination
in the general market, we can recognize the specic price determination process by
observing competitive bids in auctions. Therefore, auction oer an attractive market
arena in order to study the equilibrium price determination process. In particular, in
the general equilibrium model, the ctional Walrasian auctioneer plays an essential role
in the ta^tonnement process, which is one of the most famous model that explains how
equilibrium prices are determined.
From a game-theoretic perspective, auction theory is one of the most successful appli-
cations of incomplete information games. The second-price, sealed-bid auction demon-
strated in Vickrey (1961) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction in general are typ-
ical examples of a strategy-proof mechanism that plays an essential role in the theory of
mechanism design. Such studies are useful for designing the institutions of auctions in
the real world.
From the empirical perspective, auction models are also an attractive research eld
for econometricians. Hendricks and Porter (2007) emphasized that auction data sets are
often better than typical data sets in industrial organization. They describe two reasons
why the quality of auction data is often relatively high as follows. First, the auction game
is relatively simple, with well-specied rules. Second, the actions of the participants are
observed directly, and payos can sometimes be inferred. In addition to the availability
of high-quality data, there are several reasons auctions have been attractive to many
empirical researchers: the structural econometrics, the Bayesian econometrics, and the
nonparametric (or semiparametric) econometrics. These three econometric methodolo-
gies have succeeded in contributing to the econometrics of auction data. Below, we briey
review these three econometric methodologies in the literature of empirical auctions.
2
1.1.1 Structural Econometrics
Structural estimation is an econometric model based on the economic theory. In particu-
lar, in the structural econometrics of auction data, the econometric models are described
by auction theory. In auction theory, economists consider the auction as a game, and
often compute the equilibrium bidding strategy from each bidder's private type. In the
literature of the structural econometrics of auction data, econometricians regard the
auction theory model as the data generating process and interpret the observable auc-
tion data, such as bids, as the result of equilibrium behavior.1 In most studies of the
structural econometrics of auction data, by observing the equilibrium bids, we estimate
the structural parameters, such as bidders' private types.
Paarsch (1992) is a seminal paper in this literature. After his pioneering work, struc-
tural econometrics has joined the mainstream of empirical auction literature. There are
several reasons why many important studies that contribute to the empirical research of
auctions adopt the methodology of structural estimation. First, the equilibrium transac-
tion prices in auctions are considered to depend on both the valuation of goods and the
magnitude of competition. Usually, both factors that help determine auction prices are
not observable individually. Therefore, we cannot estimate the individual eects in the
usual manner. However, auction theory tells econometricians the complex relationship
between the valuation of goods and the magnitude of competition. Therefore, applying
structural estimation enables econometricians to estimate both factors individually.
Second, since the bidder's decision is modeled explicitly in structural econometrics,
we can conduct counterfactual simulations easily using estimated structural parameters.
For example, we could simulate how the distribution of the transaction price changes
if an auctioneer changes the auction format from English auction to Dutch auction.
1There are several exceptions. For example, Haile and Tamer (2003) made two assumptions that are
weaker than the usual assumptions to derive the dominant strategy equilibrium, and they estimated the
parameters in accordance with their assumptions. Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) dropped the Nash
equilibrium assumption and used rationalizability as the basis for strategic play. Under their assumption,
they studied identication in rst-price auctions within the independent private values paradigm (IPVP).
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Paarsch and Hong (2006), Athey and Haile (2007), and Hendricks and Porter (2007)
provide excellent surveys of this literature.
We briey review the methodology of structural estimation using the example of
second-price, sealed-bid auctions within the independent private values paradigm (IPVP).
Note that Chapter 2 is an application of the structural estimation of second-price, sealed-
bid auction within the IPVP.
Consider that in a second-price, sealed-bid auction, each bidder submits a bid si-
multaneously. The bidder who bids the highest bid among participants wins the object.
However, the price that the winner pays is not her own bid, but is equal to the second-
highest bid among participants. There are N potential bidders with risk-neutral prefer-
ences indexed by i = 1; :::; N . Each bidder's willingness to pay is denoted by Vi, which is
an independent and identically distributed random variable from the distribution, F ().
The realization of bidder i's willingness to pay, vi, is her own private information, and
she does not know others'. However, the distribution of Vi, F (), is common knowledge
to all participants. Under these assumptions, the equilibrium bid of bidder i with a
willingness to pay, Vi = vi, is denoted by bi = vi. In other words, it is a dominant
strategy for the bidder to tell her true willingness to pay.
Note that although the distribution of valuation, F (), is common knowledge among
participants, F () is unknown for econometricians; our purpose is to identify and estimate
F () from the observed bids. Econometricians accept these results of auction theory.
We assume that observed bids are equal to their valuations for items in this example.
Furthermore, the econometric model inherits all of the settings of auction theory. Under
these settings, we can estimate the distribution of valuation, F (), from the observed
bids. Observe T , independent and identical auctions of an identical item, with the
identical number of bidders, N , indexed by tf1; :::; Tg. Let Bit be bidder i's bid at
auction t which is observable for econometricians. Then, since each of bidder i's bids
equals her willingness to pay (i.e., Bit = Vit), we gain the sample from the distribution,
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F (). Therefore, the structural parameters of F () can be easily estimated from the
observed bid, Bit. For example, using the empirical distribution function, we have the
sample analogue of F (), F^ () as
F^ (v) =
1
TN
TX
t=1
NX
i=1
1(Bit  v):
1.1.2 Bayesian Econometrics
Econometricians often deal with models too complex to compute. In particular, frequen-
tist approaches, such as maximum likelihood estimation and least squares estimation,
require maximization or minimization of object functions; such optimizations often cause
computational diculties. In contrast, Bayesian methods do not require maximization
procedures. Therefore, Bayesian approaches can contribute to the progress of econo-
metrics in various elds, especially when the econometric model is too complex. The
structural econometrics of auction data is no exception. Several studies use Bayesian
methods to circumvent diculties in the literature of the structural estimation of auction
data.
As described above, the structural econometrics of the second-price, sealed-bid auc-
tions within the IPVP is made simply since the dominant strategy equilibrium bidding
functions are identity functions of bidders' valuations and, hence, trivial functions for
econometricians. However, since the Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding functions in
the rst-price, sealed-bid auctions are complex and nonlinear functions of bidders' val-
uations, the structural econometrics of the rst-price, sealed-bid auctions is not made
simply.
Perhaps, one of the most famous problems in the literature of structural econometrics
of rst-price, sealed-bid auctions is that a standard regularity condition that ensures the
asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimator no longer holds. We review
this problem briey.
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Consider that at rst-price, sealed-bid auctions, each bidder submits a bid simulta-
neously. The participant with the highest bid wins the object and pays her own bid.
There are N potential bidders with risk-neutral preferences indexed by i = 1; :::; N .
Each bidder's valuation for the object is denoted by Vi, which is an independent and
identically distributed random variable from the distribution, F (;), where  is a vec-
tor of parameters. The realization of bidder i's willingness to pay is her own private
information. However, the distribution of Vi, F (;), is common knowledge among all
participants. Under these assumptions, the equilibrium bidding functions for bidder i
with a valuation of Vi = v, (v), is
(v) = v  
R v
v [F (u;)]
N 1du
[F (v;)]N 1
;
where v denotes the lower bound of support of v.
The main diculty is that the support of bids depends on parameters to be estimated,
. Let v be the upper bound of support of v. Since (v) is a strictly increasing function
with respect to v, the upper bound of support of bids is (v). The upper bound of
support of bids, (v), is computed by
(v) = v  
R v
v [F (u;)]
N 1du
[F (v;)]N 1
= v  
Z v
v
[F (u;)]N 1du: (since F (v;) = 1)
Therefore, (v) depends on the unknown parameter, . Then, a standard regularity
condition that ensures the asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimator
is violated.2
Donald and Paarsch (1993) and Donald and Paarsch (1996) proposed a pseudo max-
2Amemiya (1985) provides regularity conditions that ensure the consistency of extremum estimators.
In our case, it is dicult to show that the likelihood function converges to a non-stochastic function that
attains a unique global maximum value at true  in probability uniformly over the parameter space.
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imum likelihood estimation that overcomes this diculty. However, these estimators are
computationally burdensome. A simple alternative solution for this problem is to apply
the Bayesian method. Bayesian econometrics does not require the asymptotic theory,
since the Bayes rule justies the inference using the Bayesian method. Furthermore,
thanks to the development of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation method, the
computational burden of Bayesian inference can be relaxed considerably, in many cases.
Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) utilized the Bayesian method to circumvent this problem in
the literature of structural estimation of second-price auctions within the common value
paradigm. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, we used the Bayesian method to estimate structural
parameters.
1.1.3 Nonparametric (Semiparametric) Econometrics
One of the major criticisms of parametric models is that they are approximations of
the real process and lead to concerns about potential misspecications. In particular,
since economic data, unlike natural science data, are usually not controlled, parametric
specications often may be strong assumptions in econometrics. Structural econometrics
of auction data is no exception. In this literature, a typical structural parameter is the
distribution of a bidder's valuation of an object. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no consensus among economists as to what distribution the buyer's valuation should
follow. Obviously, we need nonparametric methods to overcome this problem.
Fortunately, in this literature, studies that focus on nonparametric identication and
nonparametric estimation methods are well developed. Athey and Haile (2007) provided
an excellent survey of the nonparametric (and semiparametric) structural estimation
of auction data. Most studies in this literature have been based on the following two
papers: Athey and Haile (2002) and Guerre et al. (2000) (hereafter GPV). Athey and
Haile (2002) discussed the nonparametric identication conditions in standard auctions.
They showed that the distribution of bidders' valuations (viz., the structural parameters)
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can be identied from observed bids in the independent private values model. GPV
provided a nonparametric estimation strategy for rst-price, sealed-bid auctions. We
briey review GPV's estimation algorithm.
The settings are similar to the rst-price, sealed-bid auction explained in the previous
subsection. The only dierence is that we do not impose any parametric specications
on the distribution of bidders' valuations, F (). Recall that the equilibrium bidding
function of bidder i with a valuation of Vi = v, (v) is
(v) = v  
R v
v [F (u)]
N 1du
[F (v)]N 1
: (1.1)
Then, if we have the inverse function of (), the distribution of bidders' valuations can
be estimated from observed bids, since (v) is a strictly increasing function of v. In
general, however, computing inverse function is very dicult.3 Therefore, GPV gave up
on trying to estimate the structural parameters from equation (1.1) directly.
Instead of equation (1.1), GPV used the following equation:
v = (v) +
1
N   1 
F (v)0(v)
f(v)
; (1.2)
where 0() is the derivative of (), and f() is the probability density function of
bidders' valuations. Equation (1.2) can be derived from optimization problem of bidder
i.4 Let G() and g() be the cumulative distribution function and the probability density
function, respectively, of the bidder's bid, b. Since b = (v), we have G(b) = F (v) and
g(b) = f(v)=0(v). Substituting these equations into equation (1.2), we have
v = b+
1
N   1 
G(b)
g(b)
: (1.3)
3Bierens and Song (2012) estimated the distribution of bidders' valuations directly using a sieve
approach.
4Note that the equilibrium function, (), satises equation (1.2). One can derive equation (1.2)
easily by dierentiating both sides of equation (1.1), with respect to v.
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Note that each element in the right-hand side of equation (1.3) can be observed or
recovered from the observed data. Let G^() and g^() be the sample analogues of G()
and g(), respectively. Then, we obtain the pseudo values, v^, from
v^ = b+
1
N   1 
G^(b)
g^(b)
: (1.4)
For each observed bid, bit, we gain the corresponding pseudo values, v^it, from equation
(1.4) for each i 2 f1; :::; Ng and t 2 1; :::; T ; where index i denotes the bidder's identity,
and index t denotes the observed auctions. Then, the kernel density estimator, with
trimming the boundary values of bids, enables us to gain the sample analogues of the
probability density function of the pseudo values, f^(). GPV showed the consistency of
the estimators and derived the optimal uniform convergence rate, which is slower than
the optimal rate when valuations vit were observed.
5
Since implementing their estimator is simple, many papers apply their estimation
strategy. However, the nonparametric GPV estimator often faces two problems: the
curse of dimensionality and identiability. The rst diculty of nonparametric estima-
tion like GPV's is the curse of dimensionality, which stems from the dimensionality of
covariates. In particular, Hubbard et al. (2012) pointed out that even when there is no
covariate, the nonparametric estimator proposed in Li et al. (2002), which is an extension
of GPV's estimator of rst-price auctions within the aliate private values paradigm,
suers from the curse of dimensionality stemming from the number of bidders in the
rst-price auctions within the aliated private values paradigm. Hubbard et al. (2012)
proposed the semiparametric estimator, which is an extension of GPV and Li et al.
(2002). They utilized the parametric copula to capture the dependency of valuations
among bidders and succeeded in reducing the curse of dimensionality as it relates to the
5GPV did not derive the asymptotic distribution of their estimators. Marmer and Shneyerov (2012)
proposed a quantile-based nonparametric estimator, which is similar to GPV's estimator. Their estimator
attains the optimal rate of the GPV estimator and has asymptotic normality.
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number of bidders.
The second problem of the nonparametric estimation is identiability. As the econo-
metric model becomes complex, the structural parameters (e.g., the distribution of val-
uations) often cannot be nonparametrically identied from the observed data. Typical
examples are common value auctions and bidders with risk-averse preferences. Although
the common value auction model is an important theoretical model in auction theory,
little empirical research focuses on the common value model. The main reason is that
Athey and Haile (2002) showed that structural parameters cannot recovered nonpara-
metrically from the observed bids.6 Therefore, empirical studies such as that of Bajari
and Hortacsu (2003) impose some parametric specications in the literature of the struc-
tural estimation of auctions within the common value paradigm. For this same reason, in
Chapters 3 and 4, we impose the parametric specications on the distribution of bidders'
types.
Considering bidders' risk aversion also makes nonparametric identication of struc-
tural parameters dicult.7 The identication problem is simple, since the utility func-
tions are linear functions of valuations when we assume a risk-neutral preference of
bidders. When we consider risk-averse bidders, however, the identication problem be-
comes dicult. Since risk aversion only restricts the concave shape of the utility functions
with respect to valuations, the utility functions are not uniquely determined from the
observed bids, obviously. Lu and Perrigne (2008) and Campo et al. (2011) provided
semiparametric models for rst-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and made esti-
mates assuming additional identication conditions. For a similar reason, Chapter 5 of
this thesis proposes a semiparametric estimation that is an extension of GPV's for the
6Some papers have studied the identication condition of the common value auction model. For
example, Li et al. (2000) showed the identication under the additive separability of the common value
component. Fevrier (2008) showed the identication of the common value auction model restricting the
shape of the density function of the common value. d'Haultfoeuille and Fevrier (2008) proposed the
identication condition of the common value auction model, assuming the support of a private signal is
nite and varies depending on the common value.
7Guerre et al. (2009) investigated the nonparametric identication strategy for rst-price auctions
with risk-averse bidders using exclusion restrictions.
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scoring auctions.
1.2 Auctions Focused on in the Thesis
As discussed in Section 1.1, various kinds of auctions are indispensable for our social
economy. However, in practice most auctions dier from the standard auction models
considered in auction theory. In this thesis, we focused on two sorts of auctions: online
auctions and scoring auctions. These two auction formats also dier from the typical
auction models studied in auction theory. In this section, we discuss the features of
online auctions and scoring auctions.
1.2.1 Online Auctions
With the emergence of online auction markets, auctions have become familiar places
where we can actually participate. In the online auction market, many people can
become buyers or sellers and trade items easily.
In online auctions, anonymous people can become both buyers and sellers. This may
lead to greater potential for Internet fraud related to online auctions. A typical example
of Internet fraud is that sellers do not send goods to winning bidders even though they
have received payment. For this reason, many online auction sites allow winning bidders
and sellers to leave feedback after each pair of users conducts a transaction. All of the
recorded ratings of all users are public information. This system is called the feedback
system. From this point of view, online auctions dier from the typical auctions in
auction theory. In Chapter 2, we focused on this issue.
Another dierence between online auctions and typical auctions is the option of \buy
prices." In online auction sites such as eBay, in addition to an auction, a seller can set a
xed price and a bidder can purchase the object if she accepts the buy price. In online
auctions, therefore, bidders have to participate in auctions while observing the xed
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prices. In Chapter 3, we proposed an empirical model of auctions with buy prices.
1.2.2 Scoring Auctions
Governments, as buyers of public goods, often choose suppliers using procurement auc-
tions. The percentages of governments' expenditures for procurement auctions cannot
be ignored in the gross domestic product (GDP). In many countries, governments tend
to use the scoring auction format rather than the price-only auction.
The rules of price-only procurement auctions are simple. At price-only auctions, each
bidder submits a bid in a sealed envelope, and at some predetermined time, all of the
envelopes are opened. The participant with lowest bid wins the project contract, and
she fullls the contract for the price she bids. The amounts of the bid determines the
winner in the price-only auctions.
In contrast, in scoring auctions, winners are determined not only by the amounts
of their bids. Other factors help determine the winners in scoring auctions. At scoring
auctions, each bidder submits a price-quality pair in a sealed envelope, and at some
predetermined time, all of the envelopes are opened. The participant with the lowest
score, which is calculated from the submitted price and the quality level, wins the project
contract. The winner receives the payment she bids and fullls the contract, providing
the quality level she bids.8 The scoring rules (i.e., the method of calculating scores from
the submitted prices and qualities) have been published in advance. Thus, not only price
but also quality determines the winners in scoring auctions. Examples of quality include
noise level, completion time, and bidder experience.
A variety of forms of scoring rules are used in real-world public procurement. Some
U.S. states' departments of transportation, for example, Delaware, Idaho, Oregon, Mas-
sachusetts, Utah, and Virginia, use quasilinear scoring rules. In quasilinear scoring
rules, the score, s, is computed by the dierence between the payment, p, and the qual-
8These are called rst score auctions in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, other auction formats are considered
to compare the performance of the rst score auctions.
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ity level, q (viz., s = p   q). On the other hand, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Michigan,
North Carolina, and South Dakota use price-over-quality ratio rules. Price-over-quality
ratio scoring rules are also used in most public procurement scoring auctions in Japan.
In price-over-quality ratio scoring rules, the score, s, is computed by the dividing the
payment, p, and the quality level, q (viz., s = p=q).
In Chapter 5, we proposed an empirical model that covers various kinds of scoring
auctions, including quasilinear scoring rules and price-over-quality ratio scoring rules.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Ineciency in Online Auctions
In Chapter 2, we estimated the ineciency of online auctions. Online auctions can be
inecient due to Internet fraud. A typical example of Internet fraud is when sellers do
not send goods to winning bidders, even though they have received payment. Therefore,
bidders always bear a risk of fraud, and this risk may lead to transaction failure. To
mitigate this risk, most online auction sites (e.g., eBay, and Yahoo!) utilize a feedback
system. All winning bidders and sellers can leave feedback after each pair of users
conducts a transaction. All of the recorded ratings are observable by all users before
they participate.
Many studies have examined the eect of reputation on winning bids. However, such
research mainly focuses on the eect that relates to the revenue of online auctions. We
focus on the eects of reputation that relate to not only the revenue but also the eciency
of online auctions. Usually, a real-world auction is weakly ecient, in the sense that the
bidder with highest willingness to pay always wins the item at the auction without
reserve price. However, online auctions are not ecient because of Internet fraud. In
other words, a bidder with the highest valuation may fail to win the item if she estimates
the possibility of being defrauded to be relativity high. The main purpose of Chapter 2
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is to estimate the magnitude and the frequency of ineciency in online auction markets.
In our empirical example, we use eBay PlayStation 3 auctions held in 2009. We
found that online auctions are inecient with probability of more than 0.75. Namely, in
more than 75% of online auctions, the objects (PlayStation 3) are not awarded to the
bidders with the highest valuations. Besides, we found that the expected eciency loss
is about $40. Since the market price of PlayStation 3 in 2009 was $400, the value of
estimated ineciency is not small.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Online Auctions with Buy Prices
One important dierence between online auctions and the typical auction model in
auction theory is the buy price option. Most online auction sites allow sellers to set a
xed buy price. In an auction with a buy price, the seller sets a xed price, and a bidder
can purchase the item if he or she accepts the buy price. In other words, in auctions
with buy price options, buyers can receive the goods without going through an auction.
In online auctions with buy prices, bidders must participate in auctions while observing
the buy prices.
While many empirical studies have focused on the online auction market, most of
these studies ignore the buy prices. When we estimate the structural parameters in
the online auction model, ignoring the buy prices, the estimators may be incorrect. In
Chapter 3, we constructed a structural econometric model of online auction models with
buy prices.
Our empirical example is eBay mint coin auctions in 2013. We found that when we
ignore the buy prices, we underestimate the mean of bidders' signals corresponding to
the value of an item and the eect on the signals of sellers' positive rating. We computed
the optimal buy price that maximizes the sellers' expected revenue using the estimated
parameters. The estimated optimal buy price is $53.20, which is higher than the average
buy price. We also conducted a revenue comparison. We compared the revenue between
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auctions with buy prices and those without buy prices. We found that the mean of the
revenue dierence between auctions with optimal buy prices and auctions without buy
prices is $0.05.
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Bundling and Separate Sales in Online Auctions
In this paper, we focused on bundling auctions in the online auction market. Since there
are many buyers and many sellers in the online auction market, various forms of sales
are used in online auctions. In particular, some sellers often sell two or more items in
bundling auctions. However, other sellers sell the separately.
Many studies focus on bundling sales in theoretical literature. In contrast, few em-
pirical studies have researched bundling sales. In Chapter 4, we conducted an empirical
study using both the data of bundling auctions and separate auctions.
Our empirical example is eBay mint coin set auctions in 2014. In our data set, there
were two kinds of coin sets: 11-coin sets and 22-coin sets. We regarded 11-coin sets as
the separate item and 22-coin sets as the bundled item. We conducted some simulations
using the estimated parameters. We evaluated how aggressively bidders in separate
auctions bid and compared the revenue of bundling auctions and separate auctions.
We found that bidders in separate auctions will bid aggressively. Bidders in separate
auctions will bid higher than in bundling auctions by $2.4. For a revenue comparison, we
considered two scenarios: the independent signals case and the identical signals case. In
the independent signals case, we found that the expected revenue in bundling auctions
was higher than that in separate auctions by $0.37. In the identical signals case, we
found that the expected revenue in separate auctions was higher than that in bundling
auctions by $5.30.
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1.3.4 Chapter 5: Scoring Auctions
We established a structural estimation method of the scoring auction model that covers
a broad class of scoring rules, including the quasi-liner scoring rule and the price-over-
quality ratio rule.9 In many countries, when governments decide the suppliers of public
goods via procurement auctions, they often utilize scoring auctions rather than price-
only auctions. In scoring auctions, the winners are determined not only by the prices
but also by the quality that bidders bid. There are two typical scoring auction formats:
the quasi-linear scoring rule and the price-over-quality ratio rule.
Since in scoring auction models bidders' types are often multi-dimensional, the model
often becomes complex. The complexity of the econometric model often obstructs econo-
metricians' study of scoring auctions. We propose a semiparametric model for identifying
the joint distribution of biddersE multi-dimensional private signals from scoring auction
data and conduct an empirical experiment to quantify the welfare impact of changing of
formats and scoring rules for both bidders and the procurement buyer.
The data used in our empirical illustration contain the bid results of procurement
auctions for civil engineering projects from 2010 to 2013 by the Ministry of Land, In-
frastructure, and Transportation (MLIT) in Japan. We found that changing the auction
format has a very small impact on welfare; under the price-over-quality ratio scoring
rule, the procurement buyer has an approximately 0.003 to 0.004 percent lower utility
(higher exercised score) when using rst score auctions rather than the second score
auctions, whereas the winning bidder earns a payo greater by approximately 0.15 to
0.26 percent in rst score auctions, as opposed to second score auctions. Furthermore,
with a well-designed quasi-linear scoring rule, we found that the procurement buyer im-
proves utility by approximately 0.29 percent, while bidders earn lower payos by 3.4
to 4.2 percent. In addition, the outcome of a price-only auction is compared with that
of currently used price-over-quality ratio rst score auctions. In simulated price-only
9This is a joint work with Jun Nakabayashi.
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auctions, bidderspayos vary, ranging from -41.2 to 1.34 percent, whereas the procure-
ment buyer?s utility is consistently 1 to 36 percent lower than with a price-over-quality
ratio rst score auction. These results suggest that a procurer can obtain an almost
equivalent (slightly lower) gain with the use of a price-only auction with a well-designed
xed quality standard.
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Chapter 2
Estimating Ineciency in Online
Auctions
2.1 Introduction
Many people use consumer-to-consumer electronic commerce sites to buy (or sell) goods.
A common example of this is the online auction, in which a consumer posts an item for
sale and other consumers bid to purchase it. In the third quarter of 2008, eBay, the
largest online auction marketplace, hosted 700 million listings with $14 billion in goods
trading and had 370 million registered users around the world.1 In light of this, several
studies have focused on online auctions. Examples include Melnik and Alm (2002),
Livingston (2005), Houser and Wooders (2006) and Resnick et al. (2006) in reputation
eects on sellers' revenue, Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) in common value auction and
winners' curse, Bapna et al. (2008) and Giray et al. (2009) in consumer surplus, Adams
(2007) in demand in eBay, Hossain and Morgan (2005) in revenue equivalence theorem
and Roth and Ockenfels (2002) in snipe bidding.
However, the growth of online auction markets also leads to greater potential for
1See eBay Inc. Reports Third Quarter 2008 Results (http://investor.ebay.com).
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Internet fraud related to online auctions. A typical example of this is that sellers do not
send goods to winning bidders even though they have received payment. Bidders always
bear a risk of fraud, and this risk may lead to transaction failure. To mitigate this risk,
many online auction sites (e.g., eBay, Amazon, and Yahoo!) allow winning bidders and
sellers to leave feedback after each pair of users conducts a transaction. In addition, all
the recorded ratings are observable by any users before they participate in an auction.
This system is called the feedback system or the reputation system.
Many researchers have studied the eect of reputation on winning bids. Melnik and
Alm (2002) applied the Tobit model and estimated the impact of the seller's reputation
on the willingness of bidders to bid on items using data concerning coin sales as an
example. They found that the seller's reputation has a positive but small impact on the
price. Livingston (2005) examined the eect of the seller's reputation on the bidders'
decision to participate and the willingness of bidders to bid on an item. Empirical results
using data for golf clubs sold show that the seller's reputation has a positive impact on
both the bidders' decision to participate and the willingness of bidders to bid on an
item. Houser and Wooders (2006) assumed a log linear relationship between the bids
and the reputation of the seller, and examined the eect of reputation on a winning bid.
They reported that the seller's reputation has a statistically signicant eect on the
winning bid, but that the bidder's reputation does not. Resnick et al. (2006) conducted
a controlled eld experiment. In the experiment, the same honest seller sold to several
bidders under his or her regular identity, which has a strong reputation, and under a
new seller identities. Their results show that the established identity fared better; the
dierence in the bidder's willingness to pay was 8:1% of the selling price.
However, few studies have tried to examine the eect of reputation on the eciency
of the online auction. Usually, a \real-world" auction is a weakly ecient mechanism
(i.e., the bidder with highest valuation always wins the item at auction without reserve
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price) within the independent private values (IPV) paradigm.2 In an online auction,
however, the bidder with the highest valuation can fail to win the item if he estimates
the possibility of being defrauded to be relativity high. Therefore, an online auction can
be inecient.
Though eciency is an important consideration in market (or auction) design (e.g.,
Maskin (2003)), few attempts have been made to estimate the eciency losses in online
auction markets. One possible explanation for the lack of attention is the diculty of
identifying the ineciency. To identify the ineciency, we usually need the data from
ecient auctions to compare against that from online auctions. Unfortunately, these
data are often unavailable.
In this paper, we estimate the ineciency in online auctions using only online auction
data. Dividing the private values in online auctions into the evaluation of risks and the
(original) willingness to pay, we estimate the distributions of private values using only
online auction data sets under our identication conditions. Consequently, we estimate
the ineciency without the data of counterfactual ecient auctions. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the rst empirical attempt to evaluate the ineciency in online
auctions.
Our empirical example is eBay PlayStation 3 auctions held in 2009. We found that
bidders' condence increases with the number of positive ratings and decreases with the
number of negative ratings. These results are plausible for our intuition. Furthermore,
using the values of estimated parameters, we estimate the ineciency and the revenue
dierence. As discussed in Section 2.2, the eciency loss can be computed by the
dierence between the total surplus of the ecient auctions and the total surplus of the
online auctions. The ineciency is estimated at $43:5. The probability of the inecient
online auctions is estimated at 0:762. Thus, 76:2% online auctions are inecient auctions.
The revenue dierence between the ecient auctions and the online auctions is estimated
2Generally, real-world auctions can be inecient as well as online auctions. For example, auctions
with asymmetric bidders may be inecient (e.g., Maskin and Riley (2000)).
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at $83:0.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present our inecient
online auction model. In addition, we discuss the relationship between the ineciency
and the total surplus in online auctions. In Section 2.3, we discuss how to estimate
the structural parameters in our inecient online auction model described in Section
2.2. In this paper, we impose parametric specications for the structural model and use
the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to estimate the structural
parameters. After explaining the estimation strategy, we discuss how to estimate the
ineciency of an online auction market. Monte Carlo experiments are conducted in
this section. In Section 2.4, we explain the eBay PlayStation 3 auction data used in
our empirical example. We present the estimation results from the eBay PlayStation
3 auction data. In Section 2.5, we show the estimation result of ineciency in eBay
PlayStation 3 auctions. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We develop a theoretical model that describes the ex post heterogeneity of bidders'
evaluations for the risk of default. Furthermore, this model is useful for our empirical
analysis to estimate the eciency loss in online auction markets. Throughout this paper,
we represent random variables in uppercase letters and their realizations in lowercase
letters.
2.2.1 Theoretical Model
We observe L online auctions. In each auction l 2 f1; 2;    ; Lg, there are Nl risk neutral
potential bidders and a seller. The number of potential bidders, Nl is a random variable
and is an exogenous variable. At the beginning of auction l, seller l oers for sale a single
item and sets a reserve (or starting) price rl. Bidders submit their bids, and the bidder
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with the highest bid wins the object and pays the second highest bid. After auction l,
seller l decides whether to cooperate or to deceive. If he cooperates, then the winning
bidder receives the good from the seller. On the other hand, if he deceives, then the
winning bidder receives nothing or a low-quality good (e.g., a defective good, a fake good
and so on) from the seller. After the transaction, the winning bidder leaves a positive
report if seller l cooperates and leaves a negative report if seller l deceives.3
We focus on the symmetric independent private values (IPV) model. Each bidder
i 2 f1; 2;    ; Nlg has her private value vli which represents her willingness to pay for the
item at auction l and is the realization of a random variable Vli. These private values
are i.i.d. random draws from a probability distribution F () with density f(). The
support of F () is denoted by [v; v] where v is a positive number. Each bidder i knows
the realization of her own valuation vli but does not know that of others. Instead, the
probability distribution F () is common knowledge among all bidders at auction l. Each
bidder i discounts her willingness-to-pay vli in online auction l because of the risk of
Internet fraud. Observing the ratings of seller l, each bidder i at auction l estimates the
risk that seller l deceives and discounts the willingness-to-pay vli. Let Dli 2 [0; 1] denote
the risk-discount factor. The risk-discount factor Dli is an i.i.d. random draw from
a probability distribution Q(jXl) with density q(jXl), where Xl is the auction-specic
covariate vector. The auction-specic covariate vectorXl contains the number of positive
ratings and that of negative ratings of the seller l. The support of Q(jXl) is [0; 1] for any
auction-specic covariate vector Xl. Each bidder i knows the realization of her own risk-
discount factor dli but does not know that of others. Instead, the probability distribution
Q(jXl) is common knowledge for any auction-specic covariate Xl among all bidders at
auction l. We assume that bidder i's valuation Vli and her risk-discount factor Dli are
mutually independent. In addition, we make an assumption on the risk-discount factor
3On eBay, winning bidders can leave either \Positive," \Neutral," or \Negative" reports. In addition,
winning bidders can leave comments about sellers. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that winning
bidders can leave only positive or negative reports. In our empirical example, the number of negative
ratings is the sum of the number of neutral ratings and that of negative ratings.
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Dli.
Assumption 1. The risk-discount factor Dli converges in probability to a constant d 2
[0; 1] as the number of ratings of seller l goes to innity. Furthermore, the valued of d
can be computed from the number of positive ratings and that of negative ratings.
Assumption 1 implies when the number of ratings of seller l is suciently observed,
all bidders' estimates for the risk of Internet fraud coincide. This assumption seems to
be plausible since the number of ratings reects the actions of seller l and the decisions
of seller l are exogenously determined in our model.
We assume risk neutral bidders. Then, the utility function of bidder i is denoted by
u(bli; bl ijvli; dli) =
8>><>>:
dlivli  maxj 6=i blj if bli = maxfbl1;    ; blIlg
0 otherwise.
where bli is bidder i's bid at auction l and bl i represents the vector of bids at auction
l except for bidder i's bid. Let Zli  DliVli, and let G() and g() be the cumulative
distribution function and the probability density function of Zli, respectively. Hereafter,
Zli is referred as bidder i's \risk-discounted" willingness to pay or bidder i's \risk-
discounted" valuation. Then, ignoring the possibility of a tie, we have the following
result.
Proposition 1. A bidding strategy prole fzl1; :::; zlNlg is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
This result is similar to Houser and Wooders (2006). While they considered the
subjective probability instead of the risk-discount factor, and they assumed it is common
among all bidders at auction l, the realization of bidders' risk-discount factor is dierent
in our model. Under such an equilibrium, the bidder with the highest risk-discounted
value zl(1) wins, and the winning bid wl is given by wl = zl(2), where Zl(i) is the i-th
largest order statistic. That is, Zl(1)  Zl(2)      Zl(Nl).
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2.2.2 Eciency Loss
In this subsection, we discuss why online auctions can be inecient and discuss how to
calculate the eciency losses in online auctions.
Suppose all buyers and a seller in an online auction use a real-world auction to trade
the object instead of an online auction. Notice that since all the participants trade in a
public and face-to-face situation, none of the buyers must worry about the risk of being
defrauded by the seller. Thus, each bidder's risk-discount factor Dli (i 2 f1;    ; Nlg)
equals one with probability one in real-world auctions. Then, the bidder with the highest
private value vl(1) wins, and the winning bid wl is given by wl = vl(2) where Vl(i) is the
i-th largest order statistic and vl(i) denotes the realization of Vl(i). Therefore, real-world
auctions are ecient.
In contrast to a real-world auction, the bidder with the highest risk-discounted private
value always wins in an online auction. This does not always imply that the bidder with
highest private value wins. Let Id() denote the mapping from the bidder's private value
to her identity. That is,
Id(ali) = i; (ali = vli or zli):
Then, an online auction l is inecient if and only if Id(vl(1)) 6= Id(zl(1)). Furthermore,
we characterize the ineciency using the valuations v. Let vl denote the \original"
private value of bidder Id(zl(1)) (i.e., vl = vlId(zl(1))). Then, the eciency loss occurs
only when vl(1) 6= vl holds. In particular, since vl(1)  vl always holds, we gain the
following result:
8>><>>:
vl(1)   vl > 0 if eciency loss occurs, and
vl(1)   vl = 0 otherwise.
Actually, since we cannot observe the realized value of valuations and risk-discount
factors; therefore, we must estimate the value of vl(1)   vl.
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2.2.3 Relation between Eciency and Surplus
Online auction l becomes inecient if and only if vl(1) > vl holds. However, the inter-
pretation of vl(1)   vl itself is not clear. We discuss the relation between eciency loss
and total surplus and show that vl(1)   vl can be interpreted as the dierence of total
surplus.
First, we consider the total surplus of real-world auctions. Since the winning bid
of real-world auction equals the second highest private value vl(2), the surplus of the
winning bidder is vl(1)   vl(2). Analogously, the surplus of the seller is vl(2)   vl0, where
vl0 is seller l's valuation for the object. Therefore, the total surplus of real-world auction
l, TSlRA is denoted by
TSlRA = vl(1)   vl0: (2.1)
We gain the total surplus of online auctions in the same manner. Since the original
valuation of winning bidder in online auction l is denoted by vl, the surplus of the
winning bidder is given by vl  zl(2). Note that the winning bid of online auction equals
to the second highest risk-discounted valuation. Analogously, the surplus of the seller is
zl(2)   vl0. Therefore, the total surplus of online auction l, TSlOA is denoted by
TSlOA = vl   vl0: (2.2)
Then, from equation (2.1) and equation (2.2), we have the dierence of total surplus
as follows:
TSlRA   TSlOA = vl(1)   vl0   (vl   vl0)
= vl(1)   vl: (2.3)
The seller's private value vl0 is dicult to estimate. Fortunately, however, the seller's
private value vl0 is eliminated in equation (2.3). Consequently, the value of vl(1)   vl
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can be interpreted as that of the dierence in total surplus.
2.3 Estimation
2.3.1 Identication
Though eciency is an important consideration in auction theory, few attempts have
been made to estimate eciency losses in online auction markets. One possible explana-
tion for this lack of attention is the diculty of identifying the ineciency. In our model,
to identify the ineciency, we must identify the distribution of willingness to pay, Vli.
However, neither the distribution of valuations, F (), nor the distribution of risk-
discount factors, Q(), is identied nonparametrically. Recall that Zli = DliVli. Let
D0li  Dli and V 0li   1Vli where  2 (0; 1). Then, we have
Zli = DliVli
= ( 1D0li)(V
0
li)
= D0liV
0
li:
Therefore, even if the distribution of risk-discounted valuation, G(z), is identied, nei-
ther V nor D is identied. Therefore, we need additional assumptions to identify the
distribution of valuations, F (), and the distribution of beliefs, Q(), separately.
Assumption 1 is the key assumption of our identication strategy. Since both Xl and
Yl are observable for econometricians, the valued of d is also known to econometricians.
If d is known, and if the distribution of risk-discounted valuation, G(), is identi-
able, since Zli = dVli, the distribution of \original" valuation, F (), is also identiable
nonparametrically as the number of ratings goes to innity.
Once F () is recovered, then the distribution of risk-discount factor, QXl;Yl(), is also
identied for every nite Xl and Yl. Let ~Zli, ~Dli, and ~Vli denote the logarithm of Zli,
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Dli and Vli respectively. Then, since Zli = DliVli, we have ~Zli = ~Dli + ~Vli. That is, ~Zli
is the sum of two independent random variables. Therefore, we have
 ~Z =  ~D ~V ; (2.4)
where  ~Z is the characteristic function of
~Zli,  ~Z is the characteristic function of
~Dli,
and  ~Z is the characteristic function of
~Vli. Since the distribution of ~Zli is identied from
the standard result when the number of potential bidders is known, the characteristic
function of ~Zli,  ~Z is also recovered from the data set. Since F () is recovered, the
characteristic function of ~Vli,  ~V is also recovered. Therefore, the characteristic function
of ~Dli,  ~D is recovered from equation (2.4). Since the characteristic function of
~Dli
is recovered, the distribution of ~Dli is identied. As a result, the distribution of risk-
discount factor Dli, Q(jXl; Yl), is identied for every Xl < 1 and Yl < 1. Therefore,
we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose Q(jXl = 0; Yl = 0) is a non-singular distribution whose sup-
port is [0; 1]. Suppose that the distribution of discounted willingness to pay, G() is
identiable. Then, both the distribution of willingness to pay F (), the distribution of
belief Q(jXl; Yl) and eciency loss Vl(1)   Vl are identied at innity (i.e., Tl !1).
So far, we assume that the distribution of risk-discounted valuation, G(), is iden-
tiable. If the number of potential bidders, Nl is observable, then G() is identied
in our model. 4 Unfortunately, the number of potential bidders, Nl is not observed
in eBay auctions. When the number of potential bidders, Nl is not known, the distri-
bution of risk-discounted valuation, G(), is not identied from only winning bids wl
nonparametrically.
Several papers consider the identication of the auction model with an unknown
number of bidders. First, Guerre et al. (2000) assume the number of potential bidders,
4For example, Donald and Paarsch (1996) consider identication of auction model in parametric
setting and Athey and Haile (2002) study identication in nonparametric setting.
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N , is unknown for econometricians but is constant among all auctions. Under their
assumption, they show that the distribution of valuations (i.e., G() in our model) is
identiable. Song (2004) considers the identication and estimation of eBay auctions
with an unknown number of bidders. She shows that the distribution of valuations
(i.e., G() in our model) is identiable from observation of any two valuations for which
rankings from the top are known. Using the second and third highest bids in eBay
university yearbook auctions, she estimates the distribution of valuations by the semi-
nonparametric maximum likelihood estimation method proposed by Gallant and Nychka
(1987). An et al. (2010) study nonparametric identication and estimation of rst-price
auction models with an unknown number of bidders. They develop a nonparametric pro-
cedure for recovering the distribution of bids using instruments that exogenously aect
the number of potential bidders. Shneyerov and Wong (2011) consider nonparametric
identication of rst-price and Dutch auction models when the number of potential bid-
ders is unobservable. Although Song (2004) and An et al. (2010) focus on symmetric
independent private values models, they study identication of asymmetric IPV models.
In this paper, we apply Guerre et al. (2000)'s identication strategy to recover the distri-
bution of risk-discounted valuation, G(). That is, assuming that the number of potential
bidders, N is constant among auctions, we recover the distribution of risk-discounted
valuation, G(). Then the identication of eciency loss follows from Proposition 2.
2.3.2 Estimation Procedure
From Proposition 2, if G() is identied, both the distribution of original valuations, F (),
and the distribution of beliefs, Q(), are also identied as the number of ratings goes to
innity. Actually, the number of auctions seller l has held, the number of ratings is nite
for each l 2 f1; :::; Lg. Therefore, we must assume alternative conditions. Instead of
the identication condition described above, we assume each bidder i does not discount
her original valuation Vli if seller l is a PowerSeller. In other words, Dli = 1 if seller l
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is a PowerSeller. PowerSellers receive many positive ratings but few negative ratings.
Almost all PowerSellers in our data set gain more than 500 positive ratings.5
In this paper, we impose a parametric specication on the distribution of valua-
tion, F (), and the distribution of belief, Q().6 We apply the Bayesian Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation method to estimate the parameters. We assume that
valuation Vli follows the gamma distribution. That is, we assume
Vli  i :i :d :Ga(; ):
Furthermore, given auction-specic covariates, we assume that risk-discount factor Dli
follows the truncated normal distribution with support [0; 1]. That is,
DlijXl  i :i :d :Trunc-N[0;1](l; 2l )
where Xl is the auction-specic covariates and l = 
0Xl and l = exp(0Xl). As
described in Section 2.2, bidder l's risk-discount factor Dli depends on the positive and
negative ratings of seller l. Therefore, the number of positive ratings and the number of
negative ratings are plausible covariates.
First, we estimate the parameters of gamma distribution,  and . Notice, since we
assume that Dli = 1 for each bidder i if seller l is a PowerSeller, and since Zli = DliVli,
g() andG() are equal to f() and F (), respectively, if seller l is a PowerSeller. Therefore,
the likelihood of winning bids is
L(w1; :::; wLj; ) =
LY
l=1
0B@ N
N   2 1 1
1CA [1  F (wlj; )]f(wlj; )[F (wlj; )]N 2;
(2.5)
5In Section 2.4, we explain \PowerSeller" in detail.
6The distributions F () and Q() can be estimated nonparametrically using the decomposition tech-
nique. However, nonparametric estimation can be computationally burdensome.
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where N is the number of potential bidders. Note that letting nl be the number of
active bidders, which is observable for econometricians, we can estimate N consistently
by N^ = maxn1; :::; nL. Therefore, without too much loss of generality, we can assume
that N is given.
For auctions in which sellers are not PowerSellers, belief Dli 6= 1. Using the distri-
bution of risk-discounted valuations, G(), we have the likelihood function
L(w1; :::; wLj; ; l; l) =
LY
l=1
0B@ N
N   2 1 1
1CA [1 G(wlj; ; l; l)]g(wlj; ; l; l)
 [G(wlj; ; l; l)]N 2:
(2.6)
Unfortunately, the probability density function g() has no closed-form expression. Using
q() and f(), g() can be described as
g(w) =
Z 1
0
1
d
f
 w
d

q(d)dd:
Similarly, using q() and F (), G() can be described as
G(w) =
Z 1
0
F
 w
d

q(d)dd:
Therefore, we can compute the probability density function, g(), and the probability
distribution function, G(), by numerical integration.
The goal of this study is to estimate the eciency loss of online auctions. The ef-
ciency loss of online auctions can be computed from equation (2.3). The distribution
of original valuation Vli, F (), can be estimated from the procedure described above.
Therefore, the distribution of the largest valuation Vl(1) can be recovered from the es-
timated distribution of original valuation Vli, F^ (). The distribution of risk-discounted
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valuation Zli, G(), can also be obtained. As explained above, the distribution function
of risk-discount factor, Q(), can be recovered from the estimated distribution function
of risk-discounted valuation Zli, G^(), and the estimated distribution function of original
valuation Vli, F^ (). Since the distribution of risk-discount factor Pli, Q(), and the dis-
tribution of risk-discounted valuation Zli, G(), can be estimated, the distribution of Vl
can be recovered from the estimated distributions Q^() and G^(). Concretely, the distri-
bution of eciency loss dened in equation (2.3) can be obtained by the Monte Carlo
method. First, generate random draws v
(s)
1 ; :::; v
(s)
N and p
(s)
1 ; :::; p
(s)
N from the estimated
distributions F^ and Q^. Then compute the maximum value v
(s)
(1)  maxfv
(s)
1 ; :::; v
(s)
N g.
Similarly, compute z
(s)
(1)  maxfp
(s)
1 v
(s)
1 ; :::; p
(s)
N v
(s)
N g. Calculate the realization of e-
ciency loss v
(s)
(1)   v
(s)
Id(z
(s)
(1)
)
. Iterate this procedure until s becomes a large number, S.
2.3.3 Simulation Experiment
We estimate the parameters of our model using simulation data. The number of observed
auction markets is L = 750. The number of observed auctions with a PowerSeller
is L1 = 300 and the number of auctions with a non-PowerSeller is L2 = 450. In our
simulation experiments, the number of potential bidders, N is equal to 5 for all auctions.
We draw the valuations V from gamma distribution with parameters 6 and 2.
Analogously, we draw the risk-discount factor D from the truncated normal distribu-
tion, Trunc-N[0;1](l; l). The parameters of truncated normal distribution are given by
l = 1+ 2 Pos:Rep:l+ 3 Neg:Rep:l and 2l = exp(1+ 2 Pos:Rep:+ 3 Neg:Rep:).
The true values of  and  are
1 = 0:5; 2 = 0:1; 3 =  0:15;
1 =  1:0; 2 = 0:17; and 3 =  0:3:
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The prior distributions of gamma parameters  and  are
  N(0; 1000) and   N(0; 1000):
The prior distributions of the parameters of truncated normal distribution,  and  are
  N(0; 1000I) and   N(0; 1000I):
We apply the random walk-based MH algorithm to compute the posterior distribution
of parameters. The number of iteration is 70000, and burn-in period is 10000.
Table 2.1 shows p-values of the convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and
ineciency factors.7 All p-values of the convergence diagnostics are more than 0:01.
Furthermore, the values of the ineciency factor values are suciently low. The ine-
ciency factors are 63:06 to 228:63, which implies that we would obtain the same variance
of the posterior sample means from 300 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case.
Hence, we conclude that the sample paths of estimated parameters converge to posterior
distributions.
Parameter Covariate (Coecient Parameter) CD Ineciency factor
   0:04 228:63
   0:04 228:42
 Const (0) 0:30 98:96
Pos.Rep. (1) 0:98 126:66
Neg.Rep. (2) 0:51 133:84
2 Const (0) 0:27 104:88
Pos.Rep. (1) 0:65 63:06
Neg.Rep. (2) 0:20 64:67
Table 2.1: The convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the ineciency factors
for the simulation data
7The CD test statistic tests the equality of the means of the rst part and last part of the sample
path. The denition of ineciency factor is 1 + 2
P1
k=1 (k), where (k) is the sample autocorrelation
at lag k.
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The result is shown in Table 2.2. Our estimator contains the true values in a 95%
credible interval. We conclude that our estimator performs well.
Parameter Covariate (Coecient Parameter) True Mean SD 95% credible interval
   6:00 5:89 0:50 (4:90; 6:93)
   2:00 1:92 0:16 (1:61; 2:25)
 Const (0) 0:50 0:45 0:05 (0:34; 0:53)
Pos.Rep. (1) 0:10 0:09 0:01 0:07; 0:12)
Neg.Rep. (2)  0:15  0:13 0:02 ( 0:17; 0:11)
2 Const (0)  1:00  1:12 0:27 ( 1:63; 0:58)
Pos.Rep. (1) 0:17 0:20 0:04 (0:13; 0:29)
Neg.Rep. (2)  0:30  0:34 0:04 ( 0:43; 0:26)
Table 2.2: Posterior inferences for the simulation data
2.4 Empirical Examples
2.4.1 Data
Our empirical example is auctions of PlayStation 3 held on eBay in 2009. Data were
collected from 730 completed eBay auctions from June 10 through August 26, 2009.
Auctions with fewer than two actual bidders were dropped, since there are no competi-
tions with no bidder or one bidder. Since our model does not account for the use of the
\Buy-It-Now" option, auctions in which the item was sold with the Buy-It-Now option
were dropped. Consequently, 520 auctions were used to estimate the ineciency of eBay
PlayStation 3 auctions.
A PlayStation 3 auction is an excellent example for estimating the ineciency of
online auctions for at least two reasons. First, PlayStation 3 is a relatively high-value
item. In the United States, the market price of PlayStation 3 was about $400 in 2009.
Therefore, bidders would care about the risk of being defrauded by sellers. Second,
PlayStation 3 is a homogeneous item. For example, the color of almost all PlayStation
3s is black. Furthermore, we collected only auctions in which the condition of the
33
PlayStation 3 was new. Auctions for used PlayStation 3s are excluded. Therefore, we
can estimate the distribution of valuation, F (), with few covariates.
Table 2.3 provides the summary statistics. The rst column describes variables.
\Winning bid" is the transaction price and second highest bid in the eBay auction.
Note that the market price of PlayStation 3 was about $400 in 2009. Therefore, winning
bidders could get a PlayStation 3 in eBay auction for $70 less than the market price on
average. \Starting price" is the price a seller sets at the beginning of an auction. All
bids must be higher than the starting price. \Positive ratings" denotes the number of
positive ratings a seller receives. \Negative ratings + Neutral ratings" is the sum of the
number of negative ratings and the number of neutral ratings a seller receives. Usually,
the number of neutral ratings and the number of negative ratings are small (see the mean
value). We regard neutral ratings as negative ratings. \Number of actual bidders" is the
number of participants who actually bid at auction l. Since bidders whose valuation is
lower than the starting price cannot bid, the number of actual bidders is less than that
of potential bidders. \Days" denotes the duration that auction l was held.
Mean Median Std Max Min
Winning bid 328.60 330.00 28.59 405.01 177.50
Starting price 79.92 15.99 98.37 325.00 0.01
Positive ratings 250.60 26.00 1135.97 21752.00 0.00
Negative ratings + Neutral ratings 2.94 0.00 13.19 263.00 0.00
Number of actual bidders 10.31 10.00 3.83 21.00 3.00
Days 3.54 3.00 2.41 17.00 1.00
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics (# of obs. = 520)
Next, we present descriptive statistics of PowerSellers in Table 2.4. PowerSeller
status is an award for sellers on eBay. Only sellers who have sold many items and receive
mostly positive ratings can become PowerSellers. Most PowerSellers receive more than
one hundred positive ratings. Indeed, the mean value of positive ratings is 796.83. To
compare PowerSellers with non-PowerSellers, we provide the summary statistics of a
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data set excluding PowerSellers in Table 2.5. The mean value of positive ratings of non-
PowerSellers is 39.81. Therefore, PowerSellers receive more positive ratings than non-
PowerSellers. The winning bids in PowerSellers' auctions tend to be higher than those
in non-PowerSellers' auctions. Most notably, the minimum value of transaction prices in
PowerSellers' auctions is much higher than that in non-PowerSellers' auctions. There are
few dierences in the number of actual participants. However, since the starting prices
in PowerSellers' auctions tend to be lower than those in non-PowerSellers' auctions,
the number of potential bidders in PowerSellers' auctions may be lower than that in
non-PowerSellers' auctions.
Mean Median Std Max Min
Winning bid 336.04 335.00 23.51 405.01 266.99
Starting price 35.50 15.95 63.76 313.00 0.01
Positive ratings 796.61 306.00 2041.94 21752.00 12.00
Negative ratings + Neutral ratings 8.66 5.00 23.89 263.00 0.00
Number of actual bidders 11.11 11.00 3.33 21.00 3.00
Days 2.50 1.00 2.09 7.00 1.00
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics (PowerSellers, # of obs. = 144)
Mean Median Std Max Min
Winning bid 325.72 329.65 29.86 395.00 177.50
Starting price 97.09 49.95 103.94 325.00 0.01
Positive ratings 39.87 14.00 160.17 2892.00 0.00
Negative ratings + Neutral ratings 0.73 0.00 2.02 31.00 0.00
Number of actual bidders 10.00 10.00 3.96 21.00 3.00
Days 3.94 3.00 2.40 17.00 1.00
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics (Non-PowerSellers, # of obs. =376 )
New entrants are the users who have registered with eBay within one month. De-
scriptive statistics of new entrants are provided in Table 2.6. Both the mean of\Positive
ratings" and the mean of \Negative ratings + Neutral ratings" are less than one.8 The
8The denition of new entrant is the users who have registered with eBay within a month. Thus,
some new entrants have sold items and gained ratings.
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mean of the winning bids of new entrants' auctions is 309.14. Since the mean value of
winning bids using all data is 328.60, new entrants earn relatively small prots.
Mean Median Std Max Min
Winning bid 309.14 310.00 27.85 395.00 235.00
Starting price 93.61 65.00 91.66 300.00 0.99
Positive ratings 0.28 0.00 1.20 9.00 0.00
Negative ratings + Neutral ratings 0.02 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.00
Number of actual bidders 9.71 9.00 3.50 18.00 3.00
Days 3.66 3.00 1.69 10.00 3.00
Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics (New Entrants, # of obs. =61 )
2.4.2 Estimation Results
We estimate the structural parameters using eBay PlayStation 3 data. We assume the
valuation Vli follows the gamma distribution. That is,
Vit  i :i :d :Gamma(; );
where both  and  are the parameters of gamma distribution. Similarly, the distri-
bution of each bidder's risk-discount factor D is assumed to be the truncated normal
distribution. That is,
Dit  i :i :d :N[0;1](l; 2l );
where l = 0 + 1  Pos:Rep:l + 2  Neg:Rep:l and 2l = exp(0 + 1  Pos:Rep:l + 2 
Neg:Rep:l).
We generate random samples from the posterior distributions by the random walk-
based MH algorithm. The number of iteration is 800000, and the burn-in-period is
10000. Figure 2.1 presents sample paths of the estimated parameters.
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Figure 2.1: Sample path of the gamma parameters ( and ) and the truncated normal
parameters ( = (0; 1; 2) and  = (0; 1; 2))
Table 2.7 shows p-values of the convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and
ineciency factors. All p-values of the convergence diagnostics are more than 0:01.
Moreover, the values of the ineciency factor values are suciently low. The ineciency
factors are 187:7 to 1220:6, which implies that we would obtain the same variance of the
posterior sample means from 650 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case.
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Parameter Covariate (Coecient Parameter) CD Ineciency factor
   0:80 1051:70
   0:80 1051:80
 Const. (0) 0:43 1220:60
Pos.Rep. (1) 0:14 1139:0
Neg.Rep. (2) 0:34 994:80
2 Const. (0) 0:29 1186:00
Pos.Rep. (1) 0:01 632:10
Neg.Rep. (2) 0:92 187:70
Table 2.7: The convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the ineciency factors
(IF) from the eBay data
All p-values of the convergence diagnostics are suciently high. In addition, the
ineciency factors are low. From Figure 2.1 and Table 2.7, we conclude that the random
samples of estimated parameters converge to posterior distributions.
Table 2.8 shows the posterior means, the posterior standard deviations, and the 95%
credible intervals. 9 Figure 2.2 presents the posterior densities of estimated parameters.
Parameter Covariate (Coecient Parameter) Mean SD 95% credible interval
   26:75 3:29 (20:74; 33:47)
   10:27 1:13 (8:20; 12:57)
 Const. (0) 1:89 0:39 (1:29; 2:75)
Pos.Rep. (1) 0:08 0:03 (0:04; 0:14)
Neg.Rep. (2)  0:41 0:21 ( 0:88; 0:05)
2 Const. (0)  1:18 0:20 ( 1:58; 0:84)
Pos.Rep. (1) 0:003 0:001 (0:002; 0:004)
Neg.Rep. (2) 0:03 0:03 ( 0:03; 0:09)
Table 2.8: Posterior inferences for the eBay data
9We divide winning bids by 100 when we estimate the parameters.
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Figure 2.2: Posterior densities of the gamma parameters ( and ) and the truncated
normal parameters ( = (0; 1; 2) and  = (0; 1; 2))
From Table 2.8 and Figure 2.2, the posterior means of gamma parameters,  and 
are 26:75 and 10:27, respectively. That is, on average, bidders' willingness to pay for
PlayStation 3 is estimated at about $270. Since the mean of winning bids is about $330
(Table 2.3), this result is plausible.
Note that the mode of the truncated normal random variable with parameters l and
2l is given by l. Since in our specication l = 0+ 1 Pos:Rep:+ 2 Neg:Rep:, if the
sign of 1 is positive (negative), the mode of risk-discount factor, D increases (decreases)
with respect to the number of positive ratings. Similarly, if the sign of 2 is positive
(negative), the mode of risk-discount factor, D increases (decreases) with respect to the
number of negative ratings. From Table 2.8, the signs of the posterior means of 1 and
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2 are positive and negative, respectively. Thus, the mode of risk-discount factor, D,
increases with respect to the number of positive ratings and decreases with respect to
the number of negative ratings. Furthermore, intuitively, the bidders will trust the seller
if the number of positive ratings increases and will not trust the seller if the number of
negative ratings increases. These results are consistent with this intuition.
2.5 Ineciency and Revenue Comparison
The goal of our paper is the estimation of ineciency in online auction markets. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, the value of eciency loss is the dierence of total surplus between
(counterfactual) ecient auctions and online auctions. In this section, we estimate the
eciency loss of eBay PlayStation 3 auctions using the parameters estimated in Sec-
tion 2.4. Furthermore, from estimated structural parameters, the dierence of revenue
between ecient auctions and online auctions can be computed. We also present the
revenue comparison in this section.
We estimate ineciency in the eBay PlayStation 3 auction market using the esti-
mated parameters in Section 2.4. Let ; ;  = (0; 1; 2) and  = (0; 1; 2). be
the posterior means of ; ;  and . In addition, let Pos:Rep: and Neg:Rep: be the
sample average of the number of positive and negative ratings, respectively, in \Non-
PowerSeller" auctions. That is,
 = 26:75;  = 10:27;  = (1:89; 0:08; 0:41);  = ( 1:18; 0:003; 0:03)
and
(Pos:Rep:;Neg:Rep:) = (39:814; 0:74):
We estimate eciency loss in the eBay PlayStation3 auction market using ; ; ; 
and (Pos:Rep:;Neg:Rep:). The computation method is described in Section 2.3. We
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conducted 50000 random draws to compute the eciency loss.
Table 2.9 presents the result of the estimated ineciency and the dierence of rev-
enue. Figure 2.3 is a histogram of the estimated eciency loss.
Mean Standard dev. Min 5% quantile 95% quantile Max
Eciency loss 0:44 0:41 0:00 0:00 1:20 2:99
Dierence of revenue 0:83 0:32 0:00 0:32 1:38 2:33
Table 2.9: Estimated ineciency and the dierence of revenue
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of Estimated Ineciency from the eBay PlayStation 3 data
Note that since we divide the winning bids by 100 when we estimate the parameters,
the estimated value of ineciency is also divided by 100. From Table 2.9, the average
ineciency is about $40. In other words, on average, the total surplus will increase by
$40 in ecient auctions. Since the market price of PlayStation 3 in 2009 was $400, the
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value of estimated ineciency is not small. The probability that ineciency will occur
can be computed numerically. The estimated probability that ineciency will occur is
equal to 0:762. That is, in more than 75% auctions, the objects (PlayStation 3) are not
awarded to the bidders with highest willingness to pay.
We estimate the revenue dierence between the counterfactual ecient auctions and
the online auctions using the values of ; ; ;  and (Pos:Rep:;Neg:Rep:). Table 2.9
shows the result of the estimated revenue dierence. Figure 2.4 is a histogram of the
estimated revenue dierence.
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of the revenue dierence from the eBay PlayStation 3 data
The mean of the revenue dierence between ecient auctions and online auctions is
$83:0. Therefore, if there were ecient auctions, sellers could gain additional revenue of
$83. Since the market price of PlayStation 3 in 2009 was about $400, the value of the
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additional gain is not small.
2.6 Conclusions
In the paper, we estimate the ineciency in online auction markets. Online auctions
may be inecient due to the Internet fraud. A typical example of Internet fraud related
to online auctions is when sellers do not send objects to winners even though they have
received payment. Since bidders always bear a risk of fraud, online auctions can be
inecient.
We propose that the online auction is inecient due to Internet fraud. A bidder
who does not trust a seller's action can fail to obtain the object even if he or she has a
high willingness to pay. As a result, the objects are awarded to the bidders with a low
willingness to pay.
We discuss the identication and estimation strategies to estimate the structural
parameters in the inecient online auction model. We use the Bayesian MCMC method
to estimate the structural parameters. In the Monte Carlo experiments, our estimation
method works well.
Our empirical example is eBay PlayStation 3 auctions in 2009. We found that the
mode of bidders' estimates of the risk not to be defrauded is increasing with respect to
the number of positive reputations and decreasing with respect to the number of negative
reputations. Using the values of estimated parameters, we compute the ineciency and
the revenue dierence. The ineciency which is the dierence between the total surplus
of the ecient auctions and the total surplus of the online auctions, is estimated $43:50.
The probability of the inecient online auctions is estimated at 0:762. Therefore, 76:2%
of online auctions are inecient auctions. The revenue dierence between the ecient
auctions and the online auctions is estimated at $83:0.
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2.A Implementation of the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm
We describe the MCMC implementation for the procedure in Section 2.3.
First, we set initial values. For example, in Section 2.4, we set initial values (0) =
25; (0) = 10; (0) = (
(0)
0 ; 
(0)
1 ; 
(0)
2 ) = (2:0; 0:1; 0:4); and (0) = ((0)0 ; (0)1 ; (0)2 ) =
( 1:0; 0:0; 0:0).
2.A.1 Sampling  and 
From equation (2.5), the posterior density of (; ) is
(; jw1; :::; wL) /
LY
l=1
[1  F (wlj; )]f(wlj; )[F (wlj; )]N 2(; );
where (; ) is the prior density of (; ). In Section 2.4, the prior distributions of 
and  are
  N(0; 1000) and   N(0; 1000):
The most commonly used algorithm for simulating from posterior distribution is the
Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm. At iteration t, we generate the proposal value,
, from
  N((t 1); 2);
where (t 1) is the draw at iteration t 1 and  is the standard deviation of the proposal
density. The proposal draw, , is accepted into the posterior sample with probability
((t 1); ) = min

(j(t 1); w1; :::; wL)
((t 1)j(t 1); w1; :::; wL)
; 1

;
where (j(t 1); w1; :::; wL) is the posterior density conditional on (t 1). If  is re-
jected, then (t 1) is included in the posterior sample.
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Similarly, we draw the posterior sample (t). We draw the proposal value  from
  N((t 1); 2);
where (t 1) is the draw at iteration t 1 and  is the standard deviation of the proposal
density. The acceptance probability, ((t 1); ), is
((t 1); ) = min

(j(t); w1; :::; wL)
((t 1)j(t); w1; :::; wL)
; 1

;
where (j(t); w1; :::; wL) is the posterior density conditional on (t). Then we obtain
the posterior sample (t) by the following rule:
(t) =
8>><>>:
 with probability ((t 1); ) and
(t 1) with probability 1  ((t 1); ).
2.A.2 Sampling  and 
From equation (2.6), the posterior density of (; ) conditional on ((t); (t)) is
(; j(t); (t);
) /
LY
l=1
[1  F (wlj; )]f(wlj; )[F (wlj; )]N 2(; );
where 
 = (w1; :::; wL; X1; :::; XL; Y1; :::; YL) and (; ) is the prior density of (; ). In
Section 2.4, the prior distributions of  and  are
  N(0; 1000I3) and   N(0; 1000I3);
where I3 is the identity matrix of size 3. We use the random walk-based MH algorithm
to draw the posterior sample, (t). For each k 2 f1; 2; 3g, we draw the proposal value
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k from
k  N((t 1)k ; 2k);
where 
(t 1)
k is the draw at iteration t   1 and k is the standard deviation of the
proposal density. The acceptance probability, (
(t 1)
k ; 

k), is
(
(t 1)
k ; 

k) = min

(k j(t); (t);(t 1) k ; (t 1);
)
(
(t 1)
k j(t); (t);(t 1) k ; (t 1);
)
; 1

;
where (kj(t); (t);(t 1) k ; (t 1);
) is the posterior density conditional on ((t); (t);(t 1) k ; (t 1)).
Then we obtain the posterior sample 
(t)
k by the following rule:

(t)
k =
8>><>>:
k with probability (
(t 1)
k ; 

k) and

(t 1)
k with probability 1  ((t 1)k ; k).
Similarly, we draw the posterior sample 
(t)
k for each k 2 f1; 2; 3g. We draw the
proposal value k from
k  N((t 1)k ; 2k);
where 
(t 1)
k is the draw at iteration t 1 and k is the standard deviation of the proposal
density. The acceptance probability, (
(t 1)
k ; 

k), is
(
(t 1)
k ; 

k) = min

(kj(t); (t);(t); (t 1) k ;
)
(
(t 1)
k j(t); (t);(t); (t 1) k ;
)
; 1

;
where (kj(t); (t);(t); (t 1) k ;
) is the posterior density conditional on ((t); (t);(t); (t 1) k ).
Then we obtain the posterior sample 
(t)
k by the following rule:

(t)
k =
8>><>>:
k with probability (
(t 1)
k ; 

k) and

(t 1)
k with probability 1  ((t 1)k ; k).
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Chapter 3
An Empirical Model of Online
Common Value Auctions with
Buy-It-Now Prices
3.1 Introduction
Recently, auctions have become familiar for many people with the emergence of online
auction sites. For example, eBay, the largest online auction marketplace, hosted 700
million listings with 14 billion dollars of goods traded and had 370 million registered
users around the world in the third quarter of 2008.
However, there are some dierences between online auctions and conventional auc-
tions. One example of these dierence is \buy-it-now price" option.1 In an auction with
a buy price, a seller sets a xed price and a bidder can get the item if he or she accepts
it. In other words, in auctions with buy prices, buyers can purchase goods without the
auctions.
1For example, in eBay, the largest online auction site in the world, the buy price option is called
\Buy-It-Now" option.
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In standard second-price auctions (i.e., auctions without buy prices), each bidder
submits a bid. At the end of the auction, the bidder with the highest bid wins the
object, and he or she pays the winning bid, which equals the second-highest bid. On the
other hand, in buy price trading, a buyer can purchase the object for the xed price set
by the seller. In online auction markets, identical objects are often sold in both auction
and buy-it-now formats. Thus, bidders in online auctions with buy-it-now options must
participate in auctions observing xed buy prices.
There have been many studies regarding structural estimation, which focuses on
online auction markets. However, to the best of our knowledge, few studies have focused
on the buy price options. Most empirical studies in online auction literature ignore
the buy price options and estimate the revenue dierence between online auctions and
(counterfactual) real-world auctions. Houser and Wooders (2006) assume a log-linear
model and examine the eect of reputation on a winning bid. They reported that the
seller's reputation has a statistically signicant eect on the winning bid but that the
bidder's reputation does not. Melnik and Alm (2002) applied the Tobit model and
estimated the impact of the seller's reputation on the willingness of bidders to bid on
items using data concerning coin sales. They found that the seller's reputation has
a positive but small impact on the price paid. Livingston (2005) examined the eect
of the seller's reputation on the bidders' decision to participate and the willingness of
bidders to bid on item. Empirical results using data for golf clubs sold show that the
seller's reputation has a positive impact on both the bidders' decision to participate and
the willingness of bidders to bid on item. Resnick et al. (2006) conducted a controlled
eld experiment. In the experiment, the same honest seller sold to many bidders under
his regular identity, which has a strong reputation, and under a new seller's identity.
Their results show that the established identity fared better; the dierence in bidder's
willingness to pay was 8.1 % of the selling price.
However, since these papers do not focus on the buy price option, these models
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may cause incorrect estimates. In this paper, we construct a structural econometric
model of online common value auction model with a buy-it-now option. Shahriar (2008)
constructed a common value auction model with a buy-it-now option. In experimental
economics literature, Shahriar and Wooders (2011) conducted controlled experiments for
both private and common value auctions with buy prices. While nether study empirical
using real data, we focused on empirical study and the estimation strategy. Ackerberg
et al. (2011) constructed an econometric model of online auctions that focused on buy
price option. They identied risk preference parameters and time impatience parameters
using buy price auction data. While they focused on the independent private values
model, we have focused on the pure common value model.
While the common value auction model is an important theoretical auction model,
few papers have studied the structural estimation of common value auctions. Most stud-
ies on the structural estimation of auction models focus on the private values model. Few
empirical studies focus on the common value model due to the negative result of non-
parametric identication of common value auctions (Athey and Haile (2002) and Athey
and Haile (2007)). 2 Therefore, we specify the parametric forms of the distribution of
structural parameters to avoid the identication problem. A few empirical researches
which study the common value online auctions. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) proposed
the Bayesian estimation method for online common value auction models, specifying nor-
mality for the common value. Wegmann and Villani (2011) also proposed the Bayesian
estimation method for online common value auction models, specifying the gamma dis-
tribution for the common value.
Our empirical example involves eBay mint coin auctions in 2013. We found that when
we ignore the buy prices, we underestimate the mean of bidders' signals corresponding to
2Recently, some papers studied the identication condition of the common value auction model. Li
et al. (2000) showed the identication under the additive separability of common value component.
Fevrier (2008) restricted the shape of density function of common value and showed the identication
of the common value auction model. d'Haultfoeuille and Fevrier (2008) proposed the identication
condition of common value auction model assuming the support of private signal is nite and variates
depending on the common value.
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the value of the good as well as the eect on the signals of positive rating for sellers. We
found that the percentage of positive reputations has a positive eect on the mean of the
signal. We computed the optimal buy price that maximizes the sellers' expected revenue
using the estimated parameters. The estimated optimal buy price is $52:20, which is
almost equal to the average buy prices. We also conducted a revenue comparison. We
compared the revenue between auctions with buy prices and auctions without buy prices.
We found that the mean of the revenue dierence between auctions with buy prices and
those without is $0:05.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, following Shahriar
(2008), we describe the theoretical model of online common value auctions with buy-it-
now options. Section 3.3 describes the estimation strategy for the model described in
Section 3.2. Monte Carlo experiments are conducted in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we
explain the eBay mint coin auction data used in our empirical example. We also present
the estimation results from the eBay mint coin auction data. In Section 3.6, we show
counterfactual simulations. We compute the optimal buy price that maximizes sellers'
expected revenues. In addition, we compare revenue between auctions with and without
buy-it-now prices. Section 3.7 makes some concluding remarks.
3.2 The Model
Since our inference is based on the model of Shahriar (2008), it is worthwhile to review
the theoretical result of Shahriar (2008). Following the precedent of Shahriar (2008),
and Shahriar and Wooders (2011), we describe a common value model of auctions with
a buy-it-now option.
Consider a seller who sells an individual object through an auction. In the auction,
there are n  2 potential bidders. Each bidder, i, receives a private signal, Si, which is
identically and independently distributed random variable from the distribution function,
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F (the density function f). In this model, we consider the pure common value model,
i.e., the ex post value of the item is the same for each bidder. Furthermore, we consider
a specic functional form for the common values. We assume that the ex post valuation
is equal to the average of all signals. That is, the valuation takes the form of
v =
1
n
nX
i=1
si:
Each bidder, i, knows the value of its own signal, si, but does not know the realization of
others' signals, s. Therefore, each bidder does not know the realization of the common
value, v. However, the distribution of signal, F (), is common knowledge among bidders.
We assume that each bidder has a risk neutral utility. Therefore, if bidder i buys the
item and pays a price, p, her utility is v   p.
3.2.1 Auctions with Buy Prices
We regard auctions with buy prices as two-stage games. In the rst-stage, the seller
sets a buy price, p, and all bidders decide to accept or reject buy price p simultaneously.
If at least one bidder accepts buy price p, the auction game ends and the bidder who
accepts wins the item and pays price p.3 If no bidder accepts buy price p, the rst-stage
of the game ends and the auction proceeds to the second stage. In the second stage, the
winner and winning price are determined via a second-price sealed-bid auction. That is,
the winning bidder is the bidder who makes the highest bid, and the winning price is
equal to the second highest bid.
In the rst-stage, after bidder i observes the realization of her signal, si, she decides
whether to accept or reject the buy price, p. Following Shahriar (2008), we considered
symmetric cuto strategies. A cuto strategy for bidder i is a constant, c, such that the
3If n  2 bidder accept the buy price p, we assume that the bidder who accepts the buy price win
the item with probability 1=n.
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bidder will 8>><>>:
accept if si > c
reject otherwise.
Suppose that all bidders except i follow the same cuto strategy. Then, the expected
payo to bidder i with signal si from accepting buy price p is given by
UA(si; c) =
n 1X
l=0
0B@n  1
l
1CAF (c)n 1 l(1  F (c))l 1
l + 1

ul(si)

; (3.1)
where l is the number of bidders except bidder i who accepts buy price p, and
ul(s) =
Z c
 1
  
Z c
 1
Z 1
c
  
Z 1
c

1
n

s+
X
j 6=i
sj

  p

 f(s1)
1  F (c)   
f(sl)
1  F (c)
f(sl+2)
F (c)
   f(sn)
F (c)
ds i:
Next, consider the case in which bidder i rejects buy-it-now price p. Then, she can
get the item only if all of her opponents also reject buy price p and the realization of
bidder i's signal si is the highest among all bidders' signals. Let z be the highest signal
among rivals (i.e., z = maxj 6=i sj) and b() be the equilibrium bidding function of the
second-stage auction.4 Then, if bidder i wins, her payment is b(z). Note that since we
assume the pure common value paradigm, the equilibrium bidding function is
b(s) = E(V jSi = s; z  max
j 6=i
Sj = s):
Thus, the expected payo of bidder i with signal si from rejecting buy price p is given
4In the second-stage, each bidder knows that no bidder accepts the buy price at the rst-stage game.
Therefore, in the second-stage auction, each bidder knows that all bidders' signals are suciently low to
reject the buy price.
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by
UR(si; c) =
Z minfsi;cg
 1
Z s2
 1
  
Z s2
 1

1
n

si +
X
j 6=i
sj

  b(s2)

f(sn)
F (s2)
dsn    f(s3)
F (s2)
ds3

 (n  1)F (s2)n 2f(s2)ds2
= (n  1)
Z minfs;cg
 1
Z s2
 1
  
Z s2
 1

1
n

si +
X
j 6=i
sj

  b(s2)

dF (sn)    dF (s2);
(3.2)
where x2 = z.
A cuto, c, is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if a bidder gets a higher-than-
expected payo by accepting buy price p if x > c and she gets a higher-than-expected
payo by rejecting buy price p if x < c. Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Shahriar (2008)). A symmetric equilibrium cuto, c, satises
UA(c; c) = UR(c; c): (3.3)
3.3 Estimation Procedures
Before discussing how to estimate the auction model with a buy price, we briey describe
the estimation strategy for the simple auction model (i.e., an auction without a buy
price).
We observe T auctions, indexed by t = 1; :::; T . We observe the number of bidders,
nt, and the winning bid, wt, in auction t. Furthermore, we observe the auction-specic
covariate, Xt. The same item is sold in each auction, t 2 f1; :::; Tg. While we focus
on the pure common value auction model, few researchers have studied the econometric
model of the pure common value auction model. One reason that few empirical studies
focus on the the pure common value auction model is that the common value auction
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model is not nonparametrically identied from observed bids.5 Therefore, we specify the
parametric form of the distribution of signal, F (). We assume that bidders' signals are
normally distributed with mean t and variance 
2
t . That is,
Si  N(t; 2t );
where
t = 
0Xt
and
t = exp(
0Xt);
where (;) is the unknown coecient parameter vector to estimate.
Recall that the equilibrium bidding function of the second-stage auction, b(), is given
by
b(s) = E(V jSi = s; Z = max
j 6=i
Sj = s)
= E

1
n
nX
i=1
SijSi = s; Z = s

:
Since b() is a strictly increasing function, there exists an inverse function, (). There-
fore, if we observe only second-stage auctions, the likelihood function of winning bids,
wt, is given by
L(w1; :::; wT j;) =
TY
t=1
ntY
i=1
0B@ nt
1 1 nt   2
1CA [F ((wt)jt; t)]nt 2
 f((wt)jt; t) 1
b0((wt))
[1  F ((wt)jt; t)]; (3.4)
where  = (1; :::; T ), and  = (1; :::; T ).
5See Athey and Haile (2002) for detail.
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Next, we discuss how to estimate the structural parameters of auctions with buy
prices. As described in the previous section, each bidder must decide whether to accept
or reject buy-it-now price p in the rst-stage. We assume that the econometricians can
observe the buy prices, pt, in auction t. If at least one bidder accepts buy-it-now price
pt, the likelihood is given by
1  F (cjt; t)nt :
If each bidder rejects buy-it-now price pt, cuto value c
 exceeds signal si for all i 2
f1; :::; ntg. Then, the likelihood of winning bid wt is given by
ntY
i=1
0B@ nt
1 1 nt   2
1CA [F ((wt)jt; t)]nt 2f((wt)jt; t) 1
b0((wt))
[F (cjt; t) F ((wt)jt; t)]:
Let R = f1; :::; Rg where R < T is the set of buy-it-now trading. Therefore,
f1; :::; TgnR is the set of auctions without buy-it-now prices. Then, the likelihood func-
tion of w = (w1; :::; wT ) and p = (p1; :::; pT ) is given by
L(w;pj;) =
Y
t2R
ntY
i=1
[1  F (ct jt; t)nt ]

Y
t2Rc
ntY
i=1
0B@ nt
1 1 nt   2
1CA [F ((wt)jt; t)]nt 2
 f((wt)jt; t) 1
b0((wt))
[F (ct jt; t)  F ((wt)jt; t)]:
(3.5)
Note that from equation (3.4) and equation (3.5), when we estimate the structural
parameters, ignoring the buy prices, the estimator may be incorrect.
We estimate the structural parameters using the Bayesian method. We compute the
posterior distribution by the standard Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation
method. Let (0) and (0) be the initial value of  and , respectively. Then we repeat
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the following algorithm for a suciently large number, j 2 f1; :::; Jg:
1. Generate (j)j(j 1);w;p
2. Generate (j)j(j);;w;p.
We generate random samples from posterior distributions via random walk-based Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm. Note that from equations (3.1) - (3.3), observing the buy price, pt,
and the random draws, (j) and (j), the value of equilibrium cuto strategy ct can
be computed numerically. Since the inverse bidding function, () = b 1(), cannot be
obtained analytically, we compute the inverse bidding function, (), numerically. Anal-
ogous to cuto strategy ct , observing buy price pt and random draws (j) and (j),
the signal corresponding to winning bid wt can be computed by the Newton-Raphson
method.
3.4 Simulation Experiments
In this section, we estimate the structural parameters in our model using simulation
data. The number of observed auctions is T . We examine the performance of our
estimator with T = 150, 300 and 700. In our simulation experiments, the number of
potential bidders for all auction is N = 5. We set the constant buy price, p = 45:0, for
all t 2 f1; :::; Tg. We generate the auction-specic covariate, Xt, from a standard normal
distribution. We draw the signals, S, from the normal distribution. That is,
Si  i :i :d :N(t; 2t );
where t = 0 + 1Xt and t = exp(0 + 1Xt). The true values of  and  are
0 = 40:0; 1 = 0:4; 0 = 7:0; and 1 = 0:7:
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The prior distribution of  and  are
  N(0; 100I)
and
  N(0; 100I);
where I is the identity matrix of size 2.
We use the random walk-based Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate the ran-
dom draws from posterior distributions. The number of iteration is 20000, and the
burn-in period is 2000 in each case. We estimate the parameters using both the true
likelihood (3.5) and the wrong likelihood (3.4) to compare the performance of the esti-
mation results.
3.4.1 The Case of T = 150
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show results using the true likelihood (3.5) and the wrong likelihood
(3.4), respectively. From Table 3.1, the 95% credible intervals contain the true values
using the likelihood (3.5).
(True) Likelihood (3.5)
True Mean Stdev. 95% interval
0 40.00 39.56 0.46 (38.62, 40.40)
1 0.40 -0.05 0.66 (-1.32, 1.27)
0 7.00 7.12 0.12 (6.89, 7.37)
1 0.70 0.77 0.14 (0.50, 1.04)
Table 3.1: Estimation result with true likelihood (3.5) (T = 150)
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(Wrong) Likelihood (3.4)
True Mean Stdev. 95% interval
0 40.00 36.01 1.22 (33.66, 38.48)
1 0.40 -2.63 1.13 (-4.94, -0.42)
0 7.00 6.94 0.13 (6.69, 7.20)
1 0.70 0.64 0.15 (0.35, 0.92)
Table 3.2: Estimation result with wrong likelihood (3.4) (T = 150)
From Table 3.2, however, the 95% credible intervals do not contain the true values for
0 and 1 using likelihood (3.4). Therefore, we nd that the estimation using likelihood
(3.5) performs well. On the other hand, we nd that when we ignore the buy prices, p,
we fail to estimate the structural parameters correctly.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the posterior densities using likelihood (3.5) and likelihood
(3.4), respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Posterior densities using True Likelihood (3.5) with T = 150
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Figure 3.2: Posterior densities using Wrong Likelihood (3.4) with T = 150
(True) Likelihood (3.5) (Wrong) Likelihood (3.4)
CD IF CD IF
0 0:23 22:71 0:86 10:98
0 0:97 8:70 0:38 11:15
0 0:26 12:92 0:40 5:22
0 0:38 8:28 0:43 5:24
Table 3.3: The Convergence Diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the Ineciency Fac-
tors (IF) (T = 150)
Table 3.3 reports p-values of the convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the
ineciency factors (IF).6 In Table 3.3, from column 2 to column 3, we use true likelihood
(3.5) (i.e., likelihood with buy prices). From column 4 to column 5, we use wrong
likelihood (3.4) (i.e., likelihood ignoring buy prices). All p-values of the convergence
diagnostics are more than 0:2. Furthermore, the ineciency factor values are suciently
6The CD test statistic tests the equality of the means of the rst and last parts of the sample path.
The denition of ineciency factor is 1 + 2
P1
k=1 (k), where (k) is the sample autocorrelation at lag
k.
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low. The ineciency factors are 5:22 to 22:71, which imply that we would gain the same
variance of the posterior means from 880 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the sample paths of the estimated parameters using likelihood
(3.5) and likelihood (3.4), respectively. From Figures 3.3 and 3.4, it can be seen that the
sample paths of these parameters converge to posterior distributions. Thus, we conclude
that the sample paths of the estimated parameters converge to posterior distributions.
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Figure 3.3: Sample paths of parameters with T = 150 (true Likelihood (3.5))
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Figure 3.4: Sample paths of parameters with T = 150 (Wrong Likelihood (3.4))
3.4.2 The Case of T = 300
Results are shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. In Table 3.4, we use the true likelihood (3.5)
(i.e., likelihood with buy prices) to compute the posterior distributions. In Table 3.5,
in contrast, we use the wrong likelihood (3.4) (i.e., likelihood ignoring buy prices) to
compute the posterior distributions.
(True) Likelihood (3.5)
True Mean Stdev. 95% interval
0 40.00 39.80 0.28 (39.24, 40.32)
1 0.40 -0.26 0.33 (-0.88, 0.43)
0 7.00 7.01 0.08 (6.85, 7.17)
1 0.70 0.68 0.08 (0.52, 0.82)
Table 3.4: Estimation result with true likelihood (3.5) (T = 300)
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(Wrong) Likelihood (3.4)
True Mean Stdev. 95% interval
0 40.00 37.38 0.82 (35.76, 39.01)
1 0.40 -1.65 0.70 (-3.04, -0.27)
0 7.00 6.88 0.09 (6.71, 7.06)
1 0.70 0.63 0.09 (0.45, 0.79)
Table 3.5: Estimation result with wrong likelihood (3.4) (T = 300)
From Table 3.4, the 95% credible intervals contain the true values using likelihood
(3.5). However, from Table 3.5, the 95% credible intervals do not contain the true values
for 0 and 1 using likelihood (3.4). Therefore, we nd that the estimation using the
likelihood (3.5) performs well. On the other hand, we nd that when we ignore the buy
prices, p, we fail to estimate the structural parameters correctly.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the posterior densities using likelihood (3.5) and likelihood
(3.4), respectively.
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Figure 3.5: Posterior densities using true likelihood (3.5) with T = 300
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Figure 3.6: Posterior densities using wrong likelihood (3.4) with T = 300
(True) Likelihood (3.5) (Wrong) Likelihood (3.4)
CD IF CD IF
0 0:46 21:36 0:70 10:34
0 0:74 13:05 0:72 11:40
0 0:68 17:57 0:77 4:57
0 0:99 6:88 0:42 5:77
Table 3.6: The Convergence Diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the Ineciency Fac-
tors (IF) (T = 300)
Table 3.6 reports p-values of the convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the
ineciency factors (IF). In Table 3.6, from column 2 to column 3, we use true likelihood
(3.5) (i.e., likelihood with buy prices). From column 4 to column 5, we use wrong
likelihood (3.4) (i.e., likelihood ignoring buy prices). All p-values of the convergence
diagnostics are more than 0:4. Furthermore, the ineciency factor values are suciently
low. The ineciency factors are 4:57 to 21:36, which imply that we would gain the same
variance of the posterior means from 930 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case.
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Figure 3.7 and 3.8 show the sample paths of the estimated parameters using likelihood
(3.5) and likelihood (3.4), respectively. From Figures 3.7 and 3.8, it can be seen that the
sample paths of these parameters converge to posterior distributions. Thus, we conclude
that the sample paths of the estimated parameters converge to posterior distributions.
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Figure 3.7: Sample paths of parameters with T = 300 (true likelihood (3.5))
65
alpha0 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
36
38
40
alpha1 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
beta0 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
6.8
7.0
beta1 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
0.4
0.6
0.8
Figure 3.8: Sample paths of parameters with T = 300 (wrong likelihood (3.4))
3.4.3 The Case of T = 700
Results are shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. In Table 3.7, we use the true likelihood (3.5)
(i.e., likelihood with buy prices) to compute the posterior distributions. In Table 3.8,
in contrast, we use the wrong likelihood (3.4) (i.e., likelihood ignoring buy prices) to
compute the posterior distributions.
(True) Likelihood (3.5)
True Mean Stdev. 95% interval
0 40.00 40.12 0.17 (39.77, 40.44)
1 0.40 0.58 0.22 (0.15, 1.01)
0 7.00 6.96 0.05 (6.86, 7.07)
1 0.70 0.66 0.06 (0.54, 0.77)
Table 3.7: Estimation result with true likelihood (3.5) (T = 700)
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(Wrong) Likelihood (3.4)
True Mean Stdev. 95% interval
0 40.00 37.44 0.52 (36.41, 38.46)
1 0.40 -1.54 0.49 (-2.51, -0.63)
0 7.00 6.80 0.06 (6.68, 6.92)
1 0.70 0.51 0.07 (0.38, 0.64)
Table 3.8: Estimation result with wrong likelihood (3.4) (T = 700)
From Table 3.7, the 95% credible intervals contain the true values using likelihood
(3.5). However, from Table 3.8, the 95% credible intervals do not contain the true values
for all parameters using likelihood (3.4). Therefore, we nd that the estimation using
the likelihood (3.5) performs well. On the other hand, we nd that when we ignore the
buy prices, p, we fail to estimate the structural parameters correctly.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the posterior densities using likelihood (3.5) and likelihood
(3.4), respectively.
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Figure 3.9: Posterior densities using true likelihood (3.5) with T = 700
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Figure 3.10: Posterior densities using wrong likelihood (3.4) with T = 700
(True) Likelihood (3.5) (Wrong) Likelihood (3.4)
CD IF CD IF
0 0:22 11:89 0:42 10:22
0 0:84 5:05 0:20 10:26
0 0:98 8:32 0:64 4:02
0 0:34 11:06 0:44 5:41
Table 3.9: The Convergence Diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the Ineciency Fac-
tors (IF) (T = 700)
Table 3.9 reports p-values of the convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the
ineciency factors (IF). In Table 3.9, from column 2 to column 3, we use true likelihood
(3.5) (i.e., likelihood with buy prices). From column 4 to column 5, we use wrong
likelihood (3.4) (i.e., likelihood ignoring buy prices). All p-values of the convergence
diagnostics are more than 0:2. Furthermore, the ineciency factor values are suciently
low. The ineciency factors are 5:05 to 11:89 with true likelihood. This implies that we
would gain the same variance of the posterior means from 1680 uncorrelated draws, even
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in the worst case. Similarly, the ineciency factors are 4:02 to 10:26 when we ignore the
buy prices. Therefore, we would gain the same variance of the posterior sample means
from 1949 uncorrelated draws even in the worst case. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the
sample paths of the estimated parameters using likelihood (3.5) and likelihood (3.4),
respectively. From Figures 3.11 and 3.12, it can be seen that the sample paths of these
parameters converge to posterior distributions. Thus, we conclude that the sample paths
of the estimated parameters converge to posterior distributions.
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Figure 3.11: Sample paths of parameters with T = 700 (true likelihood (3.5))
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Figure 3.12: Sample paths of parameters with T = 700 (wrong likelihood (3.4))
3.5 Empirical Illustrations
3.5.1 Data Description
Our empirical example examines auctions of 2005 U.S. mint silver proof coin sets held on
eBay in 2013. Data were collected from 152 completed eBay auctions from June through
July of 2013. Auctions with fewer than two actual bidders were dropped since there is
no competition with no bidder or one bidder.
As we can see from the studies of Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Wegmann and
Villani (2011), who studied coin auctions in their empirical illustrations, coin auctions
are excellent examples in the empirical study of common value auction models. While
both Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Wegmann and Villani (2011) collected various
kinds of coins in their empirical illustrations, we collected only 2005 U.S. mint silver
proof coin sets. Therefore, we can estimate the distribution of signals, F (), with fewer
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covariates.
Mean Median Std Max Min
Winning bid 38.74 39.07 3.22 46.43 29.53
Rating ratio 0.91 0.98 0.15 1.00 0.22
Number of actual bidders 4.32 4.00 1.12 8.00 2.00
Buy-it-now price 45.74 45.96 3.19 54.15 37.91
Table 3.10: Summary statistics (2005 U.S. mint silver proof coin set, # of obs. = 152)
Table 3.10 summarizes the statistics. The rst column describes the variables. The
\winning bid" is the transaction price and the second-highest bid in the eBay auction.
Note that the \winning bid" does not contain the transaction price via the \buy-It-Now"
option. From Table 3.10, on average, one could get the mint silver proof coin for $39 via
auction. The \rating ratio" is the percentage of \positive ratings" in the total ratings
(i.e., sum of \positive ratings" and \negative ratings"). \Positive ratings" denotes the
number of positive ratings a seller receives. \Negative ratings" is the sum of the number
of negative ratings and the number of neutral ratings a seller receives. Since the number
of neutral ratings and the number of negative ratings are usually small relative to the
number of positive ratings, we regard neutral ratings as negative ratings. \Number of
actual bidders" is the number of participants who actually bid at auction t. \Buy price"
denotes the transaction price via the buy-it-now option. From Table 3.10, the average
\buy-it-now price" is about $46. Therefore, the transaction price via the \buy-it-now"
option is higher than the transaction price via auction by an average of $7.
3.5.2 Estimation Results
We estimate the structural parameters using the U.S. mint silver proof coin data de-
scribed above. We assume that the signal, Si, follows the normal distribution. That
is,
Si  i :i :d :N(t; 2t );
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where t = 0 + 1Xt and t = exp(0 + 1Xt). The parameters  = (0; 1) and
 = (0; 1) are unknown to econometricians. In this empirical illustration, the auction-
specic covariate, Xt, is the \rating ratio." That is, Xt is the percentage of \positive
ratings" in the total ratings.
The prior distributions of  and  are
  N(0; 100I)
and
  N(0; 100I);
where I is the identity matrix of order 2.
Similar to the simulation experiments in Section 3.4, we estimate the parameters
using likelihood (3.5) (i.e., true likelihood) and likelihood (3.4) (i.e., wrong likelihood).
We use the random walk-based Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate the random
draws from posterior distributions. The number of iterations is 100000, and the burn-in
period is 10000 when we use the likelihood (3.5). Similarly, The number of iterations is
70000, and the burn-in period is 5000 for the estimation using likelihood (3.4).
(True) Likelihood (3.5) (Wrong) Likelihood (3.4)
CD IF CD IF
0 0:15 335:12 0:06 238:44
0 0:14 333:25 0:05 236:95
0 0:43 331:09 0:97 256:15
0 0:45 327:86 0:98 255:10
Table 3.11: The Convergence Diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the Ineciency
Factors (IF)
Table 3.11 reports p-values of the convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and
ineciency factors (IF). All p-values of the convergence diagnostics are more than 0:05.
Furthermore, the values of the ineciency factor values are suciently low. For like-
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lihood (3.5), the ineciency factors are 327:86 to 335:12, which imply that we would
gain the same variance of the posterior means from 298 uncorrelated draws, even in the
worst case. Similarly, for likelihood (3.4), the ineciency factors are 236:95 to 256:15,
which imply that we would gain the same variance of the posterior means from 273
uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 shows the sample paths of the estimated parameters using
true likelihood (3.5) and wrong likelihood (3.4), respectively. From Figures 3.13 and
3.14, it can be seen that the sample paths of these parameters converge to posterior
distributions. Thus, we conclude that the sample paths of the estimated parameters
converge to posterior distributions.
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Figure 3.13: Sample paths of parameters using true likelihood (3.5)
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Figure 3.14: Sample paths of parameters using wrong likelihood (3.4)
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 provide the posterior inferences using likelihood (3.5) and (3.4),
respectively. In Tables 3.12 and 3.13, the second column is the posterior mean, the third
column is the posterior standard deviation, and the fourth column provides the 95%
credible intervals of the posterior distributions.
(True) Likelihood (3.5)
Mean Stdev. 95% interval
0 44.78 2.80 (39.10, 49.71)
1 4.23 2.97 (-1.06, 10.24)
0 8.33 0.74 (6.94, 9.77)
1 -0.95 0.80 (-2.49, 0.55)
Table 3.12: Estimation result with true likelihood (3.4)
74
(Wrong) Likelihood (3.4)
Mean Stdev. 95% interval
0 38.37 1.78 (34.48, 41.65)
1 1.39 1.92 (-2.18, 5.51)
0 5.18 0.84 (3.57, 6.95)
1 -0.17 0.91 (-2.08, 1.59)
Table 3.13: Estimation result with wrong likelihood (3.4)
Figures 3.15 and 3.16 show the posterior densities.
alpha0 
35 40 45 50
0.05
0.10
Density
alpha1 
-5 0 5 10 15
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125 Density
beta0 
6 7 8 9 10 11
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Density
beta1 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5 Density
Figure 3.15: Posterior densities using true likelihood (3.5)
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Figure 3.16: Posterior densities using wrong likelihood (3.4)
Comparing the estimation results, both the values of 0 and 1 in Table 3.12 are
higher than those of 0 and 1 in Table 3.13. Since t = 0 +1Xt is the mean of each
bidder's signal, Sit, estimation without buy prices (i.e., estimation result using likelihood
(3.4)) may underestimate the true distribution of bidders' signals. The posterior mean
of 1 with buy prices is higher than that of 1 without buy prices. Since the covariate
is the percentage of \positive ratings," estimates without buy prices may underestimate
the eect of \positive ratings." Both the 95% credible intervals of 1 in Table 3.12 and
3.13 contain zero. However, Figure 3.15 shows that most of 1 takes positive values
using likelihood (3.5). The probability that 1 takes negative values is 0:07 when we use
likelihood (3.5). In contrast, Figure 3.16 shows that 1 takes negative values at a rate
that cannot be ignored when we estimate without buy prices. The probability that 1
takes negative values is 0:23 when we use likelihood (3.4). Similarly, the 95% credible
intervals of 1 in Table 3.12 and 3.13 contain zero. However, Figure 3.15 shows that
most of 1 takes negative values using likelihood (3.5). The probability that 1 takes
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negative values is 0:87. In contrast, Figure 3.16 shows that 1 takes positive values at
a signicant rate using likelihood (3.4). The probability that 1 takes negative values is
0:56.
From the estimation results, we nd that the posterior mean of 1 is positive. This
implies that the percentage of positive reputations has a positive eect on the mean
of bidders' signals, S. On the other hand, the posterior mean of 1 is negative. This
result implies that if the ratio of the positive reputations increases, the variance of signal
becomes smaller. These results seem plausible.
3.6 Counterfactual Simulations
In this section, we present several counterfactual simulations using the estimated param-
eters. First, we compute the optimal buy price which maximizes the sellers' expected
revenues.
3.6.1 Optimal Buy Price
In our theoretical model described in Section 3.2, each bidder decides whether to accept
or reject buy prices after watching the buy-it-now prices. Therefore, the expected revenue
(i.e., the expected transaction price) of the seller depends on the buy prices. In this
subsection, we compute the optimal buy price that maximizes the expected revenue of
sellers using the estimated parameters,  = (0; 1) and  = (0; 1).
Let  = (0; 1) and  = (0; 1) be the posterior means of  and . In addition,
let \ PRN" be the sample average of the \rating ratio," i.e.,
 = (44:78; 4:23);  = (8:33; 0:95); and PRN = 0:91:
We compute the optimal buy price using the parameters ; ; and PRN. We employ
the grid search method to compute the optimal buy price. From the buy prices of
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p = $40:00 to $60:00 with increment $0:01, we execute the following procedure.
First, we generate random draws, s
(t)
1 ; :::; s
(t)
N from N(; 
2), where  = 0+ 1 PRN
and 2 = exp(0 + 1 PRN). Then we compute the transaction prices of auctions with
buy price, p, and the winning bids of auctions without buy prices. The equilibrium
transaction prices of auctions with buy prices can be computed using the procedure
described in Section 3.2 for each buy price of p = 40:00; 40:01; :::; 60:00. Let w
(t)
 be
the transaction price of auctions with buy prices. Similarly, since bidder i with signal
si in auctions without buy prices bids bi = E(
1
N
Pn
i=1 SijSi = s;maxj 6=i Sj = s), we
can compute the bids of auctions without buy prices from s
(t)
1 ; :::; s
(t)
N and the estimated
parameters. Iterate this procedure until t becomes a large number, T . In our example,
T = 5000. Since the expected revenue is E(W), the sample average of w
(t)
 estimates
the expected revenue.
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Figure 3.17: Expected revenue and buy prices from the eBay mint coin data
Figure 3.17 shows the expected revenue of auctions with buy prices and corresponding
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buy prices from $40:0 to $60:0. The horizontal axis is the buy price, and the vertical
axis represents the expected revenue of auctions with buy prices.
When the seller sets the buy price too low, each bidder accepts the buy prices.
Therefore, the expected revenue of sellers is equal to the buy price that the seller sets
when the buy price is suciently low. In Figure 3.17, the expected revenues are equal
to buy prices from $40:0 to $43:0. That is, we nd that bidders will accept the buy
prices when p 2 [40:0; 43:0]. On the other hand, when the seller sets the price too high,
every bidder rejects the buy price. Thus, the expected revenue of a buy price auction is
equal to that of a standard auction (i.e., auction without buy-it-now prices) when the
buy price is suciently high. In our empirical example, the estimated expected revenue
of standard auctions is about $45:56. In Figure 3.17, we nd that the expected revenues
of auctions with a buy-it-now option are equal to those of standard auctions, $45:56,
when buy prices are higher than $56:24. Besides, for p > 49:00, the expected revenue
does not substantially change in our empirical example.
According to the results of our computation, the optimal buy price that maximizes
expected revenue is $53:20. Note that from Table 3.10, the average buy prices is about
$45:74. Therefore, we nd that in eBay mint coin auctions, the optimal buy price is
higher than the average buy price that sellers set.
3.6.2 Revenue Comparison
As discussed in Section 3.2, the transaction prices in auctions with buy prices may not
be equal to the transaction prices in auctions without buy prices since buyers may accept
the buy prices. Therefore, the expected revenue of auctions with buy prices may not
equal that of auctions without buy prices. In this subsection, we compare the revenues
of auctions with buy prices and those without.
We estimate the expected revenue dierence (i.e., the dierence between the expected
revenue with buy prices and those without) in the eBay mint coin auction market using
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the estimated parameters. Similar to the previous subsection, let  = (0; 1) and
 = (0; 1) be the posterior means of  and . In addition, let \ PRN" be the sample
average of the \rating ratio," i.e.,
 = (44:78; 4:23);  = (8:33; 0:95); and PRN = 0:91:
We estimate the revenue dierence using ; ; and PRN. The procedure is similar to
the computation of the expected revenues of price auctions. First, we generate random
draws s
(t)
1 ; :::; s
(t)
N from N(; 
2), where  = 0 + 1 PRN and 
2 = exp(0 + 1 PRN).
Then, we compute the transaction prices of auctions with buy prices and the winning
bids of auctions without buy prices. Since bidder i with signal si in auctions without
buy prices bids bi = E(
1
N
Pn
i=1 SijSi = s;maxj 6=i Sj = s), we can compute the bids of
auctions without buy prices from s
(t)
1 ; :::; s
(t)
N and the estimated parameters. Let w
(t) be
the winning bid of an auction without a buy price. Similarly, the equilibrium transaction
prices of auctions with buy prices can be computed following the procedure described
in Section 3.2. Let w
(t)
 be the transaction price of an auction with a buy price. Then,
the revenue dierence between auctions with buy prices and auctions without them can
be obtained by w
(t)
   w(t). Iterate this procedure until t becomes a large number, T .
In our example, T = 5000. We execute the procedure for buy prices p = $40:0 to $60:0
with the increment $0:01.
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Figure 3.18: Expected revenue dierence from the eBay mint coin data
Figure 3.18 shows the expected revenue dierence, E(W  W ), and corresponding
buy prices from $40:0 to $60:0. The horizontal axis is the buy price, and the vertical
axis represents the expected revenue dierence.
Since the expected revenue of standard auctions does not depend on the buy price and
equals $45:56 in eBay mint coin auctions, the graph of the expected revenue dierence
in Figure 3.18 is same shape as that of the expected revenue of buy price auctions in
Figure 3.17 except the scale of vertical axis. Therefore, the buy price that maximizes the
revenue dierence is $53:20, which is the optimal buy price that maximizes the expected
revenue of auctions with a buy-it-now option. The maximized revenue dierence is $0:05.
This result implies that, on average, sellers can realize an additional prot of $0:05 when
they set the buy price at $53:20.
When the seller sets price too low, every bidder accepts the buy price. Therefore, the
graph for the buy prices p 2 [40:0; 43:0], has a linear shape. On the other hand, when
the seller sets prices too high, every bidder rejects the buy price. Thus, the expected
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revenue of an auction with a buy-it-now option is equal to that of a standard auction
when the buy price is suciently high. Then, the revenue dierence equals zero. In
Figure 3.18, we nd that the expected revenues of auctions with buy-it-now prices are
zero when the prices are higher than $56:24. However, the revenue dierence is nearly
zero and does not substantially change for p > 49:00. Furthermore, for p  49:00, the
revenue of auctions without buy price is greater than that of auctions with buy price
for p  49:00. As a result, the revenue dierence is negative or nearly zero for any buy
price p.
Table 3.14 presents the summarized statistics of the revenue dierences and buy
prices. In Table 3.14, the \acceptance rate" represents the estimated probability that at
least one bidder will accept the buy price in rst-stage game.
Buy price AR Mean Stdev. 25% quantile Median 75% quantile IQR
40.00 1.00 -5.57 11.26 -13.52 -6.20 1.81 15.33
43.00 1.00 -2.57 11.26 -10.52 -3.20 4.80 15.33
45.00 0.99 -0.83 10.92 -8.52 -1.20 6.48 15.00
50.00 0.65 -0.03 7.90 -3.52 0.00 1.75 5.27
52.00 0.41 -0.05 6.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
53.20 0.27 0.05 5.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
56.00 0.01 -0.02 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
60.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3.14: Summary statistics of revenue dierences and buy prices (AR: Acceptance
rate, IQR: Interquartile range)
As described above, when the buy price is $53:20, the expected revenue dierence is
maximized and equal to $0:05. Since the acceptance rates are 1 for p 2 [40:00; 43:00],
the transaction prices are equal to the buy prices. In addition, the winning bids without
buy prices do not depend on those prices. Therefore, for p 2 [40:00; 43:00], the standard
deviation and interquartile range are invariant. We nd that the acceptance rate de-
creases quickly for buy prices p > 47. The standard deviation decreases as the buy price
increases. Similarly, the interquartile range of revenue dierence (i.e., dierence between
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the 75% quantile and the 25% quantile of revenue dierence) decreases. In particular,
for p 2 [52; 60], both the 25% quantile and the 75% quantile are 0, and the standard
deviation is quite small. These results imply that the distribution of revenue dierences
converges to the degenerate distribution that only takes 0 as p increases in probability.
This result is reasonable, since the transaction prices with buy prices become the win-
ning bids without buy prices when the buy prices are too high. When the buy price, p,
is too high, no bidder accepts the price in the rst stage. Then, the transaction prices
are determined in the second-stage auction games. Since the second-stage auction games
coincide with auctions without buy prices, the transaction prices with buy prices equal
the winning bids without buy prices when the buy prices are suciently high. Decreases
in the standard deviation and the interquartile range of revenue dierence represent this
phenomenon.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a method for estimating online common value auction models
with buy price options. In online auction markets, buyers must submit their bids while
observing the xed buy prices. Therefore, when we estimate the structural parameters
of online auction models, we must take into account the buy price. When we ignore the
buy-it-now prices, estimates may be incorrect.
Our empirical example is eBay mint coin auctions in 2013. We found that when we
ignore the buy prices, we underestimate the mean of bidders' signals corresponding to
the value of the good as well as the eect on the signals of positive ratings for sellers.
Furthermore, we found that the percentage of positive reviews has a positive eect on
the mean of the signal. We computed the optimal buy price that maximizes the sellers'
revenue using the estimated parameters. We found that the optimal buy price was
$53:20, which is higher than the average buy prices that we observed. We also conducted
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a revenue comparison. We compared the revenue between auctions with and without
buy prices. We found that the mean of the revenue dierence between auctions with and
without buy prices was $0:05. Therefore, sellers can realize additional gain from auctions
with buy-it-now price options when they set the optimal price, p = $53:20. Furthermore,
we found that at least one bidder accepts the optimal buy price with probability 0:27.
Our ndings open the door to areas of future research. In this paper, we assume
that the bidder is risk neutral. However, Ackerberg et al. (2011) cover risk aversion and
time impatience in their model. Therefore, risk aversion and time impatience can be
considered in this model.
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Chapter 4
An Empirical Analysis of
Bundling Sales in Online Auction
Markets
4.1 Introduction
Today, many people use consumer-to-consumer electronic commerce sites to buy (or sell)
goods. In particular, with the emergence of online auction sites (e.g., eBay and Yahoo!),
many people have become familiar with auctions.
Many studies have focused on online auctions. Examples include Melnik and Alm
(2002), Livingston (2005), Houser and Wooders (2006), and Resnick et al. (2006) regard-
ing the eect of reputation on sellers' revenue; Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) regarding
common value auctions and the winners' curse; Bapna et al. (2008) and Giray et al.
(2009) regarding consumer surplus; Adams (2007) regarding demand on eBay; Hossain
and Morgan (2005) regarding the revenue equivalence theorem; and Roth and Ockenfels
(2002) regarding snipe bidding.
In such tradings, sellers often sell two or more items as bundling auctions. However,
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other sellers sell the same items separately. In this paper, we focus on bundling auctions
of online auction markets. We propose an empirical model of online common value
auctions for both bundling auctions and separate auctions.
Some papers focus on the bundling auction model in theoretical literature. Palfrey
(1983) studied bundling auctions with two bidders. He found that bundling auctions
generate more expected revenues with two bidders within the private values paradigm.
Chakraborty (1999) extended Palfrey (1983) to a general number of bidders. He found
that if the number of bidders grows large, the expected revenue of separate sales becomes
greater than that of bundling auctions. While Chakraborty (1999) studied the private
values model, Chakraborty (2002) studied the common value auction model and found
the eect that they call the winner's curse reduction eect in bundling auctions. He also
compared the expected revenues between bundling auctions and separate auctions.
Our empirical example involves eBay mint coin auctions in 2014. In our data set,
there are two kinds of coin sets: 11-coin sets and 22-coin sets. We regard the 11-coin
sets as separate items and the 22-coin sets as bundled items. We also conduct some
counterfactual simulations using the estimated parameters. We evaluated the winner's
curse reduction eect in the sense of Chakraborty (2002) and compared revenue between
bundling auctions and separate auctions. Chakraborty (2002) showed that bidders will
bid more aggressively in separate auctions than in bundling auctions; he named this
eect the winner's curse reduction eect. We measured the magnitude of the winner's
curse reduction eect. We found that bidders in separate auctions will bid $2:5 higher
than in bundling auctions. For revenue comparison, we found that the expected revenue
in a bundling auction is higher than that in separate auctions by $0:37. Since the average
transaction price of bundled items (22-coin sets) is $8:98, the value of additional gains
are not negligible.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the model
of online auctions within the pure common value paradigm. Additionally, following
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Chakraborty (2002), we review the theoretical results for the bundling auctions. Section
4.3 describes the estimation strategy for the model described in Section 4.2. We utilize
Bayesian estimation to estimate the structural parameters. In Section 4.4, we conduct
some simulation experiments. In Section 4.5, we estimate the structural parameters using
real auction data. Our empirical example is eBay mint coin set auctions in 2014. In
Section 4.6, we compute the winner's curse reduction eect in the sense of Chakraborty
(2002) and compare the revenue between separate auctions and bundling auctions using
the estimated parameters. Section 4.7 features some concluding remarks.
4.2 The Model
There are N risk neutral potential bidders and a seller. The number of potential bidders,
N , is a random variable and an exogenous variable. The seller sells two dierent objects
k = 1 and 2. In this model, we consider the pure common value model in which the
ex post valuation of the item is the same for each bidder. Let V1 and V2 denote the
values for items 1 and 2, respectively. The realizations of values are unknown to the
bidders. Instead, each bidder, i, receives her private signals corresponding to V1 and V2,
which are denoted by S1i and S2i, respectively. Each bidder knows the realization of her
own private signal but does not know the others' before auctions. However, both the
distribution of S1i and the distribution of S2i are common knowledge among bidders.
In this paper, we consider a specic functional form for V1 and V2. We assume that the
value of each item to bidders is the average of their signals. That is, the valuations take
the form of
V1 =
1
N
NX
i=1
S1i and
V2 =
1
N
NX
i=1
S2i;
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respectively. 1 For the bundled item, we impose the additive separability on bidder i's
signal for the bundled items, Si. Namely, we assume that Si = S1i + S2i. Then, from
our specic functional form for the value, the valuation of the bundled item, V , is
V =
1
N
NX
i=1
Si
=
1
N
NX
i=1
(S1i + S2i)
= V1 + V2:
We assume that Sk1; :::; SkN are independently and identically distributed. Namely,
Ski  i :i :d : Fk(x)
for k 2 f1; 2g. We assume that S1i and S2i are independently distributed. Furthermore,
we assume that for each k 2 f1; 2g, Ski is aliated with S1i+S2i in the sense of Milgrom
and Weber (1982).
4.2.1 Equilibrium
In this paper, we regard online eBay auctions as second-price auctions. That is, each
bidder submits her bid and the bidder with the highest bid among bidders wins the
object and pays the second highest bid. Then, the equilibrium bidding strategies in
separate auctions for items k = 1 and 2 are straightforward arguments from Milgrom
and Weber (1982).
Let Yki be the highest signal except bidder i's signal, Ski. That is, Yki = maxj 6=i Skj .
Then, the equilibrium bidding functions for bidder i with private signals S1i = s1 and
1This specication is the special case of Chakraborty (2002) and has been used in several papers.
Example are Goeree and Oerman (2002) for auctions within common value and private values paradigm
and Shahriar (2008) and Shahriar and Wooders (2011) for auctions with buy prices model.
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S2i = s2 in separate auctions are given by
b1(s1) = E[V1jS1i = s1; Y1i = s1] (4.1)
and
b2(s2) = E[V2jS2i = s2; Y2i = s2] (4.2)
for items k = 1 and 2, respectively.
Analogously, the equilibrium bidding function for bundling auctions can be derived
in the same manner. Let Si = S1i + S2i be the sum of bidder i's signals, S1i and S2i.
Furthermore, let G() denote the cumulative distribution function of Si = S1i + S2i.
In other words, G() is the convolution of F1() and F2(). Then, S1; :::; SN are also
independently and identically distributed with the CDF G(). Namely,
Si  i :i :d : G(s):
Let Yi be the highest signal except bidder i's signal, Si. That is, Yi = maxj 6=i Sj . Then,
using an argument similar to that of a separate auction, we gain the equilibrium bidding
function for bidder i with signal Si = s in the bundling auctions
b(s) = E[V1 + V2jSi = s; Yi = s]: (4.3)
4.2.2 Bundling Auctions versus Separate Auction
Since we computed the various eects of bundling auctions in our empirical example, it is
worthwhile to review the theoretical result of bundling auctions within the common value
paradigm. Chakraborty (2002) discussed the bundling auctions model and the separate
auctions model within the pure common value paradigm. Furthermore, he discussed the
eect of bundling auctions and separate auctions with some useful examples. In this
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subsection, we review the results of Chakraborty (2002).
Chakraborty (2002) discussed that bundling auctions have a winner's curse reducing
eect. The intuitive explanation of the winner's curse reducing eect is as follows. In
separate auctions of k = 1 and 2, winning the items k = 1; 2 implies that each winner
has the highest signal on each item. On the other hand, in a bundling auction, winning
the bundled item implies that the winner has the highest signal for the bundled item
but not for individual items, k = 1 and 2. Therefore, winning the bundling auction is
not as bad as winning two separate auctions. The following theorem is the Theorem 1
in Chakraborty (2002). They call the result of Theorem 1 the winner's curse reducing
eect.
Theorem 1 (Chakraborty (2002)). A bidder bids more aggressively when the objects
are bundled. That is,
b(s)  b1(s1) + b2(s2);
where s = s1 + s2.
4.3 Estimation
The results of equilibrium bidding strategies (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) are familiar to
economists. However, few empirical studies focus on the structural estimation of common
value auction models. The main reason is the negative result of nonparametric identi-
cation on the common value auction model. Athey and Haile (2002) and Athey and
Haile (2007) showed the conditional distribution of Ski, given Vk is not identied from
the observed bids in the common value auction model without additional identication
conditions.
Therefore, most studies of structural estimation of the auction model focus on the
private values model. Recently, some papers have studied the identication condition
of the common value auction model. For example, Li et al. (2000) showed the identi-
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cation under the additive separability of the common value component. Fevrier (2008)
restricted the shape of the density function of the common value and showed the identi-
cation of the common value auction model. d'Haultfoeuille and Fevrier (2008) proposed
the identication condition of the common value auction model, assuming the support
of a private signal is nite and varies depending on the common value. In this paper,
we impose parametric specication to avoid the identication problem.
4.3.1 Estimation Procedure
We observe Tk auctions indexed by t = 1; :::; Tk for item k 2 f1; 2g. The same items
are each sold in separate auctions. Analogously, we observe T auctions indexed by
t = 1; :::; T for bundling auctions. We can observe each bidder's bid, Bkit, and the
number of actual bidders, nt, for bidder i, for item kf1; 2g, and for auction tf1; :::; Tkg.
We cannot observe each bidder's signals, Skit and Sit, the common value, Vkt and Vt,
and the number of potential bidders, Nt.
An unknown number of potential bidders, Nt, can be a problem for identication, in
general. Within the private values paradigm, several papers proposed a novel method for
identifying the structural parameters when econometricians cannot observe the number
of potential bidders (Paarsch (1997); Song (2004); An et al. (2010); and Shneyerov and
Wong (2011)). However, for common value auctions, to the best of our knowledge, no
paper has focused on this issue. Therefore, we assume that the number of potential
bidders is constant among auctions as is the maximum number of actual number of
bidders observable by econometricians such as Guerre et al. (2000).
Following the example of Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), we assume that bidders' sig-
nals, Skit, are normally distributed with mean, kt, and variance, 
2
kt. That is, for
k 2 1; 2,
Skit  N(kt; 2kt);
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where
kt = 
0
kXkt
and
2ktk = (exp(k1); :::; exp(kd))Xkt;
where d represents the dimensionality of the vector of the coecient parameter, and
Xkt is the vector of the auction-specic covariate. The values of k = (k1; :::; kd)
and k = (k1; :::; kd) are unknown to econometricians; therefore, we estimate these
parameters.
Recall that the equilibrium bidding function bk() is given by
bk(sk) = E(VktjSkit = sk; Ykit = sk):
Since bk() is a strictly increasing function, there exists an inverse function k(). Note
that since we considered second-price auctions, the winning bid of item k, wkt, in auction
t is the second-highest bid in auction t. Therefore, observing the winning bids, the
likelihood function for separate auctions is given by
L(w1; :::; wktjk;k; (Xk1; :::; Xkt)) =
TkY
t=1
0B@ N
1 1 N   2
1CA [Fk(k(wkt)jkt; 2kt)]N 2
 fk(k(wkt)jkt; 2kt)
1
b0k(k(wkt))
 [1  Fk(k(wkt)jkt; 2kt)]; (4.4)
where fk() is the probability density function of Skit. In this case, fk() is the normal
density function.
The likelihood function for bundling auctions can be derived in the same manner.
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We assume that Sit is the normal random draw with mean t and variance 
2
t . That is,
Sit  N(t; 2t )
where
t = 
0Xt
and
2t = (exp(1); :::; exp(d))Xt;
where  = (1; :::; d) and  = (1; :::; d) are the unknown coecient parameter vector
to be estimated.
Since the equilibrium bidding function, b(), is a strictly increasing function, there
exists an inverse function, (). Similar to the separate auctions, since we considered
second-price auctions, the winning bid, wt, in auction t is the second-highest bid in
auction t. Therefore, in observing the winning bids, the likelihood function for the
bundling auction is given by
L(w1; :::; wtj;; (X1; :::; Xt)) =
TY
t=1
0B@ N
1 1 N   2
1CA [G((wt)jt; 2t )]N 2
 g((wt)jt; 2t )
1
b0((wt))
 [1 G((wt)jkt; 2kt)]; (4.5)
where g() is the probability density function of Sit. In this case, g() is the normal
density function.
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4.4 Simulation Experiments
In this section, we estimate the structural parameters in our model using simulation
data. The numbers of observed auction markets are T = 200; 500 and 1000 for item
k 2 f1; 2g and the bundling auctions. In our simulation experiments, the number of
potential bidders is N = 5 for all auctions.
Throughout this section, we assume that S1it and S2it are random variables drawn
independently from identical distributions. We draw the signals for item k 2 f1; 2g from
the normal distribution. That is,
Skit  i :i :d :N(kt; 2kt);
where kt = k0 + k1Xkt, and 
2
kt = exp(k0) + exp(k1)Xkt. We draw covariate Xkt
from gamma distribution Ga(7; 2). The true values of k and k are
k0 = 36:5; k1 = 0:2; k0 = 2:5; and k1 =  0:7:
The bundling auction features the bundling of items 1 and 2. From the reproductive
property of normal distributions,
Sit  i :i :d :N(t; 2t );
where t = 0 + 1Xt, and 
2
t = exp(0) + exp(1)Xt. The true values of  and  are
0 = 73:0; 1 = 0:4; 0 = log 2 + 2:5; and 1 = log 2  0:7:
We estimate the structural parameters using the Bayesian method. We utilize the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to compute the posterior distribution of
parameters. We use the random walk-based Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm to
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compute the posterior distribution of the parameters.
For each case, the prior distributions of k, k are
k  N(0; 100I); and k  N(0; 100I);
where I is the identity matrix of order 2. Similarly, the prior distribution of ,  are
  N(0; 100I); and   N(0; 100I):
4.4.1 The Case of T = 200
Hereafter, we omit subscript k 2 f1; 2g for the separate auctions since signals for the
two separate items follow the identical distributions in our setting. That is, (0; 1) 
(k0; k1) and (0; 1)  (k0; k2). In this case, we draw 20000 random samples from
the random walk-based MH algorithm, and the burn-in period is 2000 for both the
separate item and bundled item.
True value Mean Stdev. 95% interval CD IF
0 36.5 36.99 1.37 (34.34, 39.98) 0.18 186.15
1 0.2 0.13 0.10 (-0.10, 0.32) 0.07 181.58
0 2.5 2.29 0.27 (1.68, 2.70) 0.24 152.40
1 -0.7 -0.37 0.28 (-0.95, 0.11) 0.12 179.13
Table 4.1: Estimation results for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 200)
Table 4.1 shows the estimated posterior distributions of the parameters for separate
auctions. Our estimator contains the true values in 95% credible intervals. All p-values
of the convergence diagnostics (CD) are more than 0.07.2 Furthermore, the ineciency
factor (IF) values are suciently low.3 The values of ineciency factors are, at most,
187, which implies that we would obtain the same variance of the posterior sample means
2The CD test statistic tests the equality of the means of the rst and last parts of the sample path.
3The denition of ineciency factor is 1 + 2
P1
k=1 (k), where (k) is the sample autocorrelation at
lag k.
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from 105 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case. Figure 4.1 represents the sample
paths from estimated posterior distributions for the separate auctions. Figure 4.2 shows
the estimated posterior densities. As a result, our MCMC simulation performs well.
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Figure 4.1: Sample paths for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 200)
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Figure 4.2: Posterior densities for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 200)
True value Mean Stdev. 95% interval CD IF
0 73.0 73.06 0.48 (72.17, 74.00) 0.16 67.72
1 0.40 0.40 0.03 (0.33, 0.46) 0.19 67.56
0 3.19 3.59 0.21 (3.02, 3.81) 0.31 99.22
1 -0.01 -5.01 4.23 (-15.10, 0.31) 0.71 31.91
Table 4.2: Estimation results for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 200)
Table 4.2 shows the estimated posterior distributions of the parameters for bundling
auctions. Our estimator contains the true values in 95% credible intervals. All p-values
of the convergence diagnostics (CD) are more than 0.16. Furthermore, the ineciency
factor values are suciently low. The values of ineciency factors are, at most 99,
which implies that we would obtain the same variance of the posterior sample means
from 202 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case. Figure 4.3 represents the sample
paths from estimated posterior distributions for the bundling auctions. Figure 4.4 shows
the estimated posterior densities. As a result, our MCMC simulation performs well.
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Figure 4.3: Sample paths for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 200)
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Figure 4.4: Posterior densities for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 200)
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4.4.2 The Case of T = 500
In this case, we draw 20000 random samples from the random walk-based MH algorithm,
and the burn-in period is 2000 for the separate items. For the bundled item, the number
of iteration is 50000 and burn-in period is 2000.
True value Mean Stdev. 95% interval CD IF
0 36.5 37.17 0.92 (35.34, 38.93) 0.25 68.61
1 0.20 0.17 0.07 (0.04, 0.30) 0.38 68.05
0 2.5 2.46 0.12 (2.21, 2.69) 0.05 54.46
1 -0.7 -0.68 0.21 (-1.14, -0.31) 0.09 55.27
Table 4.3: Estimation results for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 500)
Table 4.3 shows the estimated posterior distributions of the parameters for separate
auctions. Our estimator contains the true values in 95% credible intervals. All p-values
of the convergence diagnostics (CD) are more than 0.05. Furthermore, the ineciency
factor values are suciently low. The values of ineciency factors are, at most 69,
which implies that we would obtain the same variance of the posterior sample means
from 289 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case. Figure 4.5 represents the sample
paths from estimated posterior distributions for the separate auctions. Figure 4.6 shows
the estimated posterior densities. As a result, our MCMC simulation performs well.
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Figure 4.5: Sample paths for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 500)
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Figure 4.6: Posterior densities for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 500)
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True value Mean Stdev. 95% interval CD IF
0 73.0 72.79 0.32 (72.18, 73.43) 0.95 88.75
1 0.40 0.42 0.02 (0.38, 0.47) 0.78 92.15
0 3.19 3.31 0.32 (2.63, 3.83) 0.02 197.81
1 -0.01 -0.54 2.31 (-8.41, 0.83) 0.10 96.28
Table 4.4: Estimation results for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 500)
Table 4.4 shows the estimated posterior distributions of the parameters for the
bundling auctions. Our estimator contains the true values in 95% credible intervals.
All p-values of the convergence diagnostics (CD) are more than 0.02. Furthermore, the
ineciency factor values are suciently low. The values of ineciency factors are, at
most 198, which implies that we would obtain the same variance of the posterior sample
means from 252 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case. Figure 4.7 represents the
sample paths from estimated posterior distributions for the separate auctions. Figure
4.8 shows the estimated posterior densities. As a result, our MCMC simulation performs
well.
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Figure 4.7: Sample paths for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 500)
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Figure 4.8: Posterior densities for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 500)
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4.4.3 The Case of T = 1000
In this case, we draw 20000 random samples from the random walk-based MH algorithm,
and burn-in period is 2000 for both the separate items and bundled item.
True value Mean Stdev. 95% interval CD IF
0 36.5 3.66 0.64 (35.31, 37.79) 0.01 67.46
1 0.2 0.27 0.05 (0.17, 0.36) 0.01 66.38
0 2.5 2.52 0.09 (2.34, 2.68) 0.01 63.49
1 -0.7 -0.72 0.16 (-1.07, -0.43) 0.02 63.94
Table 4.5: Estimation results for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 1000)
Table 4.5 shows the estimated posterior distributions of the parameters for separate
auctions. Our estimator contains the true values in 95% credible intervals. All p-values
of the convergence diagnostics (CD) are more than 0.01. Furthermore, the ineciency
factor values are suciently low. The values of ineciency factors are, at most 68, which
implies that we would obtain the same variance of the posterior sample means from 294
uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case. Figure 4.9 represents the sample paths
from estimated posterior distributions for the separate auctions. Figure 4.10 shows the
estimated posterior densities. As a result, our MCMC simulation performs well.
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Figure 4.9: Sample paths for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 1000)
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Figure 4.10: Posterior densities for separate auctions (Sample size: T = 1000)
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True value Mean Stdev. 95% interval CD IF
0 73.0 72.92 0.20 (72.52, 73.31) 0.08 71.70
1 0.40 0.41 0.01 (0.38, 0.44) 0.15 72.41
0 3.19 3.07 0.25 (2.42, 3.44) 0.59 162.33
1 -0.01 0.30 0.27 (-0.30, 0.81) 0.61 166.61
Table 4.6: Estimation results for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 1000)
Table 4.6 shows the estimated posterior distributions of the parameters for the
bundling auctions. Our estimator contains the true values in 95% credible interval.
All p-values of the convergence diagnostics (CD) are more than 0.08. Furthermore, the
ineciency factor values are suciently low. The values of ineciency factors are, at
most 167, which implies that we would obtain the same variance of the posterior sam-
ple means from 119 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case. Figure 4.11 represents
the sample paths from estimated posterior distributions for the separate auctions. Fig-
ure 4.12 shows the estimated posterior densities. As a result, our MCMC simulation
performs well.
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Figure 4.11: Sample paths for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 1000)
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Figure 4.12: Posterior densities for bundling auctions (Sample size: T = 1000)
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4.5 Empirical Examples
4.5.1 Data Description
Our empirical example consists of auctions of 2005 U.S. mint coin set held on eBay in
2014. Data were collected from 208 eBay auctions completed in October, 2014. There
are two types of goods in our data set. One is the 11-coin mint set and the other is the
22-coin mint set. The 22-coin mint set includes two packages of the 11-coin mint set.
The sample sizes are 107 and 101, respectively.
As Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Wegmann and Villani (2011) studied coin auc-
tions in their empirical illustrations, coin auctions are excellent examples in the em-
pirical study of the common values auction model. While Bajari and Hortacsu (2003)
and Wegmann and Villani (2011) both collected various kinds of coins in their empirical
illustrations, we only collected 2005 U.S. mint coin sets (11-coin sets and 22-coin sets).
Therefore, we estimated the distribution of signals with fewer covariates.
Mean Std Median Max Min
Winning bid 6.55 2.64 5.99 15.5 2.25
Positive reputation 6515.74 17105.87 388.00 73913 5
Negative reputation 9.52 28.49 0.00 194 0.00
Number of actual bidders 2.87 1.61 3.00 6.00 1.00
Days 5.26 2.28 7.00 10.00 0.00
Table 4.7: Summary statistics (2005 U.S. mint coin sets, (11-coin set) # of obs. = 107)
Mean Std Median Max Min
Winning bid 8.98 3.35 8.25 17.0 3.3
Positive reputation 22553.29 33006.16 1303.00 73892.00 0.00
Negative reputation 13.39 17.17 3.00 57.00 0.00
Number of actual bidders 3.47 2.04 3.00 7.00 1.00
Days 5.98 2.06 7.00 10.00 1.00
Table 4.8: Summary statistics (2005 U.S. mint coin sets, (22-coin set) # of obs. = 101)
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Tables 4.7 and 4.8 provide the summary of statistics for the 11-coin set and 22-
coin set, respectively. The rst column describes the variables. \Winning bid" is the
second highest bid in the eBay auction. As seen in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, on average,
one could purchase a mint coin set for $7:3 or $9:2 for the 11-coin set or 22-coin set,
respectively. \Positive reputation" denotes the number of positive ratings a seller has
received. Similarly, \negative reputation" is the sum of the number of negative ratings
and the number of neutral ratings a seller receives. Since the number of neutral ratings
and the number of negative ratings are usually small relative to the number of positive
ratings, we regard neutral ratings as negative ratings. \Number of actual bidders" is
the number of participants who actually bid at auction t. \Days" denotes the duration
of the auctions held.
4.5.2 Estimation Results
We estimate the structural parameters using the U.S. mint coin data described above.
The 11-Coin Set
For the 11-coin set, we assume that the signal, Si, follows the normal distribution. That
is,
Sit  i :i :d :N(1t; 21t);
where 1t = 0 + 1Xt1 + 2Xt2, and 
2
1t = exp(0) + exp(1)Xt1 + exp(2)Xt2. The
parameters  = (0; 1; 2) and  = (0; 1; 2) are unknown to econometricians.
4
In this empirical illustration, the auction-specic covariates, Xt = (Xt1; Xt2) are the
logarithm of \Positive reputation + 1" and \Negative reputation + 1"; that is,
Xt1 = log(Positive reputation + 1) and Xt2 = log(Negative reputation + 1)
4Analogous to the simulation experiments (Section 4.4), we omit subscript k = 1 for the coecient
parameters  and .
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for observed auction t.
The prior distribution of  and  are
  N(0; 10I)
and
  N(0; 10I);
where I is the identity matrix of order 3.
Similar to the simulation experiments described in Section 4.4, we used the random
walk-based Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate random draws from the posterior
distributions. The number of iteration is 20000, and the burn-in period is 1000.
Table 4.9 reports the probabilities parameters take positive (PP), the p-values of
convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and Ineciency Factors (IF). All p-values
of the convergence diagnostics are more than 0:06. Furthermore, the ineciency factor
values are suciently low. In particular, the ineciency factors are 39:88 to 95:65, which
implies that we would obtain the same variance of the posterior sample means from 209
uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case. Figure 4.13 shows the sample paths of
estimated parameters. From Figure 4.13 it can be seen that the sample paths of these
parameters converge to posterior distributions. Thus, we conclude that the sample paths
of estimated parameters converge to posterior distributions.
Parameter Covariate (Coecient Parameter) PP CD IF
1 Const. (0) 1.00 0.77 87.41
log(Pos:Rep:+ 1) (1) 1.00 0.85 95.65
log(Neg:Rep:+ 1) (2) 0.46 0.96 66.27
21 Const. (0) 0.51 0.06 54.85
log(Pos:Rep:+ 1) (1) 1.00 0.32 47.15
log(Neg:Rep:+ 1) (2) 0.44 0.77 39.88
Table 4.9: The convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the ineciency factors
(IF) for the 11-coin set
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Figure 4.13: Sample paths of parameters (11-coin set)
Figure 4.14 shows the posterior densities of parameters for the 11-coin set. Table
4.10 and Figure 4.14 provide some posterior inferences. In Table 4.10, \Mean," \Stdev,"
and \95% interval" represent the posterior mean, the posterior standard deviation, the
95% credible interval, respectively.
Parameter Covariate (Coecient Parameter) Mean Stdev. 95% credible interval
1 Const. (0) 4.59 0.71 (3.23, 6.00)
log(Pos:Rep:+ 1) (1) 0.46 0.17 (0.12, 0.79)
log(Neg:Rep:+ 1) (2) -0.03 0.39 (-0.78, 0.73)
21 Const. (0) 0.01 1.76 (-3.56, 3.12)
log(Pos:Rep:+ 1) (1) 2.27 0.22 (1.71, 2.60)
log(Neg:Rep:+ 1) (2) -0.35 1.60 (-3.70, 2.44)
Table 4.10: Posterior inferences for the 11-coin set
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Figure 4.14: Posterior densities (11-coin set)
As seen in Table 4.10, the posterior mean of 0 is 4:59. Since 0 is the con-
stant term corresponding to the mean parameter 1, when a seller has no reputation
(i.e., a new entrant), the mean of the bidders' signal is $4:59. As seen in Table 4.10,
the posterior mean of 1 is 0:46, which is the coecient parameter of the covariate
log(Positive reputation + 1) corresponding to the mean parameter 1. Therefore, if a
seller earns a more positive reputation, the mean of the bidders' signals will increase.
This result seems intuitively plausible. The posterior mean of 2 is  0:03, and 2 takes
a positive value with probability 0:46. Since 2 is the coecient parameter of the covari-
ate log(Negative reputation + 1) corresponding to the mean parameter 1, the number
of negative ratings does not have much eect on the mean of the bidder's signal. This
result is not intuitively plausible. One possible reason for the tiny eect of negative
reputations on the mean of bidders' signals is the positive correlation between positive
reputations and negative reputations. The correlation coecient between positive rep-
utations and negative reputations is 0.86, which represents a high positive correlation.
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The scatter plot is given in Figure 4.15.
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Figure 4.15: Logarithms of \Positive reputation + 1" and \Negative reputation + 1"
(11-coin set)
From Table 4.7 , the number of negative ratings is small relative to the number of
positive ratings. There are very few auctions in which sellers receive negative ratings.
In most cases, sellers receive positive ratings. From Figure 4.15, many sellers with
log(Positive reputation + 1) < 7 (i.e., sellers with positive reputations, less than 1100
total) had no negative ratings. All sellers with log(Positive reputation+1)  7 had some
negative ratings. Therefore, sellers with more trades receive more (both positive and
negative) ratings. From these facts, we conclude that the number of negative ratings
does not represent the insincerity of seller but, rather, the abundance of the seller's
experience, in our empirical example.
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The 22-Coin Set
Similar to the case of 11-coin set, we assume that the signal Si follows the normal
distribution. That is,
Sit  i :i :d :N(t; 2t );
where t = 0 + 1Xt1 + 2Xt2, and 
2
t = exp(0) + exp(1)Xt1 + exp(2)Xt2. The pa-
rameters  = (0; 1; 2) and  = (0; 1; 2) are unknown to econometricians. In this
empirical illustration, the auction-specic covariates, Xt = (Xt1; Xt2) are the logarithm
of \Positive reputation + 1" and \Negative reputation + 1".
The prior distribution of  and  are
  N(0; 100I)
and
  N(0; 100I);
where I is the identity matrix of order 3.
Similar to the case of 11-coin set, we use the random walk-based MH algorithm to
generate random draws from the posterior distributions. We draw 30000 random samples
from the posterior distribution via MH algorithm for each parameter. The burn-in period
is 3000.
Table 4.11 provides the summary of statistics of posterior distributions and the p-
values of convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and Ineciency Factors (IF). All
p-values of the convergence diagnostics are more than 0:06. Furthermore, the ineciency
factors are less than 188. Therefore, we would obtain the same variance of the posterior
sample means from 159 uncorrelated draws, even in the worst case. Figure 4.16 shows the
sample paths of estimated parameters. We conclude that the sample paths of estimated
parameters converge to posterior distributions.
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Parameter Covariate (Coecient Parameter) PP CD IF
1 Const. (0) 1.00 0.19 166.34
log(Pos:Rep:+ 1) (1) 0.99 0.10 187.68
log(Neg:Rep:+ 1) (2) 0.30 0.06 160.56
21 Const. (0) 1.00 0.85 53.65
log(Pos:Rep:+ 1) (1) 0.18 0.81 21.81
log(Neg:Rep:+ 1) (2) 0.24 0.41 16.99
Table 4.11: The convergence diagnostics for the MCMC (CD) and the ineciency factors
(IF) for the 22-coin set
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Figure 4.16: Sample paths of parameters (22-coin set)
Parameter Covariate (Coecient Parameter) Mean Stdev. 95% credible interval
 Const. (0) 5.15 1.36 (2.53, 7.90)
log(Pos:Rep:+ 1) (1) 0.70 0.29 (0.12, 1.25)
log(Neg:Rep:+ 1) (2) -0.28 0.58 (-1.42, 0.89)
2 Const. (0) 4.68 0.24 (4.27, 5.02)
log(Pos:Rep:+ 1) (1) -3.56 3.79 (-12.37, 1.71)
log(Neg:Rep:+ 1) (2) -3.18 3.94 (-12.21, 2.48)
Table 4.12: Posterior inferences for the 22-coin set
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Figure 4.17: Posterior densities (22-coin set)
Figure 4.17 shows the posterior densities of parameters for the 22-coin set. Table
4.12 and Figure 4.17 provide some posterior inferences. As seen in Table 4.12, the
posterior mean of 0 is 5:15. Since 0 is the constant term corresponding to the mean
parameter . Therefore, when a seller has no reputation (i.e., a new entrant), the
mean of the bidders' signal will be $5:15. The posterior mean of 1 is 0:70. Since 1
is the coecient parameter of the covariate log(Positive reputation + 1) corresponding
to the mean parameter , we nd that positive reputation has positive eect on the
mean of bidders' signals. The posterior mean of 2 is  0:28 and 2 takes a positive
value with probability 0:30. Recall that 2 is the coecient parameter of the covariate
log(Negative reputation + 1) corresponding to the mean parameter . According to our
results, the number of negative ratings does not have much eect on the mean of bidders'
signals. This result is not plausible to our intuition. A possible reason is the same as in
the case of 11-coin set. That is, a high positive correlation between positive reputations
and negative reputations. The correlation coecient between positive reputations and
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negative reputations is 0.92, which represents a high positive correlation between positive
reputations and negative reputations. The scatter plot is shown in Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.18: Logarithms of \Positive reputation + 1" and \Negative reputation + 1"
(22-coin set)
Table 4.8 shows the number of negative ratings is small relative to the number of pos-
itive ratings. There are very few auctions in which sellers receive negative ratings.
In most cases, sellers receive positive ratings. From Figure 4.18, many sellers with
log(Positive reputation + 1) < 7:2 (i.e., sellers with positive reputations, less than 1330
total) had no negative ratings. All sellers with log(Positive reputation+1)  7 had some
negative ratings. Analogous to the case of 11-coin set, we conclude that the number of
negative ratings does not represent the insincerity of seller but, rather, the abundance
of the seller's experience. As a result, negative ratings do not have much impact on the
mean of bidders' signals.
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4.6 Counterfactual Simulations
In this section, we compute the winner's curse reduction eect in the sense of Chakraborty
(2002) and compare the revenue of separate auctions and bundling auctions using the
estimated parameters from Section 4.5.5
In our empirical model, the distribution of bidders' signals depends on auction-
specic covariates. We compute the winner's curse reduction eect and the expected rev-
enue for a \representative" auction using the sample means of covariates, log(Positive reputation+
1) and log(Negative reputation+1), in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 and the posterior mean of the
estimated parameters in Tables 4.10 and 4.12. The sample means of log(Positive reputation+
1) and log(Negative reputation + 1) are
log(Positive reputation + 1) = 6:77 and log(Negative reputation + 1) = 1:34;
respectively. The number of participants for a representative auction is N = 7. Subse-
quently, the bidding functions can be computed using equations (4.1) and (4.3).
In our empirical example, since the separate items, k = 1 and k = 2, are the same
item, we cannot estimate the parameters for item k = 2 directly. In other words, we
cannot obtain the estimates for coecient parameters (;) for item 2 from observed
bids. However, for an arbitrary xed covariates (and hence for the representative auc-
tion), the distribution of bidders' signals for item 2 can be identied. Since bidder i's
private signal for item k = 1, S1i, and bidder i's private signal for item k = 2, S2i,
are independent, the distribution of bidders' signals for item 2 can be recovered from
the identied distributions of bidders' signals for item 1, S1i, and bidders' signals for
5Chakraborty (2002) also discussed the expected revenues of both bundling auctions and separate
auctions. Under the regularity conditions that are satised in our parametric specications (i.e., nor-
mally distributed signals), He found that revenue ranking between the revenue of bundling auctions and
separate auctions depends on the number of potential bidders, N . He found that bundling auctions
generate more expected revenue than do separate auctions for all N < N, where N is a suciently
small number.
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bundled item, Si. Note that while we assume the independence, we do not assume that
S1i and S2i have identical distributions.
6
Since our parametric specication imposes that S1i, S2i, and Si are normal random
variables, from the reproductive property of normal distributions, we have
S2i  N(  1; 2   21);
where (; 2) and (1; 
2
1) are the parameters for distributions of Si and S1i, respectively.
Let (2; 
2
2) be the parameter vector for distributions of S2i. By the estimated parameters
and the sample mean of covariates, we gain 2 = 1:85 and 
2
2 = 40:53. Note that, since
the mean of the signals for item 1 is 1 = 7:66, E(S1i) > E(S2i) holds. This inequality
seems intuitively plausible because the willingness to pay for the second item is usually
less than that for the rst item.
The statement of Theorem 1 is the winner's curse reduction eect, as proposed
by Chakraborty (2002). Namely, bi(s)  b1i(s1) + b2i(s2). For each xed signal s =
5; 10; 15, varying the value of the signal for item 1, s1, from 3:0 to s, we compute
bi(s)  (b1i(s1) + b2i(s2)).
6Our simulation experiments in Section 4.4 dealt with the special case of independent signals. In our
simulation experiments, we assume the identical distribution of S1i and S2i.
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Figure 4.19: Dierence of the bidding function with s = 5 (Independent signals case)
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Figure 4.20: Dierence of the bidding function with s = 10 (Independent signals case)
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Figure 4.21: Dierence of the bidding function with s = 15 (Independent signals case)
Figures 4.19, 4.20, and 4.21 report the dierence of the bidding function bi(s) (b1i(s1)+
b2i(s2)) for xed signals s = 5; 10; 15, respectively. The shape of the graph with s = 5 is
not similar to that of the graphs with s = 10; 15. When s = 5, the dierence decreases
as the signal for item 1, s1, increases. On the other hand, when s = 10 and 15, the
dierence decreases for s1 2 (3:0; 8:0) and s1 2 (3:0; 11:0) and it increases for s1 > 8:0
and s1 > 11:0, respectively. The values of bi(s)  (b1i(s1) + b2i(s2)) for s = 5; 10; 15 are
similar, around $2:50.
One may mistakenly conclude that Theorem 1 implies the revenue of bundling auc-
tions is higher than that of separate auctions. Actually, Theorem 1 does not imply
revenue ranking. In Theorem 1, for any signal of bundling auctions, Si = s, the equa-
tion s = s1i + s2i must hold. When we compare the revenues, the equation s = s1i + s2i
need not hold. The realizations of S1i and S2i are determined independently.
The expected revenues are computed by the Monte Carlo simulation method. Using
the estimated parameters and the sample means of covariates, we draw the signals of
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bundling and separate auctions from the estimated distributions. We assume that the
number of potential bidders is N = 7. Then, the equilibrium bids for signals are com-
puted via equation (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3). The winning bids are the second-highest bids
for both bundling and separate auctions. The revenue dierence is computed by the
dierence between the bundling auction's winning bid and that of the separate auction.
We iterate this procedure 5000 times.
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Figure 4.22: Density of revenue dierence between bundling auctions and separate auc-
tions (Independent signals case)
Mean Stdev. :25 quantile Median :75 quantile PP
Revenue (bundle) 8.67 3.12 6.61 8.85 10.88 -
Revenue (item 1) 6.99 2.48 5.39 7.10 8.73 -
Revenue (item 2) 1.32 1.90 0.09 1.41 2.67 -
Revenue dierence 0.37 4.47 -2.60 0.38 3.40 0.53
Table 4.13: Summary statistics of revenue and revenue dierences (Independent signals
case)
The density of revenue dierences between bundling and separate auctions is shown
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in Figure 4.22. The shape of the density is symmetrical at point 0. Table 4.13 reports
the summary statistics of revenues and revenue dierences. In Table 4.13, \Mean" and
\Stdev." are the mean and the standard deviation of revenue dierences, respectively.
Similarly, \.25 quantile," \Median," and \.75 quantile" represent the rst quartile, the
second quartile, and the third quartile. The probability that the revenue of bundling
auctions is higher than that of separate auctions is denoted by \PP."
According to Figure 4.22 and Table 4.13, the revenue of bundling auctions is higher
than that of separate auctions with probability 0:53. The expected revenue dierence is
$0:37. Therefore, sellers can gain an additional prot of $0:37 by using a bundle auction
rather than two separate auctions. Since the average transaction price of bundled items
(22-coin sets) is $8:98, we nd that the value of additional gains are not negligible. In
the theoretical literature, Chakraborty (2002) discussed the revenue ranking between the
revenue of bundling auctions and separate auctions. He found that bundling auctions
generate more expected revenue than do separate auctions when the number of bidders is
suciently small. According to Tables 4.7 and 4.8, the number of participants at most 7.
Therefore, our empirical example does not contradicts the result of Chakraborty (2002).
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we focused on bundling auctions in online auction markets. In online
auction markets (e.g., eBay and Yahoo!), sellers often sell two or more items in bundling
auctions. Conversely, other sellers sell the same items separately. We propose an esti-
mation procedure for bundling auction models within the pure common value paradigm.
Our empirical example is eBay mint coin set auctions in 2014. In our data set, there
are two kinds of coin sets: 11-coin sets and 22-coin sets. We regard the 11-coin sets
as the separate item and the 22-coin set as the bundled item. We also conducted some
counterfactual simulations using the estimated parameters. We computed the winner's
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curse reduction eect following Chakraborty (2002) precedent and compared the revenue
of bundling auctions and separate auctions. We found that the value of the winner's
curse reduction eect is about $2:5. For revenue comparison, we found that the expected
revenue in the bundling auctions is higher than that in the separate auctions by $0:37.
Since the average transaction price of bundled items (22-coin sets) is $8:98, the value of
additional gains are not negligible.
There are some avenues for future research in this paper. For one, we ignored the
endogenous entry of bidders. In general, bidders will decide endogenously to participate,
whether in bundling auctions or separate auctions. Analogously, we also ignored the
seller's incentive to decide which item (the bundled item or separate items) to sell. The
seller's decision as to which item to sell will depend on the revenue ranking between
bundling auctions and separate auctions.
123
Chapter 5
Structural Estimation of the
Scoring Auction Model
5.1 Introduction
Public sectors purchase a variety of goods and services from the private sector, from
snow removal services to weapons systems. OECD (2007) reported that the amount
of expenditure incurred for public procurement accounts for 10 to 15 % of GDP in
OECD countries. For public funds to be spent eciently and eectively, value for money
(relevant prices and qualities of proposals in the whole procurement cycle are assessed)
is the key principle in public procurement. Although low-bid auctions are a common
awarding mechanism, more and more procurement buyers introduce competitive bidding
processes in which the highest value-for-money oer is selected. The scoring auction, or
equivalent multi-parameter bidding, is one of the most prevalent mechanisms that meets
the objective.
In the scoring auction, bidders are asked to submit a set of multi-dimensional bids
that include price and non-price attributes (quality), such as service life, delivery date,
and the extent of environmental burden of the production processes. An ex ante publicly
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announced scoring rule maps the multiple-dimensional bid into a variable, a so-called
score, and the awarder is the bidder whose score is the highest or lowest. Scoring
auctions allow a procurement buyer to obtain more valuable (or greater value-for-money)
contracts without reducing the bidders' prots than do price-only auctions (Milgrom
(2004)).
A variety of forms of scoring rules are used in real-world public procurement. In
US states' departments of transportation, for instance, Delaware, Idaho, Oregon, Mas-
sachusetts, Utah, and Virginia, use quasilinear (QL) rules in the rst-score (FS) auction,1
whereas Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, and South Dakota use
price-over-quality ratio (PQR) rules, in which the score is equal to the price bid divided
by a quality measure that aggregates all nonmonetary bids. The PQR scoring rule is also
used in most public procurement scoring auctions in Japan and some in Australia.2 In
addition, some governments in EU countries use the scoring auction in which the score
is the sum of the price and quality measurements but the score is nonlinear in the price
bid. Note that any monotonic function cannot transform these nonquasilinear scoring
rules into a QL form, because a necessary condition for quasi-linearity requires price to
be linear in score.
A growing number of empirical works on FS auctions have been developed (e.g.,
Bajari et al. (2007) and Lewis and Bajari (2009)). Nevertheless, they are conned to
either nonstructural approaches or FS auctions with awarding rules and no reservation
price. Theoretical literature, such as Asker and Cantillon (2008), has shown that, unless
the scoring auction is quasilinear and the reserve price is nonbinding, the bidder's optimal
choice in non-price attributes hinges on the bidder's score. This implies that the bidder's
pseudo-type in Asker and Cantillon (2008) may not be monotone in the bidder's signal.
As a result, the structural estimation method of the rst-price auction model cannot
1In a FS auction, the successful bidder receives a payment equal to its price bid and provides the
quality level specied in its quality bid. See Section 5.2 for more details.
2The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation in Japan allocates most public construction
project contracts through scoring auctions based on PQR awarding rules.
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directly apply to scoring auction data with a nonquasilinear scoring rule.
In this article, we propose a structural estimation procedure of the FS auction model
where the scoring rule accepts a nonquasilinear form. The model is established by
Hanazono et al. (2013), which is an extension of Che (1993), allowing a broader class
of scoring rules,3 including nonquasilinear forms and binding reservation prices. In
addition, imposing a condition on the bidder's cost function, the model guarantees the
existence of the monotone pure equilibrium in scoring auctions in which bidders have
multi-dimensional signals. Thus, the model ts the typical FS auction data in which price
and quality are scattered in the price quality space. Based on the model, we establish a
procedure for identifying the bidder's multi-dimensional signals from FS auction data.
Our framework allows for a wide variety of scoring auction data to be used in empirical
studies.
Several assumptions are made in the FS auction model. First, multi-dimensional sig-
nals are separable and monotone in conjunction with both the bidder's cost function and
score function (Assumption 2). More specically, each bidder with an L+1-dimensional
type is asked to submit a price bid as well as an L-dimensional quality bid. For any
quality, the bidder's marginal cost of providing an additional unit of l-th dimensional
quality hinges solely on the bidder's dimension l signal for all l = 1; : : : ; L. The re-
maining dimension of the signal, i.e., l = 0, aects the bidder's total costs; the total
cost is strictly increasing in the dimension-zero signal given quality. This specication
simplies the mechanism design problem with multi-dimensional signals in a way that
the bidder's information rent hinges solely on the distribution of dimension zero signal.
The bidder's strategic interaction in the selection of the score is thus reduced to a single
dimensional problem with single dimensional private information. In addition, Assump-
tion 2 constitutes a sucient condition for the identication of the FS auction model
3A scoring rule is interdependent if the bidder's score is determined not only by his/her p and q but
also other bidders' p and q such that Si(p1; : : : ; pn; q1; : : : ; qn). In this article, we restrict attention to
independent scoring rules. See Albano et al. (2009) for the classication of scoring rules.
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with multi-dimensional signals. Note that Assumption 2 is satised, for instance, under
a PQR scoring rule if a set of cost functions with an identical dimension-zero signal are
homothetic with each other.
Second, the bidder's expected payo function satises the log-supermodularity con-
dition (Assumption 3). By Assumption 2, the bidder's choice in quality components
(non-price attributes) is thoroughly endogenous in the score. Hence, the strictly pos-
itive cross partial derivative of the log of the bidder's expected payo with respect to
both score and dimension-zero signal implies the log-supermodularity condition, which
guarantees the existence of the pure monotone strategy in the rst-score auction.
To identify the bidder's multi-dimensional signals from observed multi-dimensional
bid data, we choose a semi-parametric estimation methodology. The bidder's cost func-
tion is assumed to be known except for the L+ 1-dimensional parameters (signals). In
the FS auction, the bidder's signals are implicitly included in the bidder's rst-order con-
dition, in general. In other words, the rst-order condition just constitutes an implicit
function of the bidder's multi-dimensional signals. We, thus, exploit the monotonicity
condition given in Assumption 1 to indicate that the implicit function is monotone in
the dimension-zero signal. The identication of the remaining L dimensional signals
is straightforward given the assumption of the bidder's cost function, i.e., the marginal
cost of l-th dimensional q is monotone in l-th dimensional signal. Finally, we identify the
distribution of the bidder's multi-dimensional private signals. The structural estimation
method of rst-price auctions has been developed by Laont et al. (1995), Guerre et al.
(2000), and Li et al. (2002); and a growing number of empirical analyses of rst-price
auction data have been provided in the literature. Our methodology is an extension of
Guerre et al. (2000) to the scoring auction model.
We conduct a Monte Carlo study to investigate the consistency and the nite sample
property of our estimation method. Simulated bid data samples are created with the di-
mension zero signal following a uniform distribution, which indicates that the symmetric
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monotone equilibrium bidding strategy of the FS auction is explicitly obtained. Then,
our structural estimation method is applied to the simulated scoring bid data to recover
the distribution of the bidder's signal. The recovered cumulative distribution functions
are presented in Section 5.3.
As an empirical application, we conduct a series of counterfactual analyses using the
scoring auction data. The data is from public procurement auctions for construction
projects in Japan, where the scoring rule is PQR. Throughout the article, we assume
that the procurement buyer's true preference is represented by the observed PQR scoring
rule. In addition, bidders' true cost functions are either quadratic, cubic, and quartic
polynomials. All three functions satisfy the conditions that guarantees the existence of
a unique monotone equilibrium under the PQR scoring rule. Then, the impact of the
change in scoring rules or auction formats on both the procurement buyer's and suppliers'
utilities is measured. Furthermore, the extent to which the utility of the buyer using
scoring auctions would change by the use of price-only auctions is quantied.
The results of our empirical application are as follows. First, a change in the auction
format has a very small impact on welfare; under the PQR scoring rule, the procure-
ment buyer has an approximately .003 to .004 percent lower utility (higher exercised
score) when using FS rather than SS auctions, whereas the winning bidder earns a pay-
o greater by approximately .15 to .26 percent in FS, as opposed to SS, auctions. Note
that Hanazono et al. (2013) suggests that nonequivalence stems from the overproduction
in quality in FS auctions. Accordingly, we observe that the expectation of the winner's
quality provision is .001 to .002 percent larger in FS, as opposed to SS, auctions. Second,
there is a QL FS auction that dominates the currently used PQR FS auction. With a
well-designed QL scoring rule, the procurement buyer improves utility by approximately
.29 percent while bidders earn lower payos by 3.4 to 4.2 percent. Finally, the outcome
of a price-only auction is compared with that of the currently used PQR FS auctions.
In simulated price-only auctions, bidders' payos vary, ranging from -41.2 to 1.34 per-
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cent, whereas the procurement buyer's utility is consistently 1 to 36 percent lower than
with the PQR FS auction. These results suggest that a procurer can obtain an almost
equivalent (slightly lower) gain with the use of a price-only auction with a well-designed
xed quality standard.
The remaining part of this article is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes
the theoretical consideration of scoring auctions with general scoring rules. Section
5.3 discusses the identication of the distribution of bidders' cost schedule parameters.
Section 5.4 conducts empirical examinations using the structural estimation method.
The nal section is the conclusion.
5.2 A Theoretical Consideration
5.2.1 The Model
A procurement buyer auctions a project contract to n risk-neutral bidders.4 The scoring
function S(p; q) : RL+1+ ! R is common knowledge, mapping the bidder's price-bid
p 2 R and a quality level q = (q1; : : : ; qL) 2 [q1; q1]      [qL; qL]  Q with q` > 0
for all ` = 1; : : : ; L into a single dimensional value, the score, denoted by s 2 R. The
scoring function is smooth and strictly monotone, i.e., Sp(p; q) > 0, Sq`(p; q) < 0, and
S
q`q ~`
(p; q) = 0 for all ` = 1; : : : ; L and ~` 6= `. For instance, the PQR scoring rule
with an unbinding reservation price is S(p; q) = p=V (q) where V > 0 for all q and
Vq` > 0 for all ` = 1; : : : ; L. In addition, the QL scoring rule with an unbinding reserve
is S(p; q) = p   V (q). The procurement buyer's utility function is represented by the
scoring function, namely U(p; q) =  S(p; q).5
At the bid preparation stage, each bidder obtains an L-dimensional signal  2
[0; 0]      [L; L]   distributed following the publicly known cumulative joint
distribution F (). We allow for ` and 
~`
with ~`= 0; : : : ; L and ~` 6= ` to be correlated
4The argument in this section follows Hanazono et al. (2013).
5We relax this assumption in Section 5.4.
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with each other; however,  is identically and independently distributed for every bidder.
Finally, we denote by F`(
`) the marginal distribution of ` with ` = 0; : : : ; L.
The bidder's cost function C(qj) is increasing and strictly convex inQ and is smooth
in Q and . Furthermore, we normalize the cost function such that i) C(qj) is strictly
increasing in 0, ii) Cq` is strictly decreasing in 
` for all ` = 1; : : : ; L, and iii)Cq` is
constant in 
~`
for any ~` = 1; : : : ; L and ~` 6= `. The interpretation of this specication
is that the dimension-zero signal, 0, represents the bidder's overall productivity that
aects total cost, whereas the rest of the signal dimensions, ` with ` = 1; : : : ; L, are
scale parameters in technology; the bidder with a larger ` with ` = 1; : : : ; L has a lower
marginal cost to make an additional provision of `th-dimension quality.
Two auction formats are considered. In a FS auction, the successful bidder receives a
payment, p. In a SS auction, the successful bidder can freely choose the contracted p and
q as long as the score stemming from the contracted p and q equals the second-lowest
score in the auction.
The scoring auction game can be equivalently considered as follows. Bidders are
asked to submit a scoring bid, s 2 R. The lowest-score bidder wins the contract. Only
the winner chooses a quality vector, q, with which the winner performs the project work.
The monotonicity of the scoring function implies the existence of the inverse function
with respect to p. That is, for a score value s, the payment function, P (s; q), is dened
such that
S(P (s; q); q)  s;
for any relevant score s 2 S(p;Q) with p 2 R.
Let se be the exercised score. In a FS auction, the exercised score is the winning
bidder's score, i.e., se = s. In a SS auction, it is equal to the second-lowest score. Then,
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the bidder's problem in a scoring auction is given by
max
s;q
[P (se; q)  C(qj)] Prfwinjsg:
We assume that, for any se, there exists a unique internal solution of q that maximizes the
bidder's payo upon winning, i.e., P (se; q) C(qj). Let q`(se;) denote the maximizer
of the bidder's payo upon winning for each ` = 1; : : : ; L dimension such that
q`(se;) = argmax
q`
P (se; q)  C(qj): (5.1)
A sucient condition for the uniqueness of the optimal quality choice is that, for all ` =
1; : : : ; L, Pq`(s
e; q(se;)) Cq`(q(se;)j) = 0 with Pq`q`(s; q(s;)) Cq`q`(q(s;);) <
0. For notational convenience, we dene u(se;) = P (se; q(se;)) C(q(se;)j). Then,
the bidder's maximization problem is reduced into the following one-dimensional opti-
mization problem:
max
s
u(se;) Prfwinjsg: (5.2)
Recall that we have normalized that Ps() = 1=Sp() > 0 and C0 > 0. Therefore, the
derivatives of u(), with respect to se and 0, are given by
us(s
e;) = Ps(s
e; q(se;)) > 0;
u0(s
e;) =  C0(q(se;)j) < 0:
It suggests that the scoring auction game is a single-dimensional auction game in which
bidders with nonlinear utility functions submit scores.
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5.2.2 Equilibrium in a FS Auction
A symmetric monotone equilibrium in a FS auction with the multi-dimensional type
space is analyzed by adding the following two technical assumptions to the bidder's
utility function. The rst assumption (Assumption 2) simplies the analysis of the
scoring auction with the multi-dimensional type space, whereas the second assumption
(Assumption 3) is required for the existence of an equilibrium in a FS auction.
Let u(s; 0) be the payo of the smallest-scale bidder whose eciency level is 0, so
that u(s; 0) = u(s; 0; 1; : : : ; L). Then, Assumption 1 is summarized as follows.
Assumption 2 (Separability). There exists a monotonic function h() = h1(0; 1)h2(0; 2)
  hL(0; L) with h`(0; `)  1 and h(0; 1; : : : ; L) = 1 such that, for any 0,
dh`(0; `)=d` > 0 for all ` = 1; : : : ; L and for all s and 0,
u(s;) = h()u(s; 0): (5.3)
Assumption 2 ensures that the equilibrium bidding strategy is a sole function of
0, i.e., sI(
0). Together with the specication of the cost function such that Cq` is
decreasing in ` for all ` = 1; : : : ; L, Assumption 2 implies that bidders with an identical
0 but dierent ` in any ` never choose the same quality set in equilibrium. The
monotonicity of the marginal cost is needed for the identication of the bidder's type
from observables s and q. A detailed discussion is delivered in Section 5.3.2.
To see that Assumption 2 is sucient for the bidding strategy sI() to be independent
of ` with ` = 1; : : : ; L, suppose that two bidders have an identical 0 but dierent `
for some or all ` = 1; : : : ; L. Let  and ~ be their L + 1 dimensional signals. The
equilibrium bid strategy sI() maximizes the bidder's expected payo. The bidders'
objective functions are given by
max
s
h()u(s; 0) Prfwinjsg; max
s
h(~)u(s; 0) Prfwinjsg:
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Since the two maximization problems are monotonic transforms of each other, the two
objective functions are maximized at the same s. This implies that the equilibrium bid
strategy sI() depends solely on 0.
Assumption 2 is interpreted as a generalization of the homothetic cost function. If
the scoring function is PQR such that S(p; q), the cost function C(qj) is a homothetic
function of C(qj0; 1; : : : ; L), where h() is a multiplier. In other words, C(qj) is
homogeneous of degree zero such that
C(q1(s;)h1(0; 1); : : : ; qL(s;)hL(0; L)j) = h()C(q(s;)j0; 1; : : : ; L);
if the scoring rule is PQR.
Given Assumption 2, only one dimension of the bidder's multi-dimensional signal, 0,
associates the strategic interaction in the score choice game. Therefore, the existence of a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a FS auction only requires that the cross-partial derivative
of the log of u(se;) with respect to se and 0 is strictly positive.
Assumption 3 (Log-Supermodularity). The smallest-scale bidder's utility, u(s; 0), is
log-supermodular, namely
@2
@s@0
log u(s; 0) > 0:
Note that Assumption 3 is required only in the analysis of a FS auction, since, as
will be seen in the next subsection, a dominant strategy equilibrium exists in a SS
auction. Also note that, given Assumption 2, the expected payo of any bidder is log-
supermodular, because Assumption 2 ensures that the cross partial derivative of the log
of u(se;) is independent of ` with ` = 1; : : : ; L:
@2 log u(se;)
@s@0
=
@
@0

u(se;)
us(se;)

=
@
@0

h()u(se; 0)
h()us(se; 0)

=
@2 log u(se; 0)
@s@0
: (5.4)
Given these assumptions, a symmetric, increasing equilibrium strategy in a FS auction
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is characterized as follows. Let sI(
0) be a symmetric, increasing equilibrium in a FS
auction. The log-supermodularity of the bidder's utility function is sucient to guaran-
tee the existence of a strictly increasing Bayesian Nash equilibrium as shown by Athey
(2001). Then, the bidder's problem (5.2) is given by
max
s
u(s;)

1  F0(s 1(s))
n 1
in equilibrium. By imposing the symmetric condition, the rst-order condition is given
by
us(sI(
0);)s0(0)

1  F0(0)
n 1
= u(sI(
0);)(n  1)f0(0)

1  F0(0)
n 2
: (5.5)
Let  0 = (1; : : : ; L). Solving the dierential equation for u(sI(0);) yields
P (sI(
0); q(sI(
0);)) = C(q(sI(
0);)j)
+
Z 0
0
C0(q(sI(); ;
 0)j; 0)

1  F0()
1  F0(0)
n 1
d; (5.6)
which characterizes the equilibrium strategy sI(
0) in a FS auction.
5.2.3 Equilibrium in a SS Auction
Let s(2) be the second-lowest score in a SS auction. Then, the bidder's payo upon
winning in a SS auction:
u(s(2););
is independent of his own scoring bid. Because the winning bidder has a non-negative
payo, bidding the break-even score (the minimum score the bidder with type  makes
with a non-negative utility) is a dominant strategy in a SS auction. Therefore, a domi-
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nant strategy equilibrium sII() in a SS auction satises
u(sII(
0);) = 0: (5.7)
As in the case of a FS auction, the equilibrium strategy in a SS auction is independent
of ` with ` = 1; : : : ; L since u(sII(
0);) = u(sII(
0); 0) = 0 for any .
In the scoring auction, the prot-maximizing quality is rst-best if the exercised
score is equal to the bidder's break-even score.6 Therefore, the bidder's quality choice at
bidding is always equal to rst-best in a SS auction. Let qFB() be the rst-best quality.
Under the PQR scoring rule, for instance, qFB() satises
Cq`(q
FB()j)qFB;`() = C(qFB()j): (5.8)
5.2.4 Revenue Ranking
Revenue ranking is possible in scoring auctions. The exercised score se represents the
auctioneer's utility from the scoring auction. Hanazono et al. (2013) showed that the
equivalence regarding expected exercised scores (revenue) does not generally hold in the
scoring auction. If we restrict attention to a class of scoring rules that are linear in price
e.g., PQR and QL, then the expected exercised score is weakly greater in FS than in SS
auctions. In particular, if the scoring rule is PQR, a FS procurement auction creates
a higher expected score than does a SS counterpart. Thus, the auctioneer prefers a SS
auction if his true preference is PQR.
Using the characterization of the equilibrium strategies as well as the equilibrium
properties in FS and SS auctions, a series of empirical examinations are highlighted in
Section 5.4. As in the theoretical model, risk-neutral bidders and independently and
identically distributed signals are assumed.
6The prot-maximizing quality is always rst-best under the QL scoring rule even if the bidder's score
is strictly greater than the break-even score (Che (1993)).
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5.3 Structural Estimation of the Scoring Auction Model
5.3.1 Outline
In the scoring auction model, the bidder's induced utility u(s;), is generally an unknown
nonlinear function, although the bidder is risk neutral. This situation is somewhat
similar to auctions with risk-averse bidders. Guerre et al. (2009) showed that the model
of auctions with risk-averse bidders is generally unidentied from bid data. A question
might be whether the scoring auction model is identied only from bid data.
Because observed bids are L+1 dimensions in the scoring auction model, up to L+1
dimensions of parameters can be identied if bidders are symmetric and homogeneous
goods or services are auctioned. Therefore, a possible way to identify the scoring auction
data should be to assume that the bidder's cost function is parametric with L + 1
dimensional latent parameters. Given the specication, the bidder's nonlinear utility
function becomes parametric.
In the next subsection, we show that, if Assumption 2 is satised, then the derivative
of the bidder's objective function with respect to each dimension of the bid is obtained
parametrically and that it is strictly monotone in each dimension of the latent parame-
ters. From the next subsection, we deliver a more detailed argument on the identication
and the estimation procedure of the L+1 dimensional latent parameters from the L+1
dimensional scoring auction data.
5.3.2 Identication of the Bidder's Cost Function in a FS Auction
First, we show that, given the assumptions discussed in the previous section, an identi-
cation of the cost function parameters,  = (0; : : : ; L), is possible as follows. Since the
equilibrium strategy depends only on 0 in a FS auction, and since sI(
0) is a strictly
increasing function of 0, the inverse function of the equilibrium strategy, s 1(), exists.
Therefore, the distribution of parameter 0 is identied from observed score s. Next,
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from (5.1), ignoring the boundary solution (i.e., q` = q` or q` for some ` = 1; : : : ; L), the
optimal quality q satises Pq`(s; q) = Cq`(qj) for all ` = 1; : : : ; L.
For notational convenience, dene
 0 = (1; : : : ; L):
Note that the value of Pq`(s; q) is observable from observed score s and observed quality
q. Furthermore, as 0 can be recovered from observed score s, Cq`(qj) is known up to
 0. If Cq`(qj) is a strictly decreasing function of `, the function y(`) = Cq`(qj)
has its inverse. Therefore, if Cq`(qj) is a strictly decreasing function of ` for all
` = 1; : : : ; L, parameter ` is also identied from observed score s and quality q. The
following proposition summarizes this point.
Proposition 4. We dene that a distribution G() of observed scores (s1; : : : ; sn) is
rationalized by the distribution of the bidder's multi-dimensional private signal F () in
the scoring auction if G() is the distribution of the equilibrium score bid. Then, the
model of scoring auctions with symmetric risk-neutral bidders is identied if the bidder's
utility function is i) separable (Assumption 2) and ii) log-supermodular (Assumption 3)
and iii) if the bidder's marginal cost for q` is monotone in ` for all ` = 1; : : : ; L.
We have two remarks on the monotonicity condition of Cq`(qj). First, in the PQR
scoring rule, Assumption 2 is sucient for implying the monotonicity condition. To see
this, we have
mC(qj) = C(mqj0;m 0)
for all m > 0 in the PQR scoring rule. Therefore, we gain
Cq`(qj) = Cq`(mqj0;m 0); (5.9)
for all ` = 1; : : : ; L. Ifm > 1, because Cq`(qj) is a strictly convex function of q, Cq`(qj)
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is a strictly increasing function of q. That is,
Cq`(qj) < Cq`(mqj); (5.10)
for all ` = 1; : : : ; L. From (5.9) and (5.10),
Cq`(mqj) > Cq`(mqj0;m 0) = Cq`(qj);
for all ` = 1; : : : ; L. Therefore, Cq`(qj) is strictly decreasing in `. Similarly, if m 2
(0; 1], Cq`(qj) is strictly decreasing in q. Thus, Assumption 2 is sucient for identifying
.
Second, Assumption 2, in general, does not imply the monotonicity of Cq`(qj). In
other words, the monotonicity condition, in general, is required. A typical example is
seen under a QL awarding rule.
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C()
O qq
C(qj0; 1)C(qj0; ~1)
s
Figure 5.1: Example of nonidentiable parameter (PQR scoring rule)
Figure 5.1 shows an example in which parameter  = (0; 1) is not identiable from
the observed score s and quality q 2 R+. In this example, a bidder with cost function
Cq(qj0; 1) submits score s and quality q, whereas another bidder with cost function
Cq(qj0; ~) with 1 6= ~1 also submits s and q. Therefore, from the observed score s and
quality q, parameter 1 is not identied.
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5.3.3 Estimation for the Distribution of Cost Function Parameter Vec-
tor 
The estimation of  from the observed data (si;t, qi;t) proceeds as follows. By the
equilibrium bidding function, we have
sI(
0) = si;t: (5.11)
In addition, from (5.1), ignoring boundary solution (i.e., q = q or q), observed quality
qi;t satises Equation (5.1). Therefore, we obtain
Pq`(si;t; qi;t) = Cq`(qi;tji;t) with ` = 1; : : : ; L (5.12)
as an empirical counterpart of (5.1).
Let ^i;t = (^
0
i;t; : : : ; ^
L
i;t) be the solution of the simultaneous equations (5.11) and
(5.12). Because sI(
0) is strictly increasing, parameter 0 is possibly obtained, using the
inverse function, s 1(). Furthermore, the assumption that Cq(qj) is monotone in `
for all ` = 1; : : : ; L implies that, for given si;t, qi;t, and 
0
i;t, parameter 
`
i;t is obtained for
all ` = 1; : : : ; L. Therefore, ^ would be estimated.
Unfortunately, the inverse function s 1I () cannot be obtained analytically in general.
It could be possible to obtain the inverse function s 1() directly from (5.6) with a
numerical computation; however, given the fact that the distribution of  is unknown,
it is a computational burden. Therefore, we estimate  from the rst-order condition
instead of solving the equilibrium strategy explicitly.
Let G(s) be the cumulative distribution function of sI(
0) and g(s) be its density.
Then, letting s 1I () be the inverse function of sI() such that s 1I (sI(0)) = 0, we have
G(s) = 1 F0(s 1I (s)). By the inverse function theorem, g(s) = f0(s 1I (s))=s0I(0) holds.
From (5.5), i.e., the bidder's rst-order condition in a FS auction, and given an optimal
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quality q(s;) and parameter vector , we obtain
J(s; 0)  u(s;)
us(s;)
  1
n  1
1 G(s)
g(s)
= 0: (5.13)
Note that Assumption 2 (separability) ensures that J() is independent of  0. It follows
that u(s;))=us(s;)) = u(s; 
0; ~ 0)=us(s; 0; ~ 0) for all  and ~ 0. Therefore, J is
expressed as a function of s and 0. Moreover, (5.13) satises J(sI(
0); 0) = 0 for all
0 in equilibrium. These suggest that the rst-order condition, i.e, J(s(0); 0) = 0,
constitutes an implicit function that uniquely denes the inverse of a strictly increasing
function sI(
0). Therefore, using (5.13), we can estimate 0 from the observed score s.
The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 5. Let G(s1; : : : ; sn) be the joint distribution of (s1; : : : ; sn) with sup-
port [s; s]. Then, there exists a distribution of bidders' private signal F () such that
G(s1; : : : ; sn) is the distribution of the equilibrium scores in a FS auction with symmet-
ric, risk-neutral bidders if
1. G(s1; : : : ; sn) = 
n
i=1G(si).
2. The scoring rule and the true cost function satisfy Assumption 2 and 3.
Moreover, the following implicit function,
J(si;t; 
0
i;t) 
u(si;t; 
0
i;t)
us(si;t; 0i;t)
  1
n  1
1 G(si;t)
g(si;t)
= 0;
uniquely denes a strictly increasing and dierentiable function that coincides with the
inverse bidding strategy s 1(si;t) = 0i;t
Proof. See 5.A.
141
Two observations are made here. First, if we dene
k(sI(
0); 0)  sI(0)  u(s; 0)=us(s; 0);
the rst-order condition (5.13) explicitly gives k:
k(sI(
0); 0) = sI(
0)  1 G(sI(
0))
(n  1)g(sI(0)) :
As discussed in Hanazono et al. (2013), k is known as the bidder's pseudotype (Asker and
Cantillon (2008)) if the scoring rule is QL and the reservation price is nonbinding.7 In a
nonquasilinear scoring rule, however, estimating k may not be sucient for obtaining the
parameter 0; if the second partial derivative of u() with respect to s is strictly negative,
i.e., uss < 0, then k(sI(
0); 0) may not be strictly increasing in 0 in equilibrium.8 In
other words, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is characterized in a FS auction with an
independent scoring rule regardless of whether the equilibrium s is strictly increasing in
the equilibrium k(). Therefore, no one-to-one mapping is guaranteed from the estimated
k to the private signal 0 in the scoring auction model.
Second, although function J(s; ) includes an unknown parameter  0, obtaining the
functional form of J() only requires the values of G(s) and g(s), Assumption 2 allows us
to obtain J() explicitly. In practice, we can set  0 to be any arbitrary vector in  0,
e.g.,  0 =  0 to obtain the functional form of J . A unique inverse function s 1() is
implied by the implicit function J(s; 0) = 0, regardless of the value of  0. Thus, given
Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, using J() = 0 is a general procedure for estimating
0 from scoring auction data.
The nonparametric estimation of the distribution of  is given as follows. Because
s is observable, the cumulative distribution function, G(s), and its density, g(s), can be
7The pseudotype is also discussed in Che (1993) as productive potential as generalized cost.
8See Hanazono et al. (2013) for an example of the nonmonotonic k().
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estimated by the standard kernel estimator. Let T be the number of scoring auction
samples, each indexed by t = 1; : : : ; T . Auction-specic heterogeneities, such as the
number of bidders, project location, time, and the maximum quality level, are controlled;
let nt and xt denote the number of bidders and the covariates of auction t, respectively.
Let g(s; n;x) denote the joint density function of s, n, and x. Then, the kernel estimator
for G(s; n;x) :=
R s
 1 g(v; n;x)dv is provided by
G^(s; n;x) =
1
ThGnh
d
Gx
TX
t=1
1
n
nX
i=1
1(si;t  s)KG
 n  nt
hGn
;
x1   x1;t
hGx
;    ; xd   xd;t
hGx

;
(5.14)
where 1() is an indicator function, KG is a kernel with a bounded support, and hGn
and hGx are bandwidths. Similarly, the kernel density estimator for g(s; n;x) is given
by
g^(s; n;x) =
1
Thshgnh
d
gx
TX
t=1
1
n
nX
i=1
Kg
 s  st
hs
;
n  nt
hgn
;
x1   x1;t
hgx
;    ; xd   xd;t
hgx

; (5.15)
where Kg is a kernel with a bounded support and hs, hgn , and hgx are bandwidths. In
practice, the discrete variables, such as the number of bidders and the maximum quality
level, are smoothed out in the way discussed in Li and Racine (2006).
The estimation for F (;x) :=
R 0
 1   
R L 1
 1 f( ;x)d
0    dL 1 is given by the stan-
dard kernel method:
F^ (;x) =
1
ThdFx
TX
t=1
1(0  0i;t; : : : ; L 1  L 1i;t )KF
 x1   x1;t
hFx
;    ; xd   xd;t
hFx

;
where KF is a kernel with bounded support and hFx is a bandwidth. Similarly, the
kernel density estimator for the joint density function of  and the covariate vector x is
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given by
f^(;x) =
1
Thf   hfLhdfx
TX
t=1
Kf
 0   0i;t
hf0
; : : : ;
L 1   L 1i;t
hfL
;
x1   x1;t
hfx
;    ; xd   xd;t
hfx

where Kf is a kernel with bounded support, and hf0 , hf1 , and hfx are bandwidths. The
property of the estimator f^(;x) is examined in Guerre et al. (2000).
5.3.4 Simulation Experiments
To illustrate our identication procedure, we conduct a numerical simulation. Our Monte
Carlo study consists of R = 500 replications with T = 500 auctions in each replication
and two bidders in each auction. The cost function is specied as
C(qj) = (1 + 1)
"
q
1 + 1
  1
2
+ 0
#
:
Signal  is independently and identically distributed with the marginal distributions of
0 and 1) being Uniform (U(0; 1)) and Beta (B(3; 2)), respectively, for each replication
r = 1, 2, ..., 500. Given the specication, the equilibrium bidding function is explicitly
obtained as 9
sI(
0) =  2 +
p
20 + 6;
q(sI(
0);) = (1 + 1)

sI(
0)
2
+ 1

:
Substituting the random samples  into these equilibrium strategies, we generate a
ve hundred pairs of sample bids sI(
0). Then, using our estimation procedure, the
private signal  is recovered. We follow Guerre et al. (2000) for the nonparametric
estimation: the use of the triweight kernel and the selection of the bandwidth. The
recovered distributions of 0 and 1 are given in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. The
9See 5.B for the derivation of the equilibrium strategy.
144
results imply that our nonparametric estimation method can identify the private signals
from bid data.
Figure 5.2: Estimated CDF of 0 [Uniform(0,1)]
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Figure 5.3: Estimated CDF of 1 [Beta(3, 2)]
5.4 Empirical Experiments
5.4.1 Data
The data used in our analysis contain the bid results of the procurement auctions for
civil engineering projects from April 2010 through January 2013 by the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation (MLIT) in Japan. The number of contracts
awarded during this period was 7,538. The bid results are posted on the Public Works
Procurement Information Service (PPI) website.10 The information available from PPI
includes project names, project types, dates of auctions, engineers' estimates, scoring
10The address is http//www.ppi.go.jp.
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auctions or not, and submitted bids with the bidder's identity. MLIT procures 21 types of
construction work including civil engineering (or heavy and general construction work),
buildings, bridges, paving, dredging, and painting. The civil engineering projects cost
approximately 750 billion yen a year, which accounts for approximately 54 percent of the
entire expenditure of the ministry, as well as for approximately 7 percent of the public
construction investment in the country. Most of the procurement contracts for the civil
engineering projects (7,489 out of 7,538) are allocated through scoring auctions. The
data on price-only auctions have been removed from our samples.
Percentage Bids
In the scoring auctions held by the MLIT, the bidder with the highest-score wins the
project. The scoring bid is calculated as the factor bid divided by the price bid. The
factor bid consists of multiple components, such as noise level, completion time, and
bidder experience.
The data set records each bidder's quality bid, Q, as a number. The lower bound
of the factor bids is 100 for all auctions, and the upper bound is 110 to 200, depending
on the auction. In practice, each bidder submits a technical proposal that is converted
into the factor bid according to the publicly announced tender notice for the auction.
The bidder proposing nothing has a factor bid equal to 100. The method of converting
a technical proposal into a factor bid diers for each project. For instance, each one
decibel reduction in noise accounts for ve additional factor bid points.
We incorporate the scoring auction data into the model. Let Bi and Qi be the values
of the price and factor bids, respectively. Let Si be bidder i's score. Under the price{
factor (quality) ratio scoring rule, Si = Bi=Qi. To control for project size heterogeneity,
we introduce the percentage score; let B and Q be the engineer's estimated cost and the
factor bid evaluating nothing (the lowest possible factor bid), respectively. Then, a base
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score, S, is dened such that S  B=Q. Then, bidder i's percentage score is dened as
si =
Si
S
; (5.16)
where the bidder with the lowest percentage score wins.
Let T denote the number of procurement contracts to be auctioned o by the buyer.
Furthermore, let S(1);t, St, and Bt be the winning bidder's score, the base score, and
the engineer's estimated cost in auction t = 1; : : : ; T , respectively. Our model assumes
that the scoring rule represents the procurement buyer's utility. Thus, a higher value-
for-money contract (Q/B is higher) implies a contract with a lower quality-adjusted
cost (B/Q is lower). The winning score is the quality-adjusted procurement cost. The
eective procurement cost of purchasing T contracts is, thus, given by
PT
t=1 S(1);t: In
our data, Q is normalized to be 100 for all T projects. Hence, the average percentage of
the winning score is given by
1
T
TX
t=1
s(1);t; (5.17)
where s(1);t = S(1);t= St. In what follows, this value is considered to be the eective
procurement cost.
Covariates
The sample auction data involve signicant heterogeneity, such as in the number of
bidders, the project size, and the maximum quality level. The percentage score somehow
mitigates the project size heterogeneity but not perfectly. Therefore, we introduce a
covariate vector x to control for the auction-specic eects. In our analysis, the covariates
include the maximum quality level, the auction date, and the log of the engineer's
estimated costs (as a proxy of project sizes).
148
5.4.2 Specications under the PQR Scoring Rule with a Parametric
Cost Function
Estimation of 
Let us assume that the cost function we estimate is parameterized with the following
two-dimensional signal  = (0; 1) as
C(qj) = 1
 q
1
  

+ 0

; (5.18)
with q = 1. We x  = 1 but set  as being equal to either 2, 3, or 4, i.e., the cost
function being quadratic, cubic, or quartic polynomials, to see the robustness of our
empirical examinations against the variations of the cost function specication.
Given these cost functions, 0 and 1 remain representing the eciency and scale
parameters, respectively; the lower 0 is, the lower the bidder's cost is given all other
things are constant, whereas the higher 1 is, the greater the bidder's quality provision
level is at the break-even (zero prot) score, even if the value of the break-even score is
constant. Consequently, the marginal cost is monotonic in 1. With the PQR scoring
rule, the separability of the  dimension is achieved as long as cost functions with an
identical 0 are homothetic with each other. All three parametric cost functions are
homothetic.
The estimated implicit function that provides the inverse bidding function is given
by
J(s; 0) = s  
1
q(s; 0; 1)
"
q(s; 0; 1)
1
  

+ 0
#
  1 G(s)
(n  1)g(s):
Here, q(s; 0; 1) is the solution of argmaxq P (si;t; q)   C(qj0; 1), which is explicitly
obtained by
q(s; 1) = 1
"
s

 1
 1
+ 
#
:
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This equation is also used for estimating 1, with the fact that the observation, qi;t, must
satisfy q(si;t; i;t) = qi;t. Therefore, with the observations qi;t and si;t and the estimated
distribution and density G^ and g^, we have
^0i;t =
"
si;t   1  G^(si;t)
(n  1)g^(si;t)
#

"
si;t

 1
 1
+ 
#
 

si;t

 
 1
;
^1i;t =
qi;t
si;t

 1
 1
+ 
:
For estimating G^ and g^, the following triweight kernel is used:
K(u) =
35
32
(1  u2)31(juj < 1):
As usual, the bandwidths hs and hx are given by the so-called rule of thumb; hs =
s(
Pm
k=1 nk)
 1=6 and hx = x(
Pm
k=1 nk)
 1=6, where s = 2:978  1:06^s and x =
2:978  1:06^x, respectively. Both ^s and ^x are sample variances of the normalized
scoring bids and the observed covariate, respectively.
From the pseudo-values of 0, we compute the quality-adjusted costs, k^i;t = si;t  
u(si;t; ^)=us(si;t; ^). Corollary 1 in Hanazono et al. (2013) suggests that, under an IPV
environment, the expectation of the lowest scoring bid will coincide with the expectation
of the second-lowest bidder's k. The average of the obtained 6,088 pseudo-values of the
second-lowest bidders' k^i;t is 0.583358. The average of the winning bidders' scores is
0.583358. Therefore, our estimation result is in line with the theoretical prediction.
The following gures are the estimated joint density functions assuming that the
cost function is the quadratic polynomial ( = 2). Axes x (horizontal) and y (depth)
represent 0 and 1, respectively. Recall that we parameterize the cost function so
that the cost function shifts up vertically as the eciency parameter 0 rises. Given
this specication, a strong negative correlation is observed between 0 and 1 (R2 =
 0:8657), suggesting that more (less) ecient supplies tend to be larger (smaller).
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Figure 5.4: Estimated PDF (3D)
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Figure 5.5: Estimated PDF (Pseudo Color)
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Rationalizability
The scoring auction model imposes an additional restriction on the observations such
that Js(si;t; i;t) > 0. In this subsection, we show that the restriction is a necessary
condition for the scoring auction data to be rationalizable. Because Js contains the
latent variable 0, the restriction is not directly obtained from the observations and their
distributions. Furthermore, our observations include covariates, which also prevents us
from obtaining the restriction explicitly from the data. Therefore, we choose to check
whether the estimated i;ts are indeed strictly increasing in si;t in each auction.
We have 6,115 auction samples from which s have been eectively obtained. Of
these, 22 auctions, accounting just for 0.36 % of all auction samples, exhibit nonmono-
tonic ^0 with respect to s. Except for one auction, the nonmonotonicity is observed in
a pair of bidders in which one bid a lower score but the bidder's 0 is estimated to be
higher than that of the other. The observed scores that result in the nonmonotonic 0
are relatively close to the lower bound of the observed scores. Therefore, it is hard to
conclude that the nonmonotonicity occurs simply because the auction samples are not
rationalizable or because the non-parametric estimation suers from biases close to the
boundary.
On the other hand, the rest of the auction samples exhibit a strict monotonicity
between the observed scores and the estimated 0. Hence, we conclude that our scoring
auction data is rationalizable from the scoring auction model with symmetric risk-neutral
bidders.
5.4.3 Counterfactual Analyses
Second-Price vs. FS Auctions
We rst examine the welfare eect by using scoring auctions for government procurement.
As Milgrom (2004) addressed, one of the appeals of multi-parameter auctions is that
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bidders increase prots without reducing the auctioneer's utility. Our rst empirical
examination thus focuses on measuring how much the use of scoring auctions raises the
procurement buyer's utility U(p; q), which is assumed to be represented by the observed
PQR scoring rule, S(p; q), namely U(p; q) = p=q.
We design a series of second-price auctions, in each of which the quality level is
xed at q = 1, 1:3, 1:4, 1:5, and 1:6, where q = 1 is the minimum quality level the
bidder can propose in the observed scoring auctions, representing no quality improve-
ment. Given the estimated bidder's private information, bidders' costs are computed
for all q = 1:0; : : : ; 1:6, and the second-lowest costs are collected for all auction samples
as the contract prices of the counterfactual second-price auctions. In a counterfactual
second-price auction, the price quality ratio, p=q, no longer represent a score. Therefore,
we denote by  U(p; q) = p=q the procurement buyer's quality-adjusted procurement
cost. The buyer's quality-adjusted procurement cost for each contract is measured by
the second-lowest cost divided by q, where q = 1:0; : : : ; 1:6. Because the bidder's cost
functions are dierentiated by  = 2, 3, and 4, 15 types of counterfactual second-price
auctions are created.
Table 5.1 compares the procurement buyer's quality-adjusted procurement costs in
the observed FS auction versus those in cases where price-only auctions take place in-
stead. The extent of the government's expected welfare gain from the scoring auction
crucially depends on the xed quality level of the counterpart second-price auction. The
government utilities would drop quite trivially (approximately 1 to 2 percent) if a second-
price auction with q = 1:5 were to be used while the drops would be nontrivial (greater
than 30 percent) if a second-price auction with q = 1:0 were to be used. This suggests
that a simple low-price auction works well if the design (a xed quality standard) is
appropriate.
The bidder's payo also varies, depending on the quality standard in the price-only
auction. Table 5.2 reports the winning bidders' payos. Bidders earn signicantly lower
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payos upon winning in a rst-price auction if the quality standard is less than 1.4.
On the other hand, bidders earn larger payos in a price-only auction if the quality
standard is greater than 1.5. The positive relationship between a larger payo and a
higher quality standard in a price-only auction stems from the fact that bidders with
larger 1 are selected in price-only auctions with higher quality standards.
Although a price-only auction for a contract with an appropriate quality level still
performs worse than does an observed PQR FS auction, the dierence is not remarkably
large. In addition, the bid preparation costs for a scoring auction may be greater than
those for a simple price-only auction, which discourages potential bidders' entry into a
scoring auction. Furthermore, the bid evaluation, with respect to quality proposals, is
costly for a procurement buyer who is unfamiliar with the process. Taking into account
these disadvantages in using a scoring auction, a price-only low-bid auction has still
been a good mechanism to allocate the government contract if the quality standard of
the contract is appropriate (in our case, q = 1:5).
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Form C(qj) q Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change3
FS1 - 6,063 0.5800 0.0680 0.2623 0.9945 -
1.0 6,043 0.7638 0.0600 0.2907 1.1245 31.68%
1.3 6,050 0.6097 0.0593 0.2401 1.0266 5.124%
Quadratic 1.4 6,049 0.5909 0.0644 0.2488 1.0746 1.877%
1.5 6,049 0.5857 0.0709 0.2680 1.1345 0.975%
1.6 6,049 0.5917 0.0783 0.2825 1.2061 2.014%
1.0 6,045 0.7758 0.0638 0.2998 1.1770 33.76%
1.3 6,047 0.6160 0.0598 0.2460 1.0800 6.200%
SP2 Cubic 1.4 6,049 0.5941 0.0659 0.2502 1.2068 2.435%
1.5 6,049 0.5885 0.0767 0.2682 1.3779 1.466%
1.6 6,048 0.5995 0.0923 0.2825 1.5932 3.354%
1.0 6,045 0.7906 0.0655 0.3132 1.2092 36.31%
1.3 6,047 0.6224 0.0600 0.2514 1.1592 7.313%
Quartic 1.4 6,048 0.5975 0.0686 0.2515 1.4016 3.021%
1.5 6,049 0.5918 0.0866 0.2684 1.7635 2.036%
1.6 6,040 0.6077 0.1075 0.2825 1.8473 4.777%
1 Observed FS auctions. 2 Counterfactual second-price auctions. 3 Change in mean from FS
to SP auction.  Sample auctions with the number of bidders equal to or greater than 2; In FS
auctions, prots are less than 1 and normalized bids are less than 150% of reservation prices; In
simulated SP auctions, prots are less than 1 and price bids are less than 250% of reservation
prices.
Table 5.1: Quality-adjusted procurement costs
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Form C(qj) q Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change3
FS1 - 6,034 0.0640 0.0750 0.0018 0.7103 -
1.0 6,027 0.0376 0.0601 0.0000 0.7684 -41.20%
1.3 6,034 0.0506 0.0726 0.0000 0.8279 -20.92%
Quadratic 1.4 6,034 0.0568 0.0787 0.0000 0.8512 -11.26%
1.5 6,034 0.0635 0.0861 0.0000 0.8761 -0.80%
1.6 6,034 0.0707 0.0949 0.0000 0.9029 10.40%
1.0 6,032 0.0445 0.0657 0.0000 0.8108 -30.69%
1.3 6,033 0.0511 0.0733 0.0000 0.8290 -20.22%
SP2 Cubic 1.4 6,034 0.0570 0.0816 0.0000 0.8483 -10.99%
1.5 6,032 0.0649 0.0933 0.0000 0.9875 1.34%
1.6 6,020 0.0736 0.1017 0.0000 0.9954 14.96%
1.0 6,032 0.0448 0.0661 0.0000 0.8155 -30.02%
1.3 6,033 0.0507 0.0740 0.0000 0.8278 -20.78%
Quartic 1.4 6,034 0.0571 0.0864 0.0000 0.9976 -10.83%
1.5 6,018 0.0643 0.0924 0.0000 0.9772 0.54%
1.6 5,996 0.0747 0.0976 0.0000 0.9996 16.75%
1 Observed FS auctions. 2 Counterfactual second-price auctions. 3 Change in mean from FS
to SP auction.  Sample auctions with the number of bidders equal to or greater than 2; In FS
auctions, prots are less than 1 and normalized bids are less than 150% of reservation prices; In
simulated SP auctions, prots are less than 1 and price bids are less than 250% of reservation
prices.
Table 5.2: Bidders' payos
SS vs. FS Auctions
Next, the extent to which the expected scores would be changed by introducing SS
auctions is estimated. Given the parametric cost function, the bidder's induced utility
function u(s; ) is convex in s for any  > 1 if the scoring rule is PQR, as the second
derivative of u is given by
uss(s; ) = 
1 1
   1

s

  2
 1
> 0 with   2: (5.19)
157
Therefore, the expected exercised score will be lower in SS than FS auctions as suggested
by Theorem 3 in Hanazono et al. (2013). In this subsection, we conduct a counterfactual
analysis to empirically measure the dierence between FS and SS auctions regarding
expected exercised scores (the buyer's welfare), bidders' payos, and quality levels.
The counterfactual samples related to the SS auction is created from the estimated
parameters, ^i;t. First, the pseudo-samples of the rst-best quality q
FB() is created
from (5.8), which is given by
 
qFB
1i;t
  
!
+ 0i;t =
qFB
1i;t
 
 
qFB
1i;t
  
! 1
;
under the specic cost function. Thus, the rst-best quality of bidder i in auction t is
created as
q^FB(^i;t) 
n
q : (1  )ri;t(q)  r 1i;t (q) + ^0i;t = 0
o
; (5.20)
where ri;t(q) = q=^
1
i;t   . Next, the counterfactual samples of the bidder's break-even
score is created. From (5.7), the rst-best quality, and the observed data, the break-even
score of the bidder whose type is equal to i;t is predicted as
k (^0i;t) =
^1i;t
q^FBi;t
24 q^FBi;t
^1i;t
  
!
+ ^0i;t
35 ; (5.21)
under the PQR scoring rule.
The awarded bidder's quality choice in the SS auction is also estimated. Let ^(i);t
be the signal of the bidder whose score is the ith lowest in auction t. In SS auctions,
the exercised score is the second-lowest bidder's break-even score k (0(2)). Thus, the
winning bidder chooses the optimal quality level q(k (^0(2);t); ^(1);t): Let q^
II
t denote the
quality level. The rst-order condition of the bidder's quality choice given s suggests
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Cq(q^
II
t j^(1);t) = k^ (0(2);t), which is expressed as
qIIt = ^
1
(1);t 
24 k (^0(2);t)

! 1
 1
+ 
35 ; (5.22)
given our parametric cost functions. Thus, the awarded bidder's payo, u(k^ (0(2);t);(1);t),
is given by
u(k (^0(2);t); ^(1);t) = q^
II
t
h
k (^0(2);t)  k(q^IIt ;(1);t)
i
: (5.23)
In a SS auction, the score in the nal contract equals the break-even score of the
lowest losing bidder, denoted by k (0(2);t). The data on k
 (0(2);t) is shown in Table 5.3.
The expected score declines approximately by .04 percent (when  = 2) and .02 percents
(when  = 4) if the auction format alters from FS to SS mechanisms. The variances are
greater than that in the FS auction similar to the dierence in the variance of rst- and
second-price auctions. Table 5.4 shows that the quality level nalized in the contract is,
on average, declined approximately by 3 to 4 percents if SS auctions are used.
C(qj) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change
FS1 - 6,004 0.5803 0.0495 0.4624 0.9142 -
Quadratic 6,004 0.5801 0.0680 0.2399 0.9945 -0.0417%
SS2 Cubic 6,004 0.5801 0.0679 0.2458 0.9945 -0.0288%
Quartic 6,005 0.5802 0.0679 0.2497 0.9945 -0.0257%
1 Observed FS auctions (PQR). 2 Hypothetical SS auctions with the PQR rule.  Sample
auctions with the number of bidders equal to or greater than 2; In FS auctions, prots are less
than 1 and normalized bids are less than 150% of reservation prices; In simulated SP auctions,
prots are less than 1 and price bids are less than 250% of reservation prices.
Table 5.3: Exercised scores (quality adjusted procurement cost) in FS and SS auctions
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Form C(qj) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change
FS1 - 6,004 1.5391 0.0968 1.3100 1.9000 -
Quadratic 6,004 1.5389 0.1002 1.2968 1.9078 -0.012%
SS2 Cubic 6,004 1.5387 0.0986 1.3170 1.8988 -0.028%
Quartic 6,005 1.5388 0.0980 1.3177 1.8985 -0.024%
1 Observed FS auctions (PQR). 2 Hypothetical SS auctions with the PQR rule.  Sample
auctions with the number of bidders equal to or greater than 2; In FS auctions, prots are less
than 1 and normalized bids are less than 150% of reservation prices; In simulated SP auctions,
prots are less than 1 and price bids are less than 250% of reservation prices.
Table 5.4: Contracted quality level in FS and SS auctions
Form  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change
FS1 - 6,004 0.0637 0.0749 0.0018 0.7103 -
Quadratic 6,004 0.0638 0.0820 0.0002 0.8863 0.255%
SS2 Cubic 6,004 0.0638 0.0818 0.0002 0.8851 0.194%
Quartic 6,005 0.0638 0.0817 0.0002 0.8845 0.151%
1 Observed FS auctions (PQR). 2 Hypothetical SS auctions with the PQR rule.  Sample
auctions with the number of bidders equal to or greater than 2; In FS auctions, prots are less
than 1 and normalized bids are less than 150% of reservation prices; In simulated SP auctions,
prots are less than 1 and price bids are less than 250% of reservation prices.
Table 5.5: Bidder's payos in FS and SS auctions
QL vs. PQR Rules
Finally, we explore a QL scoring rule that dominates the current PQR scoring rule.
Specically, we suppose that the buyer uses a QL scoring rule that diers from the
buyer's true preference  U(p; q) = p=q. To construct a well-performing QL rule, we
relax the assumption that the quality price in the QL rule (the derivative of the score
function with respect to q) is one such that, for some  > 0,
S(p; q) = p  ()q: (5.24)
The lower utility caused by the use of a FS auction under PQR lies in over-provision
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in quality. In SS auctions, that upward distortion in quality provision is not observed.
Therefore, a candidate of a QL rule that dominates the current PQR FS auction is such
that the average of the winning bidders' rst-best quality is equivalent to the average of
the quality level to be chosen in a SS auction. We thus choose the following three values
of the quality price: (2) = 0:6502278, (3) = 0:6493106, and (4) = 0:6477461, each
equal to the average of the exercised score in the counterfactual SS auction at  = 2, 3,
and 4, respectively. Given (), we predict the expected value of the wining score in SS
auctions with the QL rule.
Under the QL rule, the bidder's quality-adjusted cost is given by k(q;) = C(qj) 
()q, and the rst-best quality qFB() satises Cq(q
FB()j) = (). Given the para-
metric cost function, the marginal cost is given by Cq(qj) = 
 
q=1    1. Therefore,
qFB() is given by
qFBQL(^) = ^
1 
 
+

()

 1
 1
!
: (5.25)
Using qFBQL() and the estimated , we compute the bidder's break-even score, k
 (^0),
under QL rules. With our parameterized cost function, this is expressed as
k (^0)  ^1 
24 qFBQL(^)
^1
  
!
+ ^0
35  qFBQL(^): (5.26)
Because bidders are symmetric, the bidder with the lowest k(qFBQL(^); ^) is the awarder,
receiving the payment PQL = C(q
FB
QL(^(1))j^(2)) in the SS auction with the QL scoring
rule. Thus, both the contract price and the quality level are given by PQL and q
FB
QL(^(1)).
The buyer's utility is thus computed by
sQL = p^QL=q
FB
QL(^(1)):
Table 5.6 reports the buyer's utility sQL in counterfactual SS auctions with QL rules.
In all cases, sQLs drop on average approximately by 5 to 15 percent. The greater variances
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in SS auctions due to the non-negative variance of the conditional second-order statistic
can be remedied by the use of FS auctions. Table 5.7 shows the bidder's prot. The
bidder's prot drops by 1 to 12 percent. Hence, the use of an appropriate QL rule
extracts more rents from bidders.
Form  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change
FS1 - 6,004 0.5803 0.0495 0.4624 0.9142 -
Quadratic 5,995 0.5786 0.0654 0.2650 0.9457 -0.295%
SS2 Cubic 5,996 0.5786 0.0655 0.2653 0.9424 -0.286%
Quartic 5,997 0.5786 0.0654 0.2655 0.9447 -0.288%
1 Observed FS auctions (PQR). 2 Hypothetical SS auctions with the QL rule.  Sample
auctions with the number of bidders equal to or greater than 2; In FS auctions, prots are less
than 1 and normalized bids are less than 150% of reservation prices; In simulated SP auctions,
prots are less than 1 and price bids are less than 250% of reservation prices.
Table 5.6: Exercised scores (quality adjusted procurement cost) under simulated QL
rules
Form  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change
FS1 - 6,004 0.0637 0.0749 0.0018 0.7103 -
Quadratic 5,971 0.0610 0.0763 0.0000 0.8693 -4.232%
SS2 Cubic 5,972 0.0614 0.0768 0.0000 0.8707 -3.659%
Quartic 5,972 0.0615 0.0770 0.0000 0.8714 -3.386%
1 Observed FS auctions (PQR). 2 Hypothetical SS auctions with the QL rule.  Sample
auctions with the number of bidders equal to or greater than 2; In FS auctions, prots are less
than 1 and normalized bids are less than 150% of reservation prices; In simulated SP auctions,
prots are less than 1 and price bids are less than 250% of reservation prices.
Table 5.7: Payos under simulated QL rules
The additional rent extraction by the QL scoring rule stems from the downward
distortion of the quality provision. Table 5.8 presents the contracted quality level in the
observed FS auction and simulated QL scoring auctions. The quality levels would be
sharply declined under the well-designed QL scoring rule. Although the well-designed
QL scoring rule is not optimal, the lower contracted quality levels by the QL scoring rule
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limits the winner's informational rent, resulting in the greater welfare of the procurement
buyer.
Form  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change
FS1 - 6,034 1.5388 0.0968 1.3100 1.9000 -
Quadratic 6,009 1.5135 0.1051 0.8414 1.8892 -1.648%
QL2 Cubic 6,010 1.5209 0.1035 0.7695 1.8920 -1.163%
Quartic 6,010 1.5249 0.1030 0.7334 1.8938 -0.907%
1 Observed FS auctions (PQR). 2 Hypothetical SS auctions with the QL rule.  Sample
auctions with the number of bidders equal to or greater than 2; In FS auctions, prots are less
than 1 and normalized bids are less than 150% of reservation prices; In simulated SP auctions,
prots are less than 1 and price bids are less than 250% of reservation prices.
Table 5.8: Contracted quality levels in FS and QL scoring auctions
Summary of Empirical Experiments
Our counterfactual analyses suggest that FS auctions perform poor under PQR scoring
rules. However, it does not mean that FS auctions never benet procurement buyers
whose preference is based on PQR. The performance of a price-only auction strongly
depends on the choice of the xed quality level. In many occasions, auctioneers have
limited information regarding bidders' cost structures. Thus, only experienced buyers
can choose the quality level that renders a higher expected utility to the buyer in a
price-only auction than in a FS auction. For inexperienced buyers, the use of a FS
auction is the best option even if their true preference is based on PQR. The same is
true for QL scoring rules. We observed that, when a FS auction is used, a QL scoring
rule may dominate the PQR rule in terms of the expected contracted score. However,
for the procurement buyer with PQR preference, designing a well-performing QL scoring
function, in particular, choosing the best quality price in a QL scoring function, requires
accurate information on the bidders' cost structures. Less informed buyers with PQR
preference will thus benet from the use of his/her true preference as a scoring function
since the quality price is determined in the market under a PQR scoring rule.
163
In scoring auctions, bidders' advantages in non-monetary attributes are evaluated.
Therefore, the procurement buyer may obtain a better contract without reducing the
bidder's prot. However, this is just an advantage of scoring auctions. Rather, the
advantage of the use of scoring auction is in that even an inexperienced buyer can pursue
the best value in procurement since he does not need to specify the quality level. If an
inexperienced buyer is not familiar with bidders' advantages in non-monetary attributes
rather than in costs, the scoring function selects the winner who provides the most
value-for-money contract.
We found that bidders' earnings are greater in the FS auction than in the SS auction
with the PQR scoring rule or than in the FS auction with the well-designed QL scoring
rule. This result suggests that a major advantage of the currently adopted FS auction
format lies in the promotion of bidder participation. The intensied competition by a FS
auction will lower the quality-adjusted procurement cost even if the procurement buyer
has limited information on bidders' cost structures. An interesting extension will be to
take into account potential bidders' endogenous participation in the structural model.
5.5 Conclusion
In this research, we provided a structural estimation method for a scoring auction with
generalized scoring rule. From the scoring auction data that typically include scores
and quality bids, latent parameters in the bidder's cost function was estimated. From
observed quality levels, the bidder's marginal costs are estimated through the bidder's
prot maximization behavior such that the marginal cost equals the quality price. Bid-
ders' costs were estimated through the rst-order condition by the application of the
non-parametric estimation methodology for the rst-price auction model. It is obvious
that the number of parameters capable to be identied is equal to or less than the num-
ber of dimensions of the observed data. Thus, for instance, the degree of concavity of
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the cost function is the one that is unable to be identied. We thus conducted a series
of empirical experiments in which the parameters of the cost function vary to ensure the
robustness of estimation results.
We also showed an simulation experiment to illustrate that our structural estimation
method does identify the latent distribution of the bidder's signal. The recovered density
and cumulative distribution functions were coincident with the true density and distri-
bution functions except in the areas of boundaries. Therefore, our estimation method
eectively identies the bidder's multi-dimensional signal.
Furthermore, we applied our estimation technique to real world scoring auction data.
Theory has suggested that the non-equivalence in the expected winning scores stems from
the overproduction in quality in a FS auction with the PQR scoring rule. Accordingly,
we observed that the expectation of the winner's quality provision is larger in FS than
in SS auctions. Furthermore, with a well-designed QL scoring rule, we found that the
procurement buyer improves utility while bidders earn lower payos. Generally, the
optimal design problem is hard to be solved if the bid and signal are multi-dimensional.
Therefore, our counterfactual analysis uses a standard FS or SS auction with a well-
designed QL scoring rule as a suboptimal mechanism. Nevertheless, a avor of the
optimal design problem has been seen in our empirical result, the quality provision is
distorted downward (allocative ineciency) and the bidder's informational rents are
limited.
In this article, we restrict attention to the independent scoring rule, in which the
bidder's score depends only on his or her price and quality bids. In the real-world
procurement auctions, however, a wider-variety of scoring rules are used including the
one in which the bidder's score depends also on the other bidders' price and quality bids
(an interdependent scoring rule). Literature suggests that an interdependent scoring rule
involves some ineciency when bidders choose optimal quality levels since the realized
exercised score generally diers from the score predicted by the bidder when choosing the
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quality bid. As a result, the expected exercised score (the procurement buyer's utility)
is greater (smaller) than the scoring auction with an independent scoring rule. Albano
et al. (2009) suggests that the welfare loss of the procurement buyer is approximately 11
%. Theoretical literature, on the other hand, has so far been silent on the equilibrium
in the scoring auction with such an interdependent scoring rule. An interesting future
research may lie in the structural analysis of the scoring auction with an interdependent
scoring rule. A counterfactual analysis would quantify the expected score dierence
between the FS and SS auctions with an interdependent scoring rule.
5.A Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Assumption 3 (log-supermodularity) suggests that
@
@0
us
u
> 0;
for all 0. Therefore,
@
@0
u
us
= J0 < 0:
Assumption 3 also suggests the existence of a strictly increasing equilibrium strategy
sI() for all 
0 2 [0; 0]. Therefore, for an arbitrary ~0 2 [0; 0] and a strictly increasing
equilibrium strategy sI(), we have
J(sI(~
0); 0)  u(sI(
~0); 0)
us(sI(~0); 0)
  1
n  1
1 G(sI(~0))
g(sI(~0))
:
Therefore, for all 0, we have
J(sI(~
0); 0) Q 0 if ~0 Q 0:
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Because sI() must be strictly increasing, we have
J(s; 0) Q 0 if s Q sI(0);
for all 0 in a neighborhood of (0; sI(
0)). Hence,
Js(s; 
0) > 0:
at s = sI(
0).
Applying the implicit function theorem indicates that there are a neighborhood U
of 0 and a unique C1 function ' such that 0 = '(s) and J(s; '(s)) = 0 for all 0 2 U .
The derivative of ' at 0 is
'0(s) =   Js(s; 
0)
J0(s; 
0)
;
which is strictly positive, because Js > 0 and J0 < 0 for all 
0 2 [0; 0]. In addition,
'(s) = 0. Thus, '(s) must be the inverse bidding strategy s 1 if the distribution of the
observed score is rationalizable.
5.B The Equilibrium Strategy in the Simulation Experi-
ment
The optimal quality is given by q(s; ) = (1 + 1)(s=2 + 1). Therefore, we have
u(s;)
us(s;)
=
(sI(
0))2 + 4sI(
0)  40
2sI(0) + 4
:
Given the uniform distribution of 0, the rst-order condition (5.5) is written as
s0(0) =
1
1  0
(sI(
0))2 + 4sI(
0)  40
2sI(0) + 4
:
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Because sI(
0) is strictly increasing in 0 and u(sI(
0);) = 0 at 0 = 1, we obtain
sI(1) = 2
p
2  2 as a boundary condition. Thus, the equilibrium bidding strategy is the
solution of the dierential equation
8>><>>:
s0(0) = 1
1 0
(sI(
0))2+4sI(
0) 40
2sI(0)+4
sI(1) = 2
p
2  2
Solving the dierential equation gives
(1  0) (sI(0))2 + 4sI(0)  2(1 + 0) = 0: (5.27)
Applying the implicit function theorem ensures that (5.27) be the solution of the dif-
ferential equation. Taking (5.27) as a quadratic equation, we obtain the equilibrium
bidding function explicitly as
sI(
0) =  2 +
p
20 + 6:
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